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Abstract 
 
 
The hypothesis at the heart of this thesis is that long-term economic growth depends on the 
discovery and development of new ideas and technologies which enable innovation 
resulting in increased productivity.  As technological innovation generally results from 
research processes instigated and performed by those with higher levels of education, it 
becomes important to analyse higher education as an economic actor as well as a symbolic 
institution of cultural and elite reproduction.  The thesis compares the development of 
higher levels of human capital in East and West Germany over the period 1945 – 1990: 
states with two very different and competing myths of democratic legitimacy and radically 
opposed social, political and economic systems but both convinced that human capital 
development held the key to reconstruction and economic growth.  In highlighting the 
imperatives for reform and outlining the main changes which took place in higher 
education within the strictures imposed by competing ideologies, the thesis assesses the 
effectiveness of human capital investment in terms of the success of the economic 
objectives identified by both countries.  The thesis finds that the initial hypothesis is 
proven, albeit that its effectiveness was mitigated by a number of external economic 
shocks and internal social and political factors which, in the end, led to the demise of the 
East German regime. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction and Literature Review  
 
The division of Germany into East and West following WWII provided the perfect crucible 
for a natural experiment in the effectiveness of the different political, social and economic 
systems of the two states.  Here were two countries which shared the same language and 
traditions and were tackling the same challenges of reconstruction, nation building, 
economic recovery and growth, but using methods which were ideologically and 
institutionally fundamentally opposed.  There was, however, a strong conviction on both 
sides of the Iron Curtain that one solution lay in raising the level of “human capital”, 
particularly in the areas of science and engineering, in order to stimulate economic growth 
and develop international standing.  The debate surrounding the contribution of education 
to economic growth, however, has always been contentious, not least because of the 
difficulties inherent in trying to reconcile an enormous number of wildly differing, 
country-specific variables such as educational tradition, institutional structure and culture, 
funding methods and levels of state intervention in education policy-formation, all of 
which have a major impact on education policy design and hence on the economic impact 
which can be expected from it.  This study considers the social, political and economic 
imperatives behind the educational policy reforms in the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), as well as the factors which affected 
their implementation and aims to help distinguish the variables, clarify the differences in 
approach and, ultimately, assess their relative effectiveness in terms of improving 
productivity and economic growth and international competitiveness.   
 
Because there is widespread consensus among economists that much of the scientific and 
technological progress which leads to economic growth stems from the advanced 
theoretical knowledge acquired at higher education level, the focus of my thesis is the 
interconnections between higher education, labour markets and economic performance and 
an analysis of the efficacy of specific courses of action practised by East and West.  This 
focus has at its heart the debate on the effectiveness of human capital development as an 
economic tool, and by extension, how changes to the ethos of higher education can affect 
economic growth.  The thesis will also highlight the tensions inherent in balancing social, 
political and economic agendas due to political manoeuvring and the obduracy of 
 11
entrenched socio-economic networks in both states.  In an article for Comparative 
Education, Arthur Hearnden wrote: 
 
Comparative study of East and West Germany will have made a valuable 
contribution if it can demonstrate that policies based on social ideology unrelated 
to objective analysis of their economic implications or conversely on economic 
expediency without taking account of social implications are unfruitful1 
 
It is my hope that this particular study can make a contribution to this debate and, hence, to 
that on the economic development of the two Germanys. 
 
The thesis covers the whole period of the formal division of Germany into two countries 
from 1949 – 1990 because only by considering the period of partition in its entirety can the 
results of the natural experiment be properly assessed.   It is, however, divided into two 
parts: 1949 to ca. 1970 and ca. 1970 – 1990.  The beginning of the 1970s heralded some 
radical and far-reaching changes in the political, social and economic spheres of both 
countries and consequently in their higher education systems.  In the West, 1969 saw the 
advent of the first left-leaning SDP-led ruling coalition since the creation of the FRG, 
bringing with it a change in attitude regarding the function of higher education and a more 
egalitarian approach to accessing it.  In the East, the resignation of Walter Ulbricht as party 
leader in 1971 led to the accession of Erich Honecker, who had a very different vision of 
the development of socialism in the GDR than that of his predecessor.  Both countries’ 
economies were also strongly affected by external factors.  In particular, the West was 
strongly affected by the oil crises of the 1970s, which had economic repercussions well 
into the 1980s.  While the GDR was protected initially by the long-term price agreements 
for oil with Russia and for hard coal with Poland, further agreements negotiated at a much 
higher price significantly impeded its recovery from the effects of the second oil crisis.  
 
The remainder of this introduction reviews the literature pertinent to the thesis, starting 
with a discussion of the literature on human capital development theory and that on the 
linked overeducation debate which developed as the number of students in higher 
education began to increase significantly.  This is followed by a review of the 
historiography of scientific and technical education in the two Germanys and of the 
                                                 
1
 Arthur Hearnden, ‘Inter-German Relations and Educational Policy’ in Comparative Education, Vol.9, No.1, 
1973, p 14 
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relevant literature comparing East and West Germany.  I conclude with a summary of the 
methodology employed and details of the thesis structure. 
 
 
Human Capital Development  
 
Empirically, the contribution of higher levels of education to economic growth is 
particularly hard to prove with many and varied studies by human capital theorists, 
overeducation theorists and economists often proving completely contradictory.  Much 
research into the causes of economic growth was undertaken during the 1950s.  In 
particular, Robert Solow refuted the then common belief that long-term growth would be 
achieved through investment in industry and infrastructure and the move to capital-
intensive automated production.  Reasoning that diminishing returns to capital would 
ultimately result in only a short-term burst of economic growth, he developed an economic 
growth model which argued that growth was determined by inputs of land, labour, capital 
and a fourth factor (the Solow residual) which was identified as innovation and 
technological progress.2  The standard neoclassical theory of economic growth, while 
assuming worldwide technical progress as a given, maintains that economic growth results 
from accumulated stocks of factor inputs.  Thus, as the marginal product of any factor of 
production is subject to the law of diminishing returns, the accumulation of human capital 
would, it is argued, have at best a transitory effect on growth rates.  The technological 
progress theory, in contrast, argues that as in principle all countries have access to the same 
machines and technologies, the difference in its productive use results from a country’s 
available stock of human capital (defined as including the creation of new knowledge in 
the individual and his/her ability to apply it) which brings increasing returns to scale.3   In 
this way investment in human capital can have a permanent effect on the rate of economic 
growth through its ability to facilitate innovation and/or the adoption and implementation 
of new technology which, in turn, increases productivity and economic growth.  A 
secondary benefit is that a well-educated workforce is frequently a catalyst for attracting 
                                                 
2
 See Robert M. Solow, ‘A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth’, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol.70, No.1, 1956, pp 65 – 94; and Robert M. Solow, ‘Technical Change and the Aggregate 
Production Function’, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.3, No.3, 1957, pp 312 – 320 
3
 For a discussion on this see Ludger Wößmann, Schooling and the Quality of Human Capital, (Berlin, 
Springer, 2002), p 34; pp 39 – 47; Gary Becker, Kevin M. Murphy and Robert Tamura, ‘Human Capital, 
Fertility and Economic Growth’ in Gary Becker (ed.), Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis 
with Special Reference to Education, 3rd Ed., (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp 324 – 327  
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foreign investment, both financial and in the form of physical capital.4  Logically, then, the 
new ideas and new technologies crucial to creating and sustaining high growth levels 
depend fundamentally on the development of high levels of human capital.  Studies such as 
Solow’s, and later those of Theodore W. Schulz5 and Gary Becker,6 were instrumental in 
determining policy in post-war nations and encouraging investment in research and 
technology.  More recently, commentators such as Richard Florida have highlighted the 
move towards a ‘knowledge economy’: the emergent significance of constantly increasing 
levels of knowledge to the promotion of innovative behaviour, technological progress, 
entrepreneurship, job creation, economic growth, and the resultant tendency to form 
nexuses in specific geographical areas.7 
 
Even by the 1960s, however, human capital development theory had come increasingly to 
be regarded as too simplistic by some economists.  For example, a number of studies8 
appeared to show that any potential direct causal link would be distorted by a large number 
of factors at firm level, such as the differing age of physical capital employed, different 
management styles, pricing policy and research orientation.  At the macro level, distorting 
factors might include national and supra-national legislation, market idiosyncrasies and 
level of international competition.  Moreover, while it was entirely possible that more 
highly educated personnel would make a disproportionate contribution to output, this 
would be offset financially by their entitlement to higher salaries.9  Thus, the evidence in 
favour of human capital development theory seemed inconclusive.   More recently, though, 
Wößmann’s 1990 study applied a human-capital augmented neoclassical model of growth 
and development to 132 countries across the globe and, in a second study, to the OECD 
countries alone.   These appeared to confirm that human capital development accounted for 
between 45 – 60 percent of the dispersion of levels of economic development in the larger 
study and virtually 100 percent in the more uniformly technically advanced OECD 
                                                 
4
 Clive R. Belfield, Economic Principles for Education: Theory and Evidence, (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 
2000), pp 200 – 201; Gary Becker, Kevin M. Murphy and Robert Tamura, ‘Human Capital, Fertility and 
Economic Growth’, p 307 
5
 Schultz Theodore, The Economic Value of Education, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1963) 
6
 Gary S. Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to 
Education, 1st Ed., (New York, Columbia University Press, 1964) 
7
 Richard Florida, ‘Entrepreneurship, Creativity, and Regional Economic Growth’ in David M. Hart (Ed.), 
The emergence of entrepreneurship policy: governance, start-up and growth in the U.S. knowledge economy, 
(Cambridge and New York, CUP, 2003), pp 39 – 59  
8
 Examples include a 1970 OECD study comparing entire sectors of an economy across 52 countries which 
found no definite proportionate relationship between the level of output per head and years of individual 
education cited in Mark Blaug, The Economics of Education and the Education of an Economist, (Aldershot, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 1987), p 89; and P.R.G. Layard, J.D. Sargan, M.E. Ager and D.J. Jones, Qualified 
Manpower and Economic Performance, (London, Allen Lane, 1971) which analysed a cross-sectional study 
of 68 electrical engineering plants in Britain  
9
 Blaug, The Economics of Education and the Education of an Economist, pp 88 – 91  
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countries.10  This, in turn, resonates with the findings of other commentators who argue 
that, based on empirical statistics, countries with a higher average number of years of 
education across the labour force had faster levels of economic growth; that countries with 
a faster growing general qualifications level grew faster; and that education was a more 
immediate and effective way to raise economic growth than inputs of labour and capital 
which may be inelastic in the short run.11   
 
The logic that better education can and does raise the efficiency of the labour force within 
certain parameters, such as the need for constant skills updating in an age of rapid 
technological change, is very attractive.  Moreover, education can improve the capacity of 
the labour force to adopt new technology and, in some cases, will of itself lead to the 
creation of new technology.  However, in order for this to be the case, certain 
preconditions are necessary.  These include the ‘right’ type of government, the security of 
property rights, and effective competition including within the labour markets.12   Without 
these in place, human capital development’s ability to influence growth appears less 
evident.  Research also indicates that when the responsibility for decision-making in, and 
the funding of, education lies with a central authority where the decision-makers are 
unfamiliar with local needs, educational performance seems to suffer.  Statistically, this 
appears to be particularly so in the sciences which are more influenced by the changes 
incurred through technological advance and thus lend themselves less easily to 
standardisation of the curriculum.13  Moreover, without market incentives and constraints, 
even the impulse to innovate is significantly reduced; therefore, the argument runs that a 
fully state controlled educational system can only function feasibly where innovation is 
relatively unimportant.14  Thus, in order to encourage the most up-to-date teaching and to 
maximise the potential for cutting edge research and innovative effort, there is a need for 
individual autonomy in, and competition between, educational institutions.  By exploring 
the comparison between the East and West German experiences, my thesis seeks to assess 
the validity of this hypothesis.   
                                                 
10
 Wößmann, Schooling and the Quality of Human Capital, p 48 
11
 See for example Welch (1970) cited in Blaug, The Economics of Education and the Education of an 
Economist, p 95; Belfield, Economic Principles for Education: Theory and Evidence, pp 200 – 202; see also 
Becker, Murphy and Tamura, ‘Human Capital, Fertility and Economic Growth’, p 324; Günther Rehme, 
‘(Re-)Distribution of Personal Incomes, Education and Economic Performance Across Countries’, 
Luxembourg Income Study Working Paper no. 299, March 2002, 
http://www.lisproject.org/publications/liswps/299.pdf (accessed 19.3.2006); Claudia Goldin and Lawrence F. 
Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology, (Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2008), p 2; p 41; 
12
 Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology, p 2 
13
 Wößmann, Schooling and the Quality of Human Capital, pp 185 – 186  
14
 Andrei Schleifer, cited in Belfield, Economic Principles for Education: Theory and Evidence, p 165 
 15
 
It is, of course, possible to posit the reverse scenario, which is simply that it is the 
increasing levels of economic growth which enable some countries to afford better 
education for a greater proportion of the populace.  Moreover, while human capital 
development theory appears to hold true for countries such as the USA and Japan, it is not 
entirely borne out by the experience of others such as Britain and France during the same 
period, where economic growth did not follow the same trajectory despite increasing 
qualifications levels.  Equally, the explanation for the divergent patterns in these countries 
may lie in a number of different variables, among which are the standard of education 
provided, subjects studied, management ethos and practice, labour law, and tradition which 
resulted in strong cultural attachment to less profitable manufacturing industries and a 
reluctance to adopt new practice.   If the reverse scenario were to hold true, however, it 
could be seen as one of the factors fuelling the overeducation debate, overeducation being 
one perceived result of improved levels of human capital development. 
 
Much of the current literature on overeducation is concerned with the effects on individual 
income of an excess of highly qualified manpower on the employment market. However, 
another more recent macro-economically focused debate relates to whether in the “race 
between education and technology”,15 education has raced ahead of technological progress 
resulting in an oversupply of highly qualified workers, or whether indeed technological 
advance has outstripped educational progress, in which case there is a need for more 
intensive and focused educational reform in order to supply more of the increasingly 
highly skilled labour required to exploit the new technologies.16  There is, however, a 
degree of illogicality at the heart of this debate because without educational progress, 
technological advance becomes at least unlikely, if not impossible.  It would appear, 
therefore, to be a false dichotomy.  
 
A particular fear arose in the 1970s in both East and West Germany (as well as in much of 
the industrialised world) relating to the employability of increasing numbers of highly 
                                                 
15
 The phrase was first coined by Jan Tinbergen in Income distribution: Analysis and policies, (Amsterdam, 
North Holland Publishing Co., 1975); more recently it is the title of a book by Claudia Goldin and Lawrence 
F. Katz, The Race between Education and Technology, (Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2008) 
16
 See for example T.F. Bresnahan, E. Brynjolfsson and L.M.Hitt, ‘Information technology, workplace 
organization and the demand for skilled labor: Firm level evidence’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol.117, No.1, 2002, pp 339 – 376; S. Machin and J. Van Reenen, ‘Technology and changes in skill 
structure: Evidence from seven OECD countries, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 113, No. 4, 1998, pp 
1245 – 1279; Goldin and Katz, The Race between Education and Technology, p 6 
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qualified graduates at a level commensurate with their qualifications.17  Because higher 
education represents a significant drain on a country’s resources, in one sense 
overeducation represents a waste of resources if the graduate is employed at a level below 
that for which he/she has been trained.  In another, it can be seen as an important factor in 
labour market adjustment: in periods of excess supply of highly-skilled workers, employers 
demonstrate a tendency to employ the more highly skilled in lower-skilled employment 
because the combination of more advanced theoretical knowledge and practical skills 
frequently results in increased labour productivity, in effect confirming one of the tenets of 
human capital development theory.   Thus, the problem of graduate unemployment is 
likely to occur only in a few very specific fields such as medicine, the civil service and 
teaching.  Unemployment is more likely to affect the lower- and unskilled workers; firstly, 
because qualifications inflation squeezes them out of the job market and secondly, because 
technology may even replace the labour of lower-skilled individuals in the workplace.18  
Moreover, recent studies have also demonstrated that an increase in the supply of highly 
skilled labour accelerates the pace of skill-biased technological change which, in turn, 
creates an increased demand for more highly-skilled workers.19  The question to be 
addressed, then, is whether an overeducated  workforce actually constitutes a reason for 
restricting either participation or financial investment in higher education.  There is also a 
further school of thought which argues that market forces in the form of sufficient, 
appropriate employment opportunities would, in any case, be likely to temper the surge in 
demand for higher education.20   
 
The arguments outlined above are predicated on the idea of a higher education degree in a 
field which is directly applicable to a particular vocation, rather than an arts or humanities 
degree with its more nebulous opportunity, often undertaken purely for interest’s sake.   A 
                                                 
17
 See for example, Ulrich Teichler and Bikas C Sanyal, Higher education and the labour market in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, (Paris, Unesco Press, 1982), chpt.1; O. Fulton, A. Gordon and G. Williams, 
Higher Education and Manpower Planning: A Comparative Study of Planned and Market Economies, 
(Geneva, International Labour Organisation, 1982), pp 11 – 13; pp 31 – 32; Blaug, ‘Where Are We Now in 
the Economics of Education?’, p 129; Ulrich Teichler, Dirk Hartung, Reinhard Nuthmann, Education and the 
Needs of Society, (Windsor, NFER Publishing Company Ltd., 1980), pp 22 – 24  
18
 Myra Wieling and Lex Borghans, ‘Discrepancies between Supply and Demand and Adjustment Processes 
in the Labour Market’, in Labour, Vol.15, No.1 pp 33 – 56, 2001; a similar point is made by Ulrich Teichler, 
Dirk Hartung, Reinhard Nuthmann, Education and the Needs of Society, pp 19 – 21  
19
 Daron Acemoglu, ‘Technical Change, Inequality and the Labour Market’, in Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol.40, No.1, 2002, pp 7 – 72; Claudia Goldin and Lawrence F. Katz, ‘The Origins of 
Technology-Skill Complementarity’, in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.113, No.3, 1998, pp 693 – 
732  
20
 See for example, R. Layard and J. King, ‘The Impact of Robbins’, in Carolyn Baxter, P.J. O’Leary and 
Adam Westoby, Economics and Education Policy: a Reader, (London, Longman, 1977), p 24; CEPES 
Activities, Higher Education in Europe, Vol.2, No.4, 1977, p 42 
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number of studies21 have suggested that being overeducated at the start of a working life 
could result in graduates being unable to make the transition to higher-level occupations, 
and despite on-the-job training or relocation, being permanently consigned to lower-level 
employment.   The correlation appeared to be stronger among arts and humanities 
graduates as opposed to graduates of more vocationally-oriented subjects although this 
varied considerably across countries.  Countries such as the Netherlands and Spain did not 
demonstrate any such effect, or only minimally, whereas it was strongly demonstrated in 
West Germany.  The question is whether this was due to the very different nature of the 
labour market there,22 or whether it reflected the disproportionately large numbers of 
students pursuing humanities degrees in West Germany?  If so, does this level of 
overeducation constitute an argument for what could be seen as a more economically 
rational approach to the planning of higher education in order to train the type of graduate 
required to fill identifiable gaps in the workforce and those predicted by manpower 
demand forecasts?   
 
By the late 1960s the growing discrepancy between the demand for and supply of 
engineering and science graduates had intensified the debate about the need to try to tailor 
graduate production to labour market demand in a time of escalating costs in higher 
education.23   Manpower demand forecasts were seen as a useful tool in helping to avoid 
the “under-, mis- or unemployment” of graduates.24  Despite the apparent logic of the 
policy, there were a number of problems in practice.  One arose from the sheer 
inconsistency of the results arrived at by the different studies.25  The second was created by 
the time scale involved.  Most commentators agree that a major problem inherent in 
manpower-planning was the need to be able to predict the level of economic activity and 
the development of various branches of industry over periods of ten to twenty years in 
order to calculate the expected demand for specialists and institute the long-term 
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educational and financial planning required to achieve this.  However, the speed and 
complexity of technological progress, along with the structural changes which took place 
in virtually all branches of the economy, arguably rendered much, if not all, of such  
target-setting irrelevant.26  Thus, the only way to estimate manpower demand over shorter 
time periods would be the use of short-term signals provided by the labour market such as 
unemployment rates, vacancy rates and wage rates.27  The problem here lies in the 
operation of subjective factors such as strategic hiring policy, labour law and the market 
orientation of the country under consideration, all of which affect the free operation of 
such signals.  A third controversy stems from the legal, moral, social and political 
difficulties intrinsic in imposing entry restrictions to academic subjects.  In countries where 
freedom of choice was constitutionally guaranteed, governments’ options were necessarily 
limited.  While this was obviously not a problem in centrally controlled socialist countries, 
the success of the policy depended greatly on the level of efficiency of the central 
planners.28  One of the aims of the thesis is to explore why and how manpower-planning 
was used in higher education policy development and whether it proved effective as a tool 
of economic development. 
 
Many of the issues described above are clearly visible in the development of the higher 
education systems of both East and West Germany.  The tackling of issues such as the 
redesign of higher education to conform to changing economic and social imperatives; the 
perceived overeducation of the general populace and consequent deficits in areas of the 
economy requiring lower skills levels; the employability of increasingly large numbers of 
graduates, especially those with degrees seen as irrelevant to economic growth; and above 
all, the striving to increase the level of human capital development in those areas of science 
and technology regarded as crucial to economic growth in a rapidly technologising world 
form the basis of higher education policy decisions throughout the period under 
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consideration in this thesis.  Moreover, some of the solutions attempted appeared to be 
common to both countries, although the means of tackling the challenges was obviously 
highly influenced by the radically opposed social, political and economic orientations of 
both countries.  The following section will trace the institutional development of West and 
East Germany which resulted from the division of the country into different zones of 
occupation at the end of the Second World War.    
 
 
Many of the issues described above are clearly visible in the development of the higher 
education systems of both East and West Germany.  In both cases the tackling of a number 
of key issues formed the basis of the development of higher education policy decisions 
throughout the period under consideration in this thesis.  These included the redesign of 
higher education to conform to changing economic and social imperatives; the perceived 
overeducation of the general populace and consequent deficits in areas of the economy 
requiring lower skills levels; the employability of increasingly large numbers of graduates, 
especially those with degrees seen as irrelevant to economic growth; and above all, the 
striving to increase the level of human capital development in those areas of science and 
technology regarded as crucial to economic growth in a rapidly technologising world.   
Moreover, some of the solutions attempted appeared to be common to both countries, 
although the means by which the challenges were addressed were obviously highly 
influenced by the radically opposed social, political and economic orientations of both 
countries.  The following section will trace the institutional development of West and East 
Germany which resulted from the division of the country into different zones of occupation 
at the end of the Second World War.    
 
 
Institutional Structure 
 
Post WWII, the initial agreement among the Allies was that the division of the German 
territories would last only until a democratic government could be formed and that, up to 
that time, all the territories should be treated as one economic unity.  In practice, however, 
the zones remained economically separate resulting in severe disruption of internal trading 
patterns and thus of industrial capability until the merging of the British with the American 
zone in 1947 and later the French zone in 1948.29  The Soviet zone remained resolutely 
separate due to irreconcilable differences between the Allied leaders over reparations 
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policy, prefiguring the eventual political and ideological partition of the country to leave 
one part functioning, at least notionally, as a liberal-capitalist democracy and the other as a 
socialist, Soviet satellite. 
 
Development of West German Capitalism 
 
The new political structure of West Germany owed much to the general distrust of 
powerful central state government and bureaucracy which had been such a feature of 
National Socialism, a distrust which was reinforced by the transition to communism 
happening in the East of the country.30  Despite the British preference for the creation of a 
centralised state structured along British parliamentary lines, France favoured the 
decentralisation of power as a means to remove the potential for resurgent and aggressive 
Germany.  The USA, however, favoured a strong federal structure with a functionally 
relatively weak centre as being the most favourable to the development of a private market 
economy, considered essential in maintaining a European bulwark against the spread of 
Communism.  This corresponded to the ambitions of the right-wing Christlich 
Demokratische Union (CDU) in Germany which backed a decentralised fiscal structure, 
although the more left-wing Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) argued for a 
strong central structure fiscal control and only limited autonomy for the Länder.31   The 
debate was rancorous, but the system which ultimately evolved was fiscally decentralised, 
with an independent central bank, constitutional court and powerful upper chamber of 
parliament (Bundesrat) with the power of veto which accorded the Länder decisive 
influence over virtually all matters of political importance and autonomy in areas such as 
economic policy, law, education and transport and communications.  Thus, while the new 
system was effective in restraining the worst effects of partisan political competition, at the 
same time, it left West Germany with the considerable difficulty of trying to reach 
consensus between the federal government and all the individual Länder through 
“bargaining and amicable agreement” in the matter of national law-making.32    
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One issue on which there was general agreement among the Allies was the necessity to end 
the system of ‘monopoly capitalism’ which had existed in Germany previously.  This was 
characterised by the existence of a number of large, price-fixing cartels and large, highly-
concentrated concerns which, through the virtual elimination of competition distorted the 
self-regulating mechanisms of market cycles.  These concerns had been severely 
implicated in the economic and social tribulations of the country during the Weimar era, 
the Great Depression and National Socialism.  Moreover, they had arguably actively 
delayed the recovery of the country post-WWII through the hoarding of capital and 
allowed a relatively small number of industrialists to acquire great economic and, thus, 
political power.33   Of the 2,500 officially sanctioned cartels and restrictive trade practice 
agreements which existed in the 1920s, over 1,000 were liquidated in the Western zones by 
1948.  The new political leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany proposed the concept 
of a ‘social market economy’ which would ensure optimal levels of competition by legal 
means, including strict anti-monopoly legislation.  It has been argued, however, that the 
stance of the Western Allies owed a great deal more to a desire to weaken Germany’s 
commercial development and restrict its presence on the international market.34   
 
The economic system which eventually emerged, however, ultimately appeared to be little 
different than the previous one.  Kramer argues that the resumption of cartelisation was, at 
least in part, attributable to the Korean War.  The subsequent export boom led to 
bottlenecks in production because of lack of investment in new plant.  At the same time as 
America was demanding a modification of the social market economy so that Germany 
could contribute to ‘the defence of the free world’, leaders of West Germany industry were 
again gradually acquiring the right to participate in the formulation of economic policy, 
ultimately leading to the revival of societal corporatism in an effort to expand capacity in 
the energy production, railway and coal, iron and steel sectors so vital to the rest of the 
economy.35   Other factors also played a part in the revival of cartelisation, such as the 
impossibility of controlling the size of the industrial holdings of individuals, banks or 
corporations; the importance of the large companies in terms of foreign currency earnings, 
as providers of vital goods and products and their significance as local and regional 
employers; and, more cynically, the government’s inability to control the increasing spread 
of illegal cartels.   
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In any event, after 1957 the government again began to sanction the creation of formal 
cartels, such as those in the electrical and chemical industries, while becoming increasingly 
reluctant to prosecute illegal cartels.  Moreover, over the decades since, these large 
companies and conglomerates have been supported by the federal government in times of 
economic downturn because of their significance for national prosperity and their role as 
large employers while also profiting from the difficulties of other, smaller firms.36    This 
form of capitalism, then, hardly conforms to the pre-condition of full exposure of the 
economy to the marketplace considered optimal for the functioning of human capital 
development theory.  Countering this to some extent, however, was West Germany’s 
position in the centre of a stable and open intra-European trading area (the European 
Economic Community, later the European Union), which encouraged the need for 
competitive commercial behaviour and the development of networks of small and medium 
enterprises which were more flexible in response to market conditions.37  West Germany 
has, thus, been characterised as a ‘coordinated market economy’, namely, one in which 
enterprises base their activities to a considerably greater extent on strategic interaction 
among firms and other actors, as opposed to ‘liberal market economies’ where activities 
are coordinated by competitive market arrangements, with supply and demand responding 
to the price signals thus generated.  The co-ordinated market economy, arguably, also 
results in high levels of quality control because of good relations between workers and 
suppliers, thus ensuring comparative advantage in products for which quality is the 
demand driver rather than price.38   
 
A further development in the social market economy was the autonomy of trade unions and 
employer associations when it came to industrial relations.  One of its most identifiable 
features was and remains co-determination, or the representation of the workforce on the 
boards of firms.  Designed to encourage conflict resolution through internal negotiation, 
from one point of view it proved to be “a benign and positive influence in the workplace” 
in that the information flow generated within the workplace helped to keep wage demands 
                                                 
36
 Leaman, The Political Economy of West Germany, 1945 – 85, pp 55 – 56; 63 – 65     
37
 See for example Gary Herrigel, Industrial Constructions: The Source of German Industrial Power, 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), pp 143 – 150; Jean-Antoine Karagiannis,  ‘Ein Keim, der wachsen 
muß: German Antitrust as the first Europeanised Policy’, http://www.epsnet.org/2004/pps/Karagiannis.pdf, 
(accessed 3.3.2007)  
38
 Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, ‘Introduction’ in Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (eds), Varieties of 
Capitalism: the Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2001), pp 8 – 9, p 44; Herrigel, Industrial Constructions: The Source of German Industrial Power, pp 173 – 
175  
 23
in line with productivity growth and discouraged opportunistic behaviour.39  It could be 
argued, moreover, that effective coordination between employers and trade unions can 
only enhance the economic performance of firms, while more stringent labour laws which 
guarantee greater job security encourage both greater company loyalty in the workforce 
and much greater investment in the training of the workforce on the part of the employer, 
thus enhancing the level of human capital in the firm.  Conversely, both the intricacies of 
the coordinated market economy and the more stringent labour laws are accused of being 
responsible for a greatly lowered flexibility of response to fast-changing downturns in 
market conditions and hence, are frequently accused of hindering economic progress.40 
 
The ‘social’ objective of the social market economy entailed the development of wide-
ranging social protection, paid for through a tax burden which is heavier than that of most 
of Western Europe and the United States.  Manow argues that the West German welfare 
state which has developed since WWII was, in effect, a direct continuation of that 
introduced by Bismarck prior to WWI.  Workers and firms were legally forced into 
participation in accident and health insurance systems (Körperschaften öffentlichen Rechts 
or public law corporations).  Whether state-run, labour-led or employer-led, insurance 
became obligatory under increasingly tight state regulation.  State-enforced social 
insurance participation thus led to the integration of labour and capital into the state’s 
administrative structure via the welfare state.  This “proto-corporatism” arguably “laid the 
groundwork for the full-fledged corporatism of Weimar and adumbrated the main lines of 
West Germany’s ‘social partnership’”.41  Following the Second World War, while a new 
political equilibrium existed between the federal government and the Länder which 
precluded excessive political interference in decision-making by central government, the 
welfare system was restored along traditional corporatist lines, thus ensuring that 
coordination of the organised interests of capital and labour would be the drivers of the 
economy rather than any attempt to allow the liberal market capitalism free rein.42 
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If the institutional structure of the West German economy could be said to hark back to the 
pre-Weimar era, the same could also be said of the institutional framework of the higher 
education system which appeared after WWII, which is discussed in detail below.   While 
this, in turn, also appears to fail to fulfil all the pre-conditions for a system of higher 
education which would facilitate the optimal development of human capital development 
for technical progress and economic growth detailed above, West Germany nevertheless 
managed to maintain a largely upward trajectory of economic growth over the period under 
consideration.  This, then, gives rise to the question, firstly, of whether the more “liberal” 
pre-conditions for the encouragement of human capital development and economic growth 
are the sole means of doing so or secondly, whether economic growth in the FRG was 
actually dependent on an increase in human capital development achieved through the 
higher education system.   
 
East Germany 
 
While most scholars agree that, in the immediate aftermath of the war, while Stalin was 
certain as to the ultimate division of Europe and the world into East and West, it is also the 
case that he was unsure as to whether or not to retain East Germany as part of the Eastern 
bloc.  In any event, because of disagreements with the Western Allies over reparations 
from the rest of the country, the Soviet zone was systematically pillaged, crippling the 
infrastructure and leaving much of industry incapable of functioning effectively.43  
Herrigel argues however, that that the loss of so much physical capital, much of which was 
worn and needed replacement, in no way diminished the technological potential of the area 
and may well have stimulated technological innovation.44 Thus, initial economic recovery 
was swift, giving rise to Maier’s contention that socialist economics was capable of 
functioning smoothly and efficiently.45  If this is accepted, the question then remains of 
why the initial momentum was not maintained. 
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The main features of the socialist economic system were linked to and driven by Marxist-
Leninist ideology.  The economy was controlled by a single, very hierarchical party in 
which every level was required to ensure the compliance of the level below it with 
instructions received from the level above; the basic means of production were were 
owned collectively by the ‘people’ or Volk, which in practice meant the state. Thus, the 
main lines of economic policy which determined regional and sectoral policy were decided 
by party organs at state level, including the level of investment in every sector of economic 
activity.  The main coordinating mechanism of the economy, indeed of the whole of 
society, was compulsory central planning.  Economic planning was organised by the State 
Planning Commission, set up in 1950.  It defined long-term aims covering a period of 
years, examined existing capacities, and, in theory at least, identified the changes and the 
amount of development needed to achieve the targets.  From these were developed shorter-
term yearly plans.  The first two-year plan, 1949 – 1951, was followed by two five-year 
plans till 1960, then two seven-year plans covering 1959 – 1970, and finally three five-year 
plans reaching into the mid-1980s.  Although the limited use of some market instruments 
did intrude into this system at times during the life of the regime, for example, in the form 
of the New Economic System introduced in 1963, they only ever played a very minor 
role.46  
 
One of the most striking features of East German governance was the level of bureaucracy 
which pervaded the whole system.  In the absence of market signals, the mechanisms of 
coordination were undertaken by a number of agencies including the Office of Prices 
which determined wholesale and retail prices, the Investment Bank, the Labour Office and 
agencies for material and technical supplies, the function of which was to bring together 
buyers and sellers in the production and distribution process.  State bureaucracy was also 
responsible for the management of the enterprises.47  Productivity targets were set for 
workforces and, if exceeded, were rewarded by financial bonuses and political rewards.48  
Aldcroft argues that the lack of a private sector meant that the system was relatively easy 
to implement despite its increasingly obvious and manifold inefficiencies.49  There was, for 
example, an overemphasis on the quantitative fulfilment of the Plan targets without regard 
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for product quality; the encouragement of growth through increasing inputs of labour and 
capital resulted in diminishing returns to investment; investment resources were often 
arbitrarily (mis)allocated; resources including labour, were hoarded; there were serious 
imbalances in the sectoral development of the country; and corruption and ‘working the 
system’ became endemic.  The even more intensive centralisation of industry in the 1970s 
through the grouping together of firms to form large, vertically integrated combines 
(Kombinate) in order to improve efficiency and prevent manufacturing bottlenecks, 
reduced competition even further and, instead of the desired result, produced over-
bureaucratic, unwieldy monoliths lacking in innovation and enterprise.50 
 
Despite also being a member of a supra-national trade organisation in the form of 
Comecon (also known as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance or CMEA), the 
secure market for products there, accompanied by the virtual absence of competition, 
meant there was little impulse to improve industrial performance.51  Manufacturing in the 
Comecon countries remained largely autarchic and arbitrarily and irrationally planned, 
militating against the development of trade, manufacturing and industry along the lines of 
comparative advantage.  A number of attempts to reform Comecon, for instance by 
introducing supranational agencies responsible for planning production and trade, were 
resisted strongly by national politicians and apparatchiks unwilling to surrender power to 
economic planners at supra-national level which would inevitably prioritise the needs of 
the Soviet Union as the largest country in the group.52   
 
The signs, therefore, did not augur well for the optimal development of human capital; 
although in terms of higher education, as will be explained in the following section, the 
nation did its utmost to promote those sectors which were most closely aligned with 
economic growth.  What follows is a review of the historiography of the development of 
higher education in Germany, with particular emphasis on scientific and technical 
education.   
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Higher Education Historiography 
 
Both East and West Germany were heirs to the same system of higher education which had 
existed before the Second World War which, ostensibly at least, was patterned on the 
Humboldtian principles of the freedom and unity of teaching and learning which saw the 
primary function of higher education as being the development of the individual 
personality.  However, insofar as professional training was concerned, while university 
education had traditionally prepared successive new generations of clergymen, lawyers, 
doctors, academics and government bureaucrats, utilitarianism in the form of training for 
the industrial or commercial sectors was regarded as being devoid of Geist (intellectual 
significance) and therefore not in the remit of academia.53  Moreover, a strong picture of 
organisational inertia and strong resistance to the industrialisation of the country within 
academia emerges from the literature on this period,54 even as the development of technical 
education in Prussia and the birth of the Technische Hochschulen during the 19th century 
mirrored Germany’s change from a largely agrarian to an industrial nation.   
 
By the beginning of the 20th century Germany had achieved an international reputation for 
scientific and technological excellence.  It is open to question, however, whether this was 
solely the result of the high degree of scholarship created by the traditions of Wissenschaft 
(scholarship) and Bildung (cultivation) within the universities.  Given the exclusive focus 
on basic research in the universities, the translation of this into the high technology 
products for which Germany was famous was surely the result of applied research 
conducted elsewhere, either in the Technische Hochschulen which had achieved 
university-level status at the end of the 19th century, in research institutions outwith 
university, or by industry in the workplace.55  An alternative suggestion is that other factors 
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were at play, such as competition between universities for the best researchers which 
forced a degree of flexibility on the academic scientific establishment56 and even 
competition between the federal states.57 
 
West Germany 
 
Resistance to change remained a feature of traditional academia, exacerbated by the power 
of the university senates in influencing decisions regarding the introduction of structural 
and curricular change and the difficulties in operation of the complex, federalised, joint 
decision-making process responsible for educational policy.  Academics in the more 
traditional universities dismissed Technische Hochschulen, along with more recently 
created universities, as producing only empty educational routine lacking in creative 
scholarship despite their increasing incorporation of faculties of liberal arts and 
philosophy.58  However, the teaching bodies in the Technische Hochschulen increasingly 
associated themselves with the existing elite Bildungsbürgertum (intellectual middle 
classes) and had adopted the same autonomous governing structures and attitudes as the 
traditional universities.59  Moreover, with the obvious exception of those expelled under 
National Socialism, there was remarkable continuity in personnel from the period of the 
Weimar Republic, through Hitler’s Third Reich and even into the new Federal Republic.  
This continuity in personnel also represented a continuity of attitudes to the point where it 
was suggested that Lehr- und Lernfreiheit had “become perverted into a state of anarchy 
tempered by professional tyranny”60 by the conservative and reactionary nature of German 
academia.    
 
By the end of WWII, however, German university education and scientific 
accomplishment were considered considerably inferior to that of the USA.   While long 
term underfunding, scientific isolation and the academic and scientific policies of the 
National Socialists were factors in this, the innate conservatism and elitism of the system 
during the Weimar period and in the decades following the war must also be considered as 
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prime causes.  Issues raised by the literature include the inability and/or unwillingness of 
the Hochschulen to turn the results of fundamental research to practical ends.   Because, in 
this sense, investment in higher education could be seen as a non-productive investment, 
this may have become a factor in limiting government expenditure in the sector, thus 
exacerbating the problem.61  Another issue relates to the elitist nature of higher education 
and whether the maintenance of the status quo was justifiable on social, political or 
economic grounds, especially in the light of an impending demographic boom.   A system 
which so strongly disadvantaged females, working class, rural and Catholic children also 
represented a failure to tap a huge reserve of latent talent for economic gain.62   
 
Given that, at around six percent, the proportion of an age cohort being educated to Abitur 
level and going on to higher education was considerably lower in West Germany than in 
any other industrialised country in the world, the question arises of whether the quantity of 
graduates being produced was sufficient to cope with the pace of scientific and 
technological development.63  Nevertheless, West Germany underwent a spectacular post-
war economic boom during the 1950s and 1960s, arguably negating the argument that 
more higher education was necessary for economic growth particularly in view of the 
expanding needs of industry for lower-skilled labour.64  However, as in all developed 
states, the number of jobs for which a higher education was necessary was growing faster 
than the number with such an education and in Germany the discrepancy appeared to be 
particularly sharp.65  Related to this there is the question of whether the subjects offered 
and the level of teaching were adequate to cope with the pace of scientific and 
technological development, particularly in view of the mounting pressure from industry for 
a much greater emphasis on technical education and increasing technological specialisation 
within higher education.   
 
Despite objections from those who wished to reserve university education for a small 
intellectual elite, the reform of the education system in the mid-1960s encouraged a 
substantial expansion of the student body, the development of unified academic 
programmes across the country, the building of a number of new higher education 
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institutions and the inclusion of more professional courses of study, as well as 
recommendations for the inclusion of engineering faculties at all universities.66   
Nevertheless, by the end of the 1960s economic growth was markedly slowing and the 
government becoming increasingly concerned about the growing gaps in technology 
between West Germany and the USA.  This begs the question of whether these issues were 
related to insufficiently radical reform measures in higher education, the perpetuation of 
academic obduracy and public resistance to a change in the function of higher education, 
or whether other factors were at play such as ineffective management within industry, 
resistance from social partners and failure to invest sufficiently in either higher education 
or research and development.  At the same time, however, West Germany’s performance in 
a number of more traditional research-intensive industries such as chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals remained very strong and internationally competitive,67 proving that 
scientific excellence and technological progress were achievable.  My thesis aims to 
explore the main factors influencing economic and technological development in West 
Germany and, in particular, the role of higher education in both the failure to close the gaps 
in technology and in the scientific and technological success stories.    
 
It was not until the early 1970s that student numbers expanded to the extent that the term 
Massenuniversitäten (mass universities) came into play.  Much of the literature on higher 
education from the 1970s and 1980s discusses the structural problems incurred through this 
such as the difficulties of funding the rapidly mushrooming sector in a steadily worsening 
economic climate.68  The issues of institutional overcrowding and the consistently 
increasing average duration of study were another focus for debate as was the fear that the 
exigencies of teaching ever-increasing numbers would disrupt the balance of the ‘unity of 
research and teaching’ to compromise the performance of the pure theoretical research 
which was seen as crucial to academic training and intellectual growth.69  The ‘unity of 
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research and teaching’ was described as the “Achilles heel” of research in the 
Hochschulen.70  This was in part because of the extreme reluctance of the Hochschulen to 
increase the flexibility of their traditional institutional structure and make it more adaptable 
to changing circumstances even as the economic situation intensified the pressure on them 
to be more accountable in terms of research, to contribute both directly and indirectly to 
the promotion of innovation and to increase efforts in interdisciplinary, cross-disciplinary 
and inter-institutional research, in both basic and applied fields.71  Closely related to this 
was the lack of competition between institutions following the reform, which in the past 
had been credited as responsible for Germany’s former stellar international academic 
reputation by encouraging specialisation and competition for the best researchers and 
students.  These factors, in turn, encourage questions as to the effectiveness and even the 
viability of the collective decision-making process responsible for the development of 
educational and research policy, which it is argued has consistently operated as a blocking 
mechanism to change.72   The main questions arising from these developments, which my 
thesis will address, concern firstly the effect of such rapid expansion on the quality of 
teaching and scholarship in the Hochschulen; and secondly, why the Hochschule 
candidates were so reluctant to move away from what was perceived to be the ‘traditional’ 
academic path of the humanities, philosophy in particular, and embrace more technical 
specialties conforming to labour demand.  Thirdly, it will explore the how the policy-
making process affected the ability of higher education to adapt and change. 
 
The problem of employing large numbers of graduates gained even greater significance 
through the 1970s and 1980s as the saturation of traditional graduate employment markets 
led to even stronger pressure for a more technological focus and more vocationally 
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oriented courses in the Hochschulen.73  One of the main questions to be addressed is how 
students’ subject choices affected their employment opportunities and what the impact of 
the absorption of so many humanities-trained graduates had on the employment market and 
the economy. With reference to the arguments presented in the overeducation debate, my 
thesis will analyse the development of the graduate employment situation and how it 
affected the academic choices of students.74  Stemming from the first two questions is a 
third.  Despite West Germany’s laggardly attitude to the adoption of a more economically 
pragmatic approach to higher education design in contrast to East Germany, economic 
growth continued, albeit at a considerably slower pace after 1970, and innovation and 
progress carried on apace in a number of areas of technology.  The big question to be 
answered, therefore, and the purpose of this thesis, revolves around higher education’s real 
relevance to economic growth in West Germany. 
 
East Germany 
 
Much of the historiography of higher education in East Germany understandably focuses 
on the revisionist reforms enacted in order to achieve the sovietisation of the system.   One 
strand of the literature stresses that these were undertaken in order to ensure the 
development of modern socialist personalities,75 while another argues rather that the 
reforms represented the attempt to mobilise university education as one component in the 
drive for increased economic productivity,76 although in government rhetoric the two were 
generally declared as being inextricably interdependent.  Hence, because the ideal socialist 
personality allegedly found personal fulfilment only in the fulfilment of the greater 
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societal, political and economic interests,77 the traditional idea of higher education solely 
for individual personal development was rendered largely obsolete.  It became instead an 
instrument for the reproduction of ideologies and the creation of good socialist 
personalities; for democratisation and the development of a proletarian technical elite; and 
above all, for the rigid direction of training and education in conformity with economic and 
ideological priorities.78  Thus, funding for higher education was overwhelmingly directed 
from the humanities to technical subjects and ever more narrowly specialised technical 
disciplines were introduced and taught through nationally standardised curricula, while 
political and ideological adherence was frequently prioritised over academic competence 
when it came to staffing the Hochschulen and selecting the students.   
 
One question to be addressed, however, is whether the discontinuities thus created 
permitted the wholesale adoption of the new higher education system and a closer 
identification with the new regime.  Alternatively, did the practical difficulties created 
through denazification and the competition with West Germany for the talents of the 
professoriate, at least until 1961, result in enduring continuities with the previous system 
becoming embedded in the new one?79  If so, how did this affect the functioning of the 
system envisaged by the East German authorities?  My thesis will analyse the effects on 
the quality of teaching and research both of this and of the appointment of large numbers 
of under-qualified professors with little or no prior academic experience following 
denazification.  Secondly, it will consider how industry increasingly became the frame of 
reference for most of the technical universities.  More specifically, it reflects on the 
pressure placed on the academic sector to work in close collaboration with local industry in 
order to supply graduates suitably trained to work in specific positions in industry,80 and in 
the pursuit of innovative activity leading to increased productivity.   
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Most commentators agree that the passage of the Third Higher Education Reform Bill in 
1968 finally established centralised control over every aspect of higher education and 
successfully achieved the re-orientation of a whole new generation of university teachers.  
In so doing, however, the literature raises the issue of whether this finally eradicated much 
of what would have enabled the East German universities to compete on a par with those 
of the West.81    One question which will be considered by this thesis is what effect the 
increasing emphasis on socialist ideology had on the curricular content, the structure of 
university education and level of academic achievement.  A second is how significantly the 
wide-ranging research relevant to the national economic priorities of international-level 
technological progress and economic growth was affected by tying the output of higher 
education institutions and their research agendas even more closely than previously to the 
needs of local industries.82  A third concerns technology transfer and how effectively this 
was fostered and facilitated for the benefit of the economy.  Given that the economic 
evidence would appear to argue that it was not, the question to be addressed is why and 
what factors may have contributed to the problem? 
 
Fourthly, graduate employability became an issue.   Despite the close links forged between 
higher education and industry and rigorous education and manpower demand planning,83 
overeducation appeared to be as prevalent in the GDR as in the FRG.  Disparity between 
qualification and employment was apparent at all levels but particularly so among 
graduates.84  The disparity worsened when change of leadership in 1971 brought about the 
de-emphasis of the pursuit of the scientific-technological revolution. The result was an 
attempt to adjust supply to workplace demand by restricting access to higher education and 
prioritising lower-level vocational training.85  The questions arising with regard to this, 
                                                 
81
 This point is made by Eckhardt Förscht in ‘Science, Higher Education, and Technology Policy’ in 
Macrakis and Hoffman (eds), Science under Socialism, pp 41 – 42; a similar argument is presented by 
Manfred Rexin, ‘Die Entwicklung der Wissenschaftspolitik in der DDR’ in Peter Christian Ludz (ed.), 
Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft in der DDR, (Munich, Carl Hanser Verlag, 1979), pp 78 – 121 
82
 Raymond Bentley, Research and Development in the Former German Democratic Republic, pp 82 – 86 
argues strongly that it did; for an opposing viewpoint from the GDR perspective see H. Irmer and B. Wilms, 
‘New Forms of Co-operation for Research in the German Democratic Republic between Higher Education 
Institutions and Industry’ in Higher Education in Europe, Vol.9, No.4, 1984, pp 35 – 40  
83
 See for example Sachse, ‘Manpower Planning and a Programme of Higher Education Development in the 
German Democratic Republic’, pp 3 – 5  
84
 See for example. Baylis, The Technical Intelligentsia and the East German Elite: Legitimacy and Social 
Change in Mature Communism, pp 45 – 46; Bentley, Research and Development in the Former German 
Democratic Republic, pp 93 – 94; Augustine, The Red Prometheus, pp 78 – 85; Anna-Jutta Pietsch, 
‘Reaktionen im Ausbildungs- und Beschäftigungssytem auf Probleme der Bildungsexpansion in der DDR 
under UdSSR’, in Oskar Anweiler and Friedrich Kuebart (eds), Bildungssyteme in Osteuropa Reform oder 
Krise?, (Berlin, Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz, 1983), pp 216 – 218 
85
 See for example Oskar Anweiler, ‘Bildungssysteme in Osteuropa – Reform oder Krise?’, p 14 and Dietmar 
Waterkampf, ‘Das Einheitlich Bildungssytem der DDR in den Siebziger Jahren’, in Anweiler and Kuebart 
(eds), Bildungssysteme in Osteuropa – Reform oder Krise, pp 49 – 50, 54; for the official GDR position on 
 35
covered in the thesis, concern the effects of restricted entry to higher education on the 
general educational level of the country,86 its scientific, technological and economic 
performance87 and on the general morale and perceptions of the populace.88  On a different 
tack is the question of why so many graduates found it difficult to obtain suitable 
employment when the need for continually increasing numbers had previously been seen 
as critical and had been planned for. 89 
 
The restrictions on higher education lasted only until the late 1970s when the leadership’s 
emphasis shifted to research into, and the production of, high technology.  In order to 
achieve the necessary scientific and technical capabilities for this policy, GDR 
commentators again began to stress the obligation of a ‘developed socialist society’ to 
consistently raise the level of education of the population.90  While this approach arguably 
largely conforms to the theory of human capital development, it is certainly open to 
question whether the GDR was really subscribing to the philosophy, or was simply 
increasingly aware of the need to maximise the available potential of a declining 
population in order to meet its goals in terms of productivity and in the achievement of 
international standards in the high technology sector.  In the event, despite strenuous 
attempts to maximise the economic applicability of higher education, the economy failed 
catastrophically. The point to be addressed, then, is to what extent the higher education 
system could be said to have contributed to this, or whether the blame lay elsewhere.   
 
I will attempt to assess the real relevance of both the East and West German systems of 
higher education to economic performance and compare the two to assess parallels and 
                                                                                                                                                    
this see Werner Wolter, ‘Contemporary Approaches to the Planning of Higher Education’, in Higher 
Education in Europe, Vol.9, No.1, 1984, pp 21 – 22; Sachse also argues that the synchronisation of 
educational change with long-term educational planning had been achieved in ‘Manpower Planning and a 
Programme of Higher Education Development in the German Democratic Republic’, p 3 
86
 See for example Anna-Jutta Pietsch, ‘Reaktionen im Ausbildungs- und Beschäftigungssystem auf 
Probleme der Bildungsexpansion in der DDR und der UdSSR’, pp 216 – 218  
87
 See for example Siegfried Baske, ‘Die Konzeptionen der Hochschulpolitik und Hochschulgestaltung in der 
DDR und in der Volksrepublik Polen’, in Anweiler and Kuebart (eds), Bildungssysteme in Osteuropa – 
Reform oder Krise, p 297; Steiner, Von Plan zu Plan: Eine Wirtschaftsgeschichte der DDR, p 180 
88
 See for example Margrete Siebert Klein, The Challenge of Communist Education, (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1980), p 79; Waterkampf, ‘Das einheitliche Bildungssytem der DDR in den siebziger 
Jahren’, p 54 
89
 Raymond Bentley, Research and Technology in the former German Democratic Republicpp 93 – 94; 
André Steiner, Von Plan zu Plan: Eine Wirtschaftsgeschichte der DDR, (Munich, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 
2004), p 180; Dolores L. Augustine, The Red Prometheus, pp 298, 322 
90
 See for example, Manfred Nast, ‘Right to Education and the Tasks of Higher Education in GDR’, pp 25 – 
27; Heinz Haas, ‘Information on some Non-Traditional Forms of Higher Education in the German 
Democratic Republic’, in Higher Education in Europe, Vol.3, No.4, 1978, pp 15 – 16; Willi Wolter, ‘Higher 
Education and Lifelong Learning in the German Democratic Republic’, in Higher Education in Europe, 
Vol.4, No.4, 1979, pp 20 – 21; H.J. Schulz, ‘The Development of Higher Education in the GDR in the 
Eighties’, in Higher Education in Europe, Vol.6, No.2, 1981, pp 50 – 54; Werner Wolter, ‘Contemporary 
Approaches to the Planning of Higher Education’, pp 21 – 24  
 36
differences in the way in which higher education influenced the economies of the 
respective countries. 
 
Comparative Literature 
 
There currently exists very little literature comparing aspects of higher education in East 
and West Germany, and that which does exist, while informative and relevant to this 
thesis, has a rather different focus.  For instance, Arthur Hearnden provides a direct 
comparison of the development of the education systems of both countries from 1945 – 
1972.91  The work highlights the institutional and curricular changes dictated by the 
divergent social and political development of the states, using these to draw parallels with 
the development of communist and non-communist states in general.   The main focus, 
however, is on primary, secondary and lower-level tertiary education with, inexplicably, 
very little attention devoted to higher-level education and thus to the implications that 
ideologically driven reform had for the innovative technological advance and economic 
growth which are at the heart of my work.  Koeshall also adopts a sociological approach, 
albeit one which focuses considerably more heavily on higher education.  In an exhaustive 
pedagogical and social analysis comparing curricula and education styles, he concludes 
that a Marxist-Leninist education had a markedly deleterious effect on the critical thinking 
abilities of East German students in relation to those of their West German counterparts.92  
Koeshall’s work, however, also stops short of drawing inferences as to the effect of the 
differently structured educational methods on the push for scientific and technological 
innovation and development.   
 
In contrast, Ash’s 1999 study93 focuses exclusively on scientific communities and the 
continuities and discontinuities in those of East and West Germany as a result of political 
upheaval.  The work concentrates on the response of both the extra-academic and academic 
scientific communities to the new social and political constructs emerging from 1933, 1945 
and 1999.  He reinforces a point made in much of the general historiography of German 
higher education of the instinct for self-preservation of the professoriate and its struggle to 
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maintain, or reconstruct itself as an autonomous elite.  Nevertheless, he has little to say 
with regard to changes in university structure and ethos, or the practical consequences in 
terms of technological progress and economic growth which form the basis of my thesis 
and which are very much the focus of Raymond Bentley’s studies on technological change 
in the GDR.94  Bentley’s work, however, cannot be considered a true comparison of East 
and West as West German statistics are used only as a yardstick against which to measure 
East German progress; the core analysis is of the East German case. 
 
This brief overview of the literature serves to highlight how the more important issues 
related to human capital development theory manifested themselves in both East and West 
Germany within two very distinctive approaches to the shifting dynamic between Bildung 
and Technik.   To present a simple comparison of the two countries, however, would fail to 
do justice to the infinite complexities of such an influential sector of society and the 
economy.  It has been argued that “comparison does not and cannot mean emphasising 
similarities at the expense of differences…the aim is to establish both…in order to explain 
them as precisely as possible”.95   My study aims to explain, in the light of contemporary 
economic and political developments, both the more overt differences and a surprising 
number of parallels in policy design and objectives in both countries despite their very 
different Weltanschauungen (world views).  
 
 
Methodology 
 
My initial plan for this project was to provide a detailed comparison of the effects of the 
higher education policies in both countries based on a limited number of case studies of 
higher education institutions.  Because of the very diverse historical development of the 
different types of higher education institutions, both pre- and post-war, however, I planned 
to draw on the experiences of a traditional university and of a technical 
university/Technische Hochschule in each country.  The examples I proposed to use in the 
West were the University of Heidelberg and the Technische Hochschule Aachen, and in the 
East the Humboldt University in Berlin and the Technische Universität Dresden.  In 
addition to their divergent origins, the two Western examples were subject to different 
social and political pressures after WWII resulting from their geographical location in 
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different zones of occupation: Aachen was in the British zone and Heidelberg in the 
American.  Moreover, the post-war political allegiances of the states of North Rhine 
Westphalia (Aachen) and Baden-Württemberg (Heidelberg), while not constant (at least in 
the case of North Rhine Westphalia), in general deviated significantly from each other.96  
While the same could not be said of the two East German cases chosen, at least during the 
period 1945 – 1990, the two have differed significantly in their voting patterns since, 
which may or may not be an indicator of longer term, suppressed differences in political 
climate between Berlin and Saxony.97 
 
The initial aim, then, was to examine how the higher education policy decisions taken at 
national and state level played out in the individual institutions and to try to extrapolate 
from this a picture of the development of higher education as a whole in both countries.  
As my research proceeded, however, it rapidly became obvious firstly, that the focus was 
too narrow and secondly, that the natures of all the institutions of higher education in both 
countries were extremely diverse.  Hence, by limiting the scope of the thesis to four 
institutions, the picture obtained would not be indicative of the state of higher education 
nationally in either.  This was particularly true of West Germany, where the level of 
institutional and state autonomy was, and remains, such that federal bodies had, at best, 
very limited influence on the decisions concerning policy change.  While, in contrast, all 
policy decisions regarding higher education in East Germany were taken centrally (at least 
after the Second Reform Act of 1951 – 52 which swept away the education ministries at 
Länder level), conclusive evidence nevertheless emerged from the primary sources of 
considerable variation in the levels of conformity and resistance among the institutions of 
higher education, with those further from the centre in Berlin often being less likely to toe 
the party line.  Hence, for example, although they were not alone in this, the activities of 
the Universities of Rostock and Greifswald to the north and Halle and Jena to the south 
frequently appeared to be the cause of much impassioned indignation in, and censure from 
the Committee of Further and Higher Education and the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in 
Berlin.98  
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I therefore decided that a more accurate picture could be achieved by taking a wider 
overview of the development of higher education in both countries.  While this inevitably 
involved sacrificing some degree of detail at the level of the individual institutions, this 
was compensated for, to a large extent, by the more finely nuanced picture achieved by 
analysing the country as a whole.  One method used to achieve this was a strong focus on 
the policy-making bodies which, in West Germany, represented government at both Land 
and federal level as well as the individual institutions of higher education.  It became 
obvious that it was the factors influencing the interaction, or lack of it, between these 
various institutions and organisations which were dictating the pace and direction of the 
development of higher education in the West rather than any overarching societal or 
economic imperative.  Conversely, while economic and ideological imperatives did form 
the basis for decisions on higher education policy in the GDR, their frequently-changing 
nature coupled with differing levels of cooperation or resistance from academia and 
students in individual universities and Hochschulen resulted in a somewhat varied picture 
across the country as a whole.  
 
Hence, in addition to considering a wide range of secondary literature, my thesis is based 
on the detailed analysis of a considerable number of archival sources.  These include, for 
West Germany, the files of the federal government-instituted Wissenschaftsrat (Science 
Council) responsible for overseeing all matters relating to higher education; the advisory 
Bund-Länder Kommission für Bildungsplanung und Forschungsförderung (Federal/Land 
Commission for Education and Research Planning); the Ständige Konferenz der 
Kultusminister der Länder (Permanent Committee of the Culture Ministers of the Federal 
States who had responsibility for all education in the Länder), the advisory Deutscher 
Ausschuss für Erziehung und Bildungswesen (Committee for Education and Culture), the 
advisory Bildungsrat (Education Council) and the Westdeutsche Rektorenkonferenz 
(Permanent Committee of West German Rectors), the latter specifically representing the 
individual institutions of higher education.  Because of data protection strictures, most of 
the primary information for West Germany in the period 1975 – 1990 came from policy 
documents in the on-line archive of the Bundestag.  Some additional primary material was 
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sourced from early issues of Higher Education in Europe, the official publication of the 
Centre Européen pour l’Enseignement Supérieur (CEPES) of UNESCO which reprinted 
many government policy documents, parliamentary proceedings and speeches on higher 
education, and a number of OECD reports.  Statistical information was sourced largely 
from these, the publication Wirtschaft und Statistik of the Federal Office of Statistics and 
selected issues of the Economic Survey of Europe of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe. 
 
East German primary sources included the files of the Kulturbund (Cultural Association), 
the Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkommittee der SED (Institute of 
Marxism-Leninism) and the Zentralverwaltung der Gewerkschaft Wissenschaft (Central 
Administration of the Scholarly Trade Union), which included a full archive of the files of 
the Minister für Hoch- und Fachschulwesen (Minister for Further and Higher Education).   
Further information was obtained from CEPES, the Economic Survey of Europe, OECD 
reports and from the published Protokolle der Parteitagen der Sozialistischen 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands (minutes of the SED party conferences) as well as from the 
archives of the Party newspaper, Neues Deutschland.  Most of the statistical data came 
from the statistical yearbooks of the GDR. 
 
This strong focus on policy-making bodies combined with an analysis of the effects of 
policies on several higher education institutions, enable much clearer insights into the 
reasons for the policy decisions, the effectiveness of their application within the 
institutions and their ultimate success or failure in terms of the aspirations of the 
governments of the day. 
 
 
Chapter outline 
 
The thesis is divided into two parts covering the periods ca. 1945 to ca. 1970, and ca. 1970 
– 1990 for the reasons outlined earlier.  Part one consists of chapters two through four.   
Chapter two outlines the background to, and early context of, the development of higher 
education in Germany before WWII.  It traces the development of the academic tradition 
and the reasons for Germany’s international reputation for academic excellence, 
particularly in the sciences, as well as exploring how this influenced the behaviour of 
academia through the industrialisation of Germany, the First World War, the Weimar era 
and during the rise of National Socialism.  The catastrophic effects of this, and of the 
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policies of the National Socialists with regard to higher education for the condition of 
German academic and scientific achievement are analysed, as are the continuities and 
discontinuities within the system.   
 
This theme is continued in chapter three with a description of the immediate post-war 
environment for higher education in what became West Germany.  It then examines the 
growing pressure for reform which accompanied growing democratisation, the widening 
gaps in technology between Germany and the USA during the 1950s and 1960s and the 
push for economic growth, which resulted in a major expansion of the higher education 
system.  The implications of this for the funding and autonomy of higher education are 
discussed, as are the pressures on the institutional structures of academia and the effects on 
the standards of teaching and research, as well as the initial attempts to direct higher 
education down a more market-oriented path.  An analysis of the consequences for the 
economic aims of the government runs throughout the chapter. 
 
East Germany in the period until the regime change in 1971 is the subject of chapter four, 
with a discussion of the three major reforms of the higher education system which 
systematically sovietised and economised the higher education system as it came under 
centralised control.  The implications of a comparatively large expansion of the system 
with concomitant curricular changes reflecting the new Weltanschauung are discussed with 
reference to the quality of academic output and funding issues, while the wholesale 
orientation of higher-level education to economic priorities is analysed as to its feasibility 
and effectiveness. 
Part two of the thesis covers the period ca. 1970 – 1990.  The story of West Germany 
during the 1970s and 1980s is outlined in chapter five.  In part as a result of the restrictions 
on the use of archival material from the mid 1970s onwards, the chapter is divided into 
two.  The first part discusses higher education policy and the changes which took place in 
the 1970s, including the effects of an even more dramatic rise in higher education 
participation.  It analyses the consequences of the number and type of graduates produced 
with regard to the economic and technological goals of the country in a period of 
prolonged economic turbulence.  The chapter then explores the consequences of the 
strategies pursued in the 1970s through the policy changes of the 1980s as endeavours to 
direct higher education and its research effort to the service of the economy intensified in 
an attempt to counter the effects of persistently high unemployment levels and stagnating 
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economic growth.  The chapter includes a detailed analysis of the employment market for 
graduates. 
East Germany over roughly the same period is the focus of chapter six with a discussion of 
the radical cutbacks to higher education introduced by the new leader in 1971 as the ethos 
changed from the pursuit of technological progress at international level to the increased 
provision of consumer goods.  It then considers the volte-face which took place towards 
the end of the 1970s as the focus again changed, this time to the high technology sector, 
and explores the measures undertaken as pressure mounted increasingly strongly on higher 
education, industry and research institutions to produce enhanced results for much reduced 
investment as the economy continued to slide downward. 
The final chapter returns to the themes developed in the introduction and pulls together the 
strands of the analyses of the earlier chapters to try and reach some tentative conclusions 
regarding the question at the heart of the thesis: the effects of policy changes on the 
contribution of higher education to the economic growth of the two Germanys.  It then re-
examines the importance of the work to the historiography of higher education, attempts to 
place this project in historical perspective and highlights areas for future study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part One: 1945 – ca. 1970 
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Chapter 2   
 
Higher education in the German states 1800 – 1949  
 
The higher education system in the federalised German states can be seen as evolving in 
response to a series of cataclysmic social, political and economic upheavals throughout the 
19th and 20th centuries including industrialisation, parliamentary democratisation in the 
Weimar Republic following the First World War, hyperinflation, the rise of National 
Socialism (which also saw a brief centralisation of the federal states), and defeat in the 
Second World War.  It has also been characterised by the resistance of academia to change 
and modernisation, which can be seen either as a response to the crises of orientation 
created by these upheavals, or as simple intransigence in the face of repeated threats to its 
status and influence.  Following Prussia’s rout and near-bankruptcy in the Napoleonic 
Wars at the beginning of the 19th century and the appointment of Wilhelm von Humboldt 
as Education Minister, the Romantic philosophical movement in German higher education 
was replaced by a new humanistic ethos emphasising Lern- und Lehrfreiheit (the freedom 
of learning and teaching) and focused on the fostering of Bildung (cultivation of the 
individual) and Wissenschaft (scholarship), decoupled from any direct economic or societal 
application.  The system was responsible for the creation of Germany’s international 
reputation for academic excellence, particularly in the sciences, and became the inspiration 
for most universities in Western Europe and the USA.  However, it also permitted the rise 
in power of a self-styled and self-replicating academic elite which was to become 
increasingly isolated from a rapidly industrialising and ever more technologically 
challenging society.   
 
This ‘Ivory Tower’ mentality became harder to maintain, however, in the face of the 
increasing number and social diversity of students entering university as economic 
prosperity and increasing industrialisation created new and different societal elites 
demanding a traditional higher education for their offspring.  The increasing social 
egalitarianism which followed the First World War spawned an even deeper 
disenchantment with what academia regarded as a crisis of modernisation, while the advent 
of democratic government eroded its elite social status and encouraged a considerable 
number to support the rise of National Socialism either tacitly or actively.  Growing 
reluctance to participate in international scientific circles, combined with the attitude of the 
National Socialists towards higher education and research led to Germany falling 
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increasingly behind international standards in many scientific fields, while large gaps in 
technology were opening up between Germany and the USA in particular.  The outbreak of 
the Second World War only exacerbated the situation, leaving the higher education 
systems of both Germanic states with a great deal of leeway to make up by the end of 
hostilities. 
 
In taking an overview of the period 1800 to 1949, this chapter will trace the development 
of the German academic tradition and the response of academia to the series of crises 
outlined above.  In so doing, it will establish the basis from which the systems of higher 
education evolved in both East and West Germany, explain why both states entered the 
post-war era so far behind the rest of the industrialised world and thus clarify the reasons 
for the reforms instigated by the respective governments in the second half of the 20th 
century, which will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
 
The Humboldtian University 
 
Throughout the twentieth century, convention has identified the German university system 
as being patterned on the ideals of the ‘Humboldtian’ university.  This humanistic 
university model, stemming from the work of idealistic scholars such as Wilhelm von 
Humboldt, Johann Fichte and Friedrich Schleiermacher around the beginning of the 19th 
century, was part of a series of wide-ranging liberal social and political reforms which took 
place in Prussia following its comprehensive defeat at the hands of Napoleon I at the Battle 
of Jena in 1806 and subsequent near-bankruptcy.1  Prior to this, the core faculties of any 
European university were considered to be law, medicine and theology.  The elevation of 
the status of science as a professional career option did not take place until after 1825, 
while the philosophical movement, which in much of Western Europe concerned itself 
with public debate on social reform and the empirical problems of political change and 
scientific enquiry, had little relevance to a Germany ruled, as it continued to be, by an 
autocracy.  Instead, romanticism and idealism became the dominant philosophical trends 
with the emphasis on the aesthetic self-expression of the individual but also of the nation, 
demonstrated by its allegedly unique culture and the development of distinctive Germanic 
theories of metaphysical knowledge.2   
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Much of the older historiography argues that the Humboldtian philosophy was made 
manifest in the new Berlin University founded in 1810 which then became the prototype 
for all other modern German universities.  Pivotal to the Humboldtian university concept 
was the belief that, while all academic disciplines should be represented within the 
university, the core faculty linking all disciplines and faculties should be that of 
philosophy.  In this way the assimilation of science would also ensure a moral education 
because the unity of research and learning created through total engagement with objective 
cultural values would develop in the individual student a “force which shaped mentality” 
and generate the “dynamics which formed reality”.   This, in turn, would forge an indelible 
quality defined as Bildung, regarded as rivalling the characteristics of the aristocrat.  This 
was to be enhanced through the university’s function as a research institution, which 
through the practice of Lern- und Lehrfreiheit would further the cause of “pure” scientific 
knowledge unaffected by vested interests or external influence.  Over time the humanities 
also came to be treated as sciences with philological investigation being regarded as a valid 
method of empirical scientific research.3  
 
Above all, practicality and utilitarianism in study were to be abhorred as demonstrating a 
vulgar preoccupation with material gain, or the “petty practicality of the French”,4 (the 
reform movement in France had abolished all universities in 1793 and replaced them with 
a number of specialist professional schools where the emphasis was on applied science and 
specialised education providing technical qualifications for various professions required by 
the state).5   In contrast, the German contention was that research without specific goals in 
mind could provide solutions for unanticipated requirements which scholarship with 
functional applications at its core would neglect.6   The only exception to the rule was the 
introduction of applied chemistry around 1840 in the laboratory of Justus Liebig at the 
University of Giessen.  His encouragement of research into soil and animal chemistry had 
such obvious direct relevance to an economy suffering from recurrent poor harvests due to 
what he could prove was soil nutrient depletion, that by the 1850s applied chemistry was 
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integrated as a field of study in universities as well as in technical colleges in a number of 
states.7     
  
Recent research, however, has suggested that the idea of the Humboldtian university is 
more myth than reality on several counts.  For example, in references to the German 
university system in dictionaries, books or speeches during the nineteenth century the 
name of Humboldt was rarely, if ever, actually mentioned, nor indeed the idea of a 
humanistic university.  The emergence of the modern university appeared to owe more to 
the creation of the new Reformuniversitäten of Halle and Göttingen during the 
Enlightenment with their emphasis on rationalism and organisational restructuring.  Rather, 
the universities of 19th century Germany appear to have been run primarily for the social 
reproduction of a limited number of professions (academia, theology, medicine, the law 
and the upper levels of public administration) with the development of the humanities and 
sciences as a secondary remit and only thirdly the function of general education.  While 
Lern- und Lehrfreiheit were indeed regarded as sacrosanct, as well as being the special 
feature and source of the excellence of the universities, this would not appear to have been 
rooted in the philosophy of idealism but was, rather, a historical legacy from the 
university’s earlier corporate independence.8   
 
The autonomy of academia and the social status of professorial staff in the highest 
echelons of the civil service were safeguarded by the institution of the Academic 
Corporation, a national body representing the university senates.  Although the financial 
control of the universities remained a matter of state along with the ultimate (if rarely 
exercised) authority for the appointment of professors to university ‘chairs’, the university 
senates were in control of all academic affairs.  Notionally, this was supposed to ensure 
that academic matters would be regulated by experts motivated solely by scholarly 
interests and the advancement of theoretical knowledge.  In practice, as Ringer has argued, 
it allowed an otherwise politically powerless, intellectual middleclass to form itself into a 
distinctive elite, an “aristocracy of intelligence”, on the basis of its Bildung, its close 
connection with the bureaucracies running the country, the power it exercised though 
privilege distribution and its role as “guardians of pure learning”.9  As Prussian Minister of 
Culture Carl Heinrich Becker would later write, “When we speak about the 
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university…we have a clear and distinct image in our souls, a sort of Holy Grail of pure 
scholarship.  Its knights serve a sacred cause.” 10 
 
Less than one percent of working males were actually employed in the academic 
professions during the ninetheenth century, yet these men succeeded in forming themselves 
into a social and cultural elite which became “the functional ruling class of the nation”. 
Ringer also accused the Academic Corporation of causing the virtual sclerosis of the 
universities and of “routinising” the idea of self-cultivation into the defence of social 
privilege and resistance to change, particularly that being wrought by the advent of the 
industrial revolution.11  In a sense, the development of the universities simply reflected a 
feudal ruling system which had prevented the growth of a strongly entrepreneurial or 
politically important middle class, such as had developed in Britain, and thus discouraged 
any impetus to apply scientific models to the political economy for economic benefit.12  
However, the neglect of occupational and industrial education with a pragmatic economic 
orientation and its rigid segregation from personal cultivation also resulted in the social 
relegation of a large number of the middle classes who had not ‘benefited’ from a classical 
education.13  Despite a modernist minority in academia which recognised the inevitability 
of industrialisation and a more democratic arrangement of society, the “less articulate, 
politically unsophisticated and intellectually less distinguished” majority persisted in the 
preservation of the “mandarin heritage” in society and scholarship in the face of all 
challenges posed by the changing times.14    
 
It is, however, undeniable that German universities were held in high esteem right 
throughout the nineteenth century.  Their traditions of Wissenschaft and Bildung were 
deemed responsible for an “impetus to excellence” which had resulted in German research 
being at the forefront of discovery in numerous fields, while the vast number of 
professional and academic publications produced had caused German to become one of the 
global languages of science.15   As an example, in 1887 seventy percent of all references in 
psychology texts used German sources as opposed to 21.1 percent for English and only 7.4 
percent for French.16  This begs the question of how what appeared to be a sclerotic, 
reactionary and elitist bureaucracy managed to produce such internationally esteemed 
                                                 
10
 Carl Heinrich Becker quoted in Paletschek, ‘The German University Idea’, p 42 (Paletschek’s translation) 
11
 Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins, p 35   
12
 Ben David, The Scientist’s Role in Society, pp 109 - 110 
13
 Kees Gispen, New Profession, Old Order, p 23 
14
 Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins, pp 26; 34 – 35; 38; 130 
15
 Beyerchen, ‘On the Stimulation of Excellence in Wilhelmian Science’, p 139 
16
 Ben David, The Scientist’s Role in Society, p 191 
 49
innovative science.  One reason was undoubtedly the degree of academic rivalry between 
the numerous universities in what was a large and rapidly expanding academic market both 
internationally, and in the German-speaking areas of Europe in particular.  Strong 
competition between universities to attract successful researchers almost certainly 
counteracted some of the more unwilling universities’ reluctance to adopt innovations and 
obliged them to establish and maintain high standards.  Moreover, the major German 
university laboratories played host to many of the brightest students from all over the 
world, including virtually all of the most prominent natural scientists working at the end of 
the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries.  The personal and professional 
networks thus developed were also effective in overcoming some of the disadvantages 
created through the isolation of the university laboratories and facilitating coordinated 
research in particular areas.17  Competition between the individual federalised states has 
also been posited as a reason for the level of scientific innovation which earned German 
higher education global respect.18   Nor is it likely that every professor was 
bureaucratically hidebound.  Ironically, however, it is equally possible that because those 
whose primary focus was teaching and research immersed themselves exclusively in this, it 
left the less imaginative, the “faculty drones”, in control of administrative decision-
making.  This, in turn, probably served to exacerbate the inflexibility already inherent in 
the system due to their inability to recognise the benefits of change and innovation.19  More 
significantly perhaps, a second argument suggests that German science’s place at the 
vanguard of science and technology owed considerably more to the rise in importance of 
non-academic research facilities from 1840 onwards.  These included the establishment of 
research institutes, the development of industrial laboratories and the Technische 
Hochschulen (polytechnic college equivalents), where the emphasis was on applied 
research and technological development with a more directly beneficial economic impact.    
 
 
Industrialisation and the growth of the Technische Hochschulen 
 
As early as 1816 Gottlob Kunth, tutor to Wilhelm von Humboldt, described Germany’s 
relatively unsophisticated  level of technology as due to a lack of proper knowledge and 
educational facilities which were: 
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…a great handicap for our economic classes…At the same time it consolidates 
the dividing wall between them and the so-called learned or educated classes – 
to the detriment of both 20 
 
Even as late as 1882 at least 43 percent of the working population were still actively 
involved in the primary sector.21  Rapid industrialisation, however, created a growing 
requirement for more educated and specialised personnel, such as engineers, who could 
adapt to the needs of industrial production.  The planning and running of the new factories, 
for example, required electrical, chemical and metallurgical engineers as well as the more 
obvious mechanical and construction variety.  Electrotechnical development, in particular, 
required complicated and integrated programmes of research and development involving a 
number of scientific disciplines.  In response, the Technische Hochschulen increased in 
size, multiplied in number and gradually improved their educational prestige.  Their 
research projects resulted, amongst other things, in the rapid development of the electric 
motor and consequent promotion of power consumption in industry and the home.  It had a 
profound effect on the mechanical construction industry, revolutionising craft traditions 
such as the optics industry and precision mechanics and was also instrumental in 
improving productivity and reducing transport and labour costs through the mechanisation 
of heavy mechanical construction, iron and steel works and the mining industry.  Research 
projects spawned a new electrochemical – electrometallurgical industry which used 
electrolysis to produce chlorine, carbons, explosives, fertilisers and detergents as well as 
aluminium, ferroalloys and special steels.22  Moreover, the Technische Hochschulen often 
incorporated region- and industry-specific specialties. Thus, students in Karlsruhe could 
major in subjects such as forest-hydraulic engineering as well as construction, mechanical, 
electrical, chemical, electro-chemical, physical-chemical engineering, architecture and 
pharmacy.  Such was the success of the Technische Hochschulen that, as well as 
contributing significantly to Germany’s economic growth, by the beginning of the 
twentieth century German engineering, technology and engineers were in demand 
throughout the world, while the strong links between the Technische Hochschulen and 
industry created a steady stream of foreign students eager to study with German industrial 
chemists and physicists.23  So unbridgeable remained the rift between Technik and Bildung, 
however, that the technically educated were forced to compete with, rather than join the 
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established social order.  Gispen argues that the result of this competition was twofold.  
Firstly, it was responsible for the development of an internationally recognised standard of 
technological excellence and for the high level of economic achievement which went with 
it.  Secondly, it left traditional academia feeling embattled, strengthening its resistance to 
change and embedding it even more firmly into the academic culture.24   
 
The vast majority of innovations in the chemical field (measured by the number of ‘high-
value’ patents issued i.e. those renewed for fifteen years or more) had been invented and 
developed not by universities or Technische Hochschulen, but by the research and 
development departments of industrial firms.  Additionally, the knowledge transfer which 
resulted, for example from chemical firms to textile manufacturers, was directly 
responsible for creating a vigorous cycle of endogenous growth.25  In an attempt to ensure 
that the basic research relevant to their needs was carried out, however, many of the major 
chemical firms created in the 1860s and 1870s had provided financial and material support 
to some university laboratories, while the German Chemical Society was created in 1867 to 
assist the bilateral communication of information between industry and academia.  
Nevertheless, because of the unwillingness of the universities to cooperate in the provision 
of directed basic research, this too gradually became part of the remit of the Technische 
Hochschulen as well as other extra-academic laboratories such as the Physikalisch-
Technische Reichsanstalt (Imperial Institute of Physics and Technology) inaugurated in 
1887 and the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften (Kaiser 
Wilhelm Society for the Promotion of the Sciences) in 1910.  This latter was a government 
sanctioned research foundation for the pursuit of basic research, financed by industry and 
directed by the universities.  It was founded partly in response to the spiralling costs of 
maintaining scientific laboratories with first-class scientists in individual firms and in 
direct response to the threat posed to Germany’s international leadership in the natural 
sciences by American advances in the biomedical sciences.26   The research undertaken 
was to have both pure and applied dimensions and committed the universities to close, if 
reluctant, cooperation with both industry and the state.27  Much care, however, still went 
into the preservation of institutional vested interests and existing hierarchies of prestige 
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within the research field.28  The university professoriate still appeared happier to 
countenance the appearance of the new, non-university research establishments than 
consider making any changes to it own institutional infrastructure and taking full and more 
directed advantage of the scientific talent at its disposal.29  Nevertheless, the competition 
stimulated by the presence of these societies at the cutting edge of scientific research was 
also responsible for forcing a degree of flexibility on some of the universities at least, 
resulting in the development of ‘pockets of excellence’ and a body of scientists convinced 
of the increasing need for applied scientific research in a time of rapid technological 
growth.  The universities themselves benefited from applied science and technology in the 
form of better designed and more modern instruments, access to the scientific data 
produced by other establishments, the opportunity to place graduates in research 
laboratories and professional discussion with other researchers.  Moreover, the university 
professors were assiduously courted by extra-academic establishments, not only to gain 
access to research findings, but in an effort to acquire the brightest university students for 
their own laboratories.30   
 
Official recognition of the right of the Technische Hochschulen to confer undergraduate 
and postgraduate degrees, ushering in a new professional structure for German engineers, 
eventually arrived in 1899.  It was fiercely contested by the Corporation of German 
Universities which deprecated the lack of Kultur (culture) in those graduates who had been 
admitted to the Technische Hochschulen with a scholastic background in the natural 
sciences as opposed to the classics.  This was denounced by the German Engineering 
Association (Verein Deutscher Ingenieure or VDI) as a blatant attempt to reinforce social 
barriers and defend the universities’ monopoly of higher education and ultimately, the 
Corporation’s resistance was defeated through the personal intervention of Kaiser Wilhelm 
II who officially sanctioned the new status of the Technische Hochschulen.   Ironically, 
however, Gispen argues that once having obtained full professional status at university 
level, the teaching bodies of the Technische Hochschulen then gradually came to be 
considered, and to consider themselves, as fully fledged members of the 
Bildungsbürgertum (intellectual middle-classes) and began to define their sector as simply 
another variant of classical Bildung.31  Moreover, they began to exercise much the same 
kind of autonomy as did professors of the traditional universities and in many instances 
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came to display the same resistance to the idea of being seen as the “handmaidens of 
capitalist industry“.  This being the case, it is reasonable to surmise that, notwithstanding 
the huge contribution that the Technische Hochschulen had made to scientific and 
technological progress, their effectiveness in terms of direct responsiveness to societal and 
economic need was likely to diminish.32     
 
Student numbers at the Technische Hochschulen continued to increase.   The following 
table illustrates the numbers attending from 1890 – 1910: 
 
Table 2.1 
Student Numbers in Technische Hochschulen 1890, 1900, 1910 
  
 Number of Students 
    
    
Technische Hochschule 1890 1900 1910 
    
    
Charlottenburg 1,640 4,343 2,943 
Munich     882 2,476 3,062 
Darmstadt     318 1,674 1,768 
Karlsruhe     571 1,538 1,343 
Hannover     580 1,458 1,770 
Dresden     403 1,161 1,447 
Stuttgart     496 1,034 1,224 
Aachen     198    567    916 
Brunswick     273    483    663 
Danzig    -    - 1,315 
Breslau    -    -     117 
    
    
Total 5,361 14,734 16,568 
    
Source: Robert Locke, The End of the Practical Man, (Greenwich Connecticut, JAI Press 
Inc., 1984), p 34 
 
 
Particularly striking is the leap in the numbers attending Technische Hochschulen in the 
decade 1890 – 1900 during which the population of the country increased by only ten 
percent, and before the Technische Hochschulen had acquired university level status.   This 
arguably indicated a growing disenchantment with the more hierarchical distribution of 
privilege in society.  More likely, it simply reflected the increasing pace of German 
industrialisation and perceived opportunity in a changing society.  More practically, 
however, it also caused a serious glut of technically trained personnel on the job market, 
most particularly in the decade before WWI.  This particular crisis saw virtually an entire 
generation of graduates, which had enrolled expecting to graduate into a profession with 
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good career opportunities, being employed in inferior positions for which their training 
was wholly unsuitable and earning salaries which were often lower than those of skilled 
blue-collar workers.  Moreover, unless possessed of exceptional talent or advantageous 
social connections, professional advancement became progressively more unlikely.   
Enrolment was particularly high in the mechanical engineering departments of the 
Technische Hochschulen, considered to be the most versatile, most easily adaptable course 
and thus most useful for career purposes.  Numbers in this discipline rose by more than 
300 percent from 1890 – 1891 (1,878 students) to 1901 – 1902 (7,593 students).  To some 
extent, however, this rise may also have been due to the lack of non-academic engineering 
schools, because what employers actually appeared to want were large numbers of the 
more practically trained Techniker rather than Diplom- and Doktor-Ingenieure with no 
workplace experience and few practical hands-on skills.  This was intensified by a trend 
towards the increasing bureaucratisation of industry, and attempts to improve productivity 
through the increasing division of labour and the fragmentation and deskilling of jobs 
which accompanied the rise of large industrial firms.  Hence, the career prospects for the 
majority of academically trained engineers were bleak.  Although primarily a cyclical 
problem caused by over-rapid expansion of the sector, the effect was what the Verband 
Deutscher Diplom-Ingenieure (VDDI) described as a harmful and degrading double 
proletarianisation bringing with it a loss of both income and professional identity 
accompanied by the fear of downward social mobility.33 
 
However, the elite, quasi-aristocratic position of the traditional academics was also 
becoming increasingly untenable.  The accelerating decline in the classical tradition of the 
university raised fears among the academic elite that the universities were being turned 
into “factories for practical research and the mass production of technicians” and that the 
traditional identification between the universities and the cultivated segment of society was 
being lost.34  Germany’s belated and somewhat abrupt change from backward agricultural 
nation to industrial superpower had led to the evolution of an industrial elite and new 
socio-economic power blocs which had a dramatic effect on the political landscape.  As 
well as a consistent rise in the number of Technische Hochschule students, university 
populations were also becoming larger and more socially diverse with the number of 
students registered doubling between 1876 and 1892 from 16,124 to 32,834.35  This led to 
the first coining of the slogan ‘academic proletariat’ prompted by fears of a surfeit of 
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theoretically educated graduates vying for a very limited number of positions in the 
‘learned professions’ of law, medicine, the church, the upper civil service and secondary 
and university teaching.36  By 1918 student numbers would increase even further to 
72,000.  The relatively much smaller increase in the numbers of academic staff, from 1,313 
in 1860 to 3,090 in 1909, in part caused by the operation of the academic promotional 
process, resulted in a much higher teaching load for academics with correspondingly less 
time to pursue research interests.37 
 
Running parallel to this was a growing trend toward specialisation in research, which did 
not conform to the accepted traditional divisions in university science.  Rather than 
reforming their organisational structure to encompass the new specialties, however, the 
academic corporations professed the fear that overspecialisation would cause the neglect of 
the larger, more basic questions of science.  This led them to restrict the development of 
new disciplines even, for example, in such intellectually important fields as physical and 
physiological chemistry, and to relegate them instead to the status of sub-specialties within 
existing disciplines under the control of a single professor who ostensibly was expert in 
them all.38  The limiting of the number of professorial chairs in this way obviously 
reinforced their elite status, but it also further increased the ratio of students to full 
professors from 17:1 in 1870 to almost double that by 1905.  The professors felt 
themselves increasingly beleaguered.39  However, there were increasingly numerous 
complaints that professors in fact spent too much time researching obscure specialities 
instead of teaching40 and that the instruction given was overly theoretical meaning that 
graduates were unable to adapt effectively to employment outwith academia.41    
 
 
Higher Education in the Weimar Republic 
 
The loss of the First World War, the end of the monarchical system and the ensuing 
political revolution accompanied by economic collapse and catastrophic hyperinflation 
served to deepen the divisions within higher education and between higher education and 
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society.  The belief that true scientific objectivity was incompatible with politics allowed 
academia simultaneously to reject the new democratic regime and to see themselves as the 
only true representatives of the interests of the nation.42  The professoriate came to believe 
that they, the “bearers of culture”, were living through a “crisis of culture”43 which 
threatened their status as a social and cultural elite and their hold over the major 
administrative systems of the country.  For one thing, their conviction of the superiority of 
German culture and the German Sonderweg44 had been shown to be very misplaced.  
Secondly, the hyperinflation of the early 1920s had increased the trend towards 
egalitarianism by strengthening the new entrepreneurial, managerial and technical elites 
whilst concentrating its more destructive effects on the traditional middle class.  This 
particularly affected those in the public sector such as higher officials and professors, 
whose social position demanded an expensive lifestyle but whose incomes lagged well 
behind the escalating cost of living.45  Thus, although the financial position of academics 
was no worse, and indeed, rather better than that of many other groups as the 
hyperinflationary period ended, it had nevertheless weakened their material position and 
caused deep concern about the erosion of status differentials in society and the 
maintenance of their position within it.46   
 
Thirdly, in an economy which increasingly demanded technically trained manpower in 
order to translate technological transformation and booming industrial development into 
economic growth, those trained academically for traditional careers in the army and civil 
service found their employment opportunities narrowing and hence the rewards achievable 
from years of study receding, leaving many feeling “spiritually and physically exploited”.47  
Fourthly, the pressure to fill the growing numbers of teaching and engineering positions 
resulted in the changing and lowering of university entry requirements and created fears of 
a “democratisation of the professions”.48  The result was disaffection from the new liberal 
society which the Weimar Convention was attempting to create and a retreat into “a kind 
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of Peter Pan ideology for a society that didn’t want to grow up”.49   A further factor was 
the expansion and changing nature of the university population.  Most historians highlight 
the radical change which took place in the student body with, by 1930, almost seventy 
percent of students coming from the middle and particularly the lower middle classes.50   
Working class representation was still no higher than three percent, but the most significant 
change was that women constituted around sixteen percent of the student population.  
Given its previous adamant resistance to female participation, it seems highly ironic that 
the greatest proportion of these consisted of the daughters of the educated elite.51  The 
following table gives the number of students attending university and the Technische 
Hochschulen during summer semester over the period 1913 – 1929:   
 
Table 2.2 
Student Numbers in Universities and Technische Hochschulen  
(selected years 1913 - 1929) 
         
Year Universities Technische Hochschulen 
         
  
Males 
 
Females 
% 
Females 
 
 
Total 
 
Males 
 
Females 
% 
Females 
 
Total 
 
1913 56 693  3 368 5.6 60 061 11 705 62 0.5 11 767 
1924 60 654  7 460 11.0 68 114 21 460 357 1.6 21 817 
1925 53 650  6 808 11.3 60 458 20 842 374 1.8 21 216 
1926 57 170  7 851 12.1 65 021 21 315 368 1.7 21 683 
1927 62 569  9 570 13.3 72 139 20 461 466 2.2 20 927 
1929 78 167 14 923 16.0 93 090 22 024 657 2.9 22 681 
         
 
Sources: Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich, 1928, pp 509 – 510; 1930, pp 456 – 457  
 
 
The table demonstrates three things in particular.  Most obvious is the steady increase in 
student numbers at both university and the Technische Hochschulen despite a blip in the 
year 1925.  Secondly, the number of female students in higher education also rose 
consistently with history, and in particular ‘philological historical science’ followed by 
general medicine and mathematics and the natural sciences, by far the most popular 
choices.  In the Technische Hochschulen the most favoured option for women was general 
science followed by architecture and, increasingly over the decade, chemistry, metallurgy 
and economics.  Although 1913 saw the first women studying agricultural engineering, 
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mechanical engineering and electrotechnology, they were never numbered in more than 
threes and fours throughout the 1920s.52  
 
Thirdly, the figures clearly show the supremacy in numbers of university students 
compared to those in Technische Hochschulen.  Thus, by virtue of sheer size alone the 
contribution of the universities remained of crucial potential importance to the national 
economic effort and to technological growth.  If, as has been argued, their structure and 
organisation was overly rigid, their focus was on the purely theoretical and their product 
was graduates whose education left them ill-equipped to take their place in the 
employment market, this would inevitably have had an adverse effect on the country’s 
potential for growth.  Moreover, it has been suggested that although Germany still ranked 
as a world leader scientifically until the early 1920s, most of that reputation for excellence 
was as a result of work done before WWI; thereafter the crown was being steadily lost to 
the USA.  By the decade 1910 – 1920 the majority of the great German scientists were 
ageing, while in the US the organisation of scientific research was advancing with such 
rapidity that in 1930, for example, the US accounted for almost thirty percent of the total 
production of scientific papers in the chemistry field and over thirty percent in the field of 
physics as opposed to Germany’s six percent in both.53  
 
The new republic was keen to effect reforms which would better integrate the institutions 
of higher education into the changing society; however, few of the reforms proposed were 
ever realised.54   Nevertheless, three new urban universities were founded in Frankfurt, 
Hamburg and Cologne which concentrated on practical research in new fields such as 
social and commercial science, politics, municipal and social administration as well as in 
older disciplines such as medicine.  The idea of incorporating such innovations into all 
universities, however, again brought forceful and obdurate opposition from the 
Corporation of German Universities.55  More opposition was incurred by the development 
of an enhanced status for the new and independently funded business schools 
(Handelshochschulen).  Developed from existing two-year business school programmes, 
their mission was to impart an “entrepreneurial way of thinking”.56  Their increasing 
popularity led to the expansion of the curriculum into “pragmatic disciplines” including 
business economics (as opposed to the traditional historically-oriented German 
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economics), auditing, financial accounting and the development of modern management 
techniques.   
 
These institutions ultimately gained the right to grant not only undergraduate degrees, but 
also doctorates in 1928.  In the eyes of established academia, the status of these institutions 
was seriously compromised because, for the first time, students could enter higher 
education without first having succeeded in passing the Abitur (although the majority of 
those entering had in fact done so).  Moreover, most of the professors who taught there 
originally were men with undistinguished academic histories (though a great deal of 
practical experience and personal talent), many of whom had to be awarded honorary 
doctorates by the state in order to be legally able to teach at ‘university’ level.  The 
business schools were, nevertheless, popular, well funded and rapidly became an 
established feature of German higher education performing their own, practically oriented 
research.57  One effect appeared to be a much higher level of commercial awareness in 
German firms.  By 1927, the Balfour Committee on Industry and Trade would draw an 
unfavourable comparison between the tens of students undergoing commercial education 
in Great Britain compared to the hundreds in Germany at a time when British export 
performance was suffering at the hands of well trained German export salesmen instructed 
in their customers’ languages and backed up by a commercially minded consular service.58  
 
In contrast, post-war inflation and excessive reparation demands ensured that the state-
funded universities were suffering from an increasing inability to pay for even the most 
basic of scholarly provisions, causing fears of permanent damage to German research and 
scholarship.59  In appeals for financial support, luminaries such as Max Planck, Adolf 
Harnack, Fritz Haber and the spokesmen for the Union of German Universities argued that 
“scientific and scholarly prestige [was] the sole great-power attribute remaining to the 
German nation…[acting]… as a surrogate for the other, lost attributes of a great power”.60  
It was an argument which appeared to have resonance across the political spectrum with 
even the Social Democrats calling for billions to be struck from the military budget and re-
employed in the service of culture and science.61   Forman has demonstrated, however, that 
the doctrine of science as a surrogate for military and economic might, when coupled with 
general academic disaffection, also led to a situation where the German researchers 
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withdrew their cooperation with major international scientific bodies such as the 
International Research Council because they feared not being given due recognition as one 
of the leading nations of the world.62  Again, Forman argues that this conduct received 
enthusiastic approval right across the political spectrum.   However, this academic self-
isolation also meant withdrawal from multilateral international scientific competition and 
almost certainly contributed to the deficits in German science which were to be reinforced 
during the National Socialist era and would lead to the opening of large gaps in technology 
between Germany and the West.63   
 
The situation was aggravated by the decline of the economy after 1923 which lasted right 
up until the Great Depression and the ultimate demise of the Weimar Republic.   In 
response, both industrialists and labour advocated the Rationalisierung (rationalisation) of 
industry in order to be able to undercut foreign competitors and earn the necessary foreign 
currency to pay the war reparations.   However, while for labour this meant the adoption of 
the latest technologies in order to create economic well-being across society in an 
“American-style consumer society”, industrialists interpreted it rather as the introduction 
of harder work for longer hours in an effort to cut costs.  The encouragement of invention 
and the introduction of new technologies was also de-prioritised in favour of investment in 
new machinery to better exploit existing technologies.  The result, predictably, was a 
period of technological stagnation.  This gave rise to serious antagonism from engineers, 
inventors and industrial scientists who regarded innovation as the best means of 
stimulating economic growth and the introduction of American-style efficiency to German 
industry.64   
 
The rise of National Socialism 
 
Alienation from what it saw as a crisis of modernisation caused by the “accelerated speed 
of the industrial and technological revolution”65 and a perceived deterioration in the tone of 
academic life led academia to an even more rigidly nostalgic attachment to the values of 
the past and calls for a restoration of the true humanistic university concept coupled with a 
retreat from practically oriented research.  More dangerously, their progressively stronger 
rejection of Western politics and liberal Western thought allowed the professors to identify 
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themselves increasingly with the growing völkisch (nationalistic-ethnic) movement66 and 
the idea of a strong state with a cohesive national community which would re-establish the 
lost certainties of a bourgeois way of life.67  Coupled with a strong degree of latent anti-
Semitism, their hypothetically neutral stance towards politics, contemporary affairs and 
even technology, by which they affirmed themselves as elevated from the rest of society, 
allowed right wing interests to abuse the study of history and literature for anti-Semitic and 
virulently nationalistic propaganda, thereby assisting the rise of the National Socialists.68  
Majority support for the Nazis had also been achieved in a violently anti-Semitic student 
body long before 1933.69  By the time the academic elite realised that the “national” 
movement claiming to represent a “spiritual revival” which they had regarded as “genuine 
at the core” if a little “undisciplined” was in fact wholly pernicious, it was far too late to 
revise their position.  Through what has been described as their “abandonment of 
intellectual responsibility”,70 the consequences for academia as well as for the nation were 
disastrous.   
 
If the increase in the student population pre-WWI had created fears of an academic 
proletariat in Germany, at the beginning of the 1930s student population ratios of around 
25 per 10,000 of national population appeared to be causing generalised panic at the 
prospect of the creation of an entire generation of unemployed academics, as expressed in 
the writing of Pascal Jordan:   
 
Only a fraction of those studying today will have the opportunity to find a  
position such as that which they have in mind in the civil service…the reason for this 
overexpansion is without doubt mainly due to the defective structure of our education 
system (more exactly: to the failure of the politically motivated reforms which have 
been carried out since 1918)71 
 
University graduates were again forced to take up positions inconsistent with their 
qualification level working, for example, in business where their qualifications were 
largely irrelevant.72  In industry, graduate engineers were increasingly falling foul of the 
                                                 
66
 Paletschek, ‘The German University Idea’, p 43  
67
 Weisbrod, ‘Bourgeois Society in Germany’, p 33 
68
 Ben David, The Scientist’s Role in Society, pp 136 – 137  
69
 Weisbrod, ‘Bourgeois Society in Germany’, p 33 
70
 Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins, pp 443 - 446 
71
 Pascual Jordan, ‘Die Wandlung der Universität’, Rostocker Universitätszeitung vom 9. Mai 1933 pp 3 – 5, 
Appendix 1 in Dieter Hoffman,‘Pascual Jordan im Dritten Reich – Schlaglichter’, Preprint 248, Max-Planck-
Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 2003, p 13, http://www.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/Preprints/P248.PDF 
(accessed 12.2.2006)  
72
 Ringer, Education and Society in Modern Europe, p 99 
 62
social conflict between the tradition of engineers as on-the-job trained craftsmen and the 
concept of a formally educated applied scientist.   As a result, many complained of their 
“misuse or non-use”.73  Under the National Socialists, therefore, enrolment quotas for 
higher education were introduced, in particular for women.74  The following table shows 
the decline in student numbers from 1929 to 1937:    
 
Table 2.3 
Student Numbers in Universities and Technische Hochschulen  
(selected years 1929 – 1936) 
   
Year Universities Technische Hochschulen 
 
        
 
 
Male 
 
Female 
% 
Female 
 
 
Total 
 
Male 
 
Female 
% 
Female 
 
Total 
         
1929¹ 78 167 14 923 16.0 93 090 22 024 657 2.9 22 681 
1934/35² 57 158 10 990 16.1 68 148 12 628 471 3.6 13 099 
1936/37² 40 726   7 382 15.3 48 108 10 603 325 3.0 10 928 
         
¹ Summer Semester 
² Winter Semester 
Sources: Statistische Jahrbücher für das deutsche Reich (1930 - 1937)75 
 
 
The reduction in numbers is striking.  In a comparison with the 1929 figures, the number 
of men studying at university almost halved and the number of women was reduced by 
more than half, although their respective proportions remained little altered; the 
Technische Hochschulen were even worse affected.  The situation was aggravated by the 
introduction of a compulsory six-month spell in labour camp and a further two years in 
military service for all those males succeeding in university entrance examinations.  Once 
there, they were subjected to many pressures to remain in military service instead of taking 
up their university places.76  Formal university entry requirements were relaxed to favour 
deserving young Nazis who had proved their credentials through enlistment in the Hitler 
Youth or the Labour Service; nevertheless, these ultimately accounted for less than one 
percent of admissions to university and 1.76 percent to Technische Hochschulen.  Thus, 
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any change in the social origins of the student body was infinitesimal and the recruitment 
patterns established throughout the 19th century persisted.77 
 
The system of academic self-government, however, was destroyed.  Freedom of learning 
and the principle of the objectivity of scholarship were officially repudiated and there was 
an upsurge in research and teaching based on racism and völkisch thinking.  The new 
regime had no use for scholarship without practical application for the aims of National 
Socialism and thus some of the more theoretical academic subjects were withdrawn to be 
replaced with pseudo-sciences such as Aryan linguistics, eugenics and the bizarre 
Welteislehre – a National Socialist invention starting from the somewhat dubious premise 
that the cosmos was formed by the energy derived from the struggle of blazing giant suns 
with infinite ice-fields in the universe.78  Technological development was heavily 
prioritised and the Kaiser- Wilhelm Institutes met with particular favour.  Their research, 
centred on the practical application of science in industry, had been involved throughout 
the Weimar period in projects aimed at economic self-sufficiency in order to free Germany 
from dependency on world markets.  This pursuit of autarchy was unquestionably of 
benefit to the National Socialist in the build-up to war, thus the percentage of the national 
research funding ‘pot’ allocated to the KWG increased exponentially till 1945 at the 
expense of the Hochschulen.79    
 
Reich Minister for Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels stated that, “We...live…in a century 
whose melody is determined by the thousand-fold buzz of machines and roar of 
engines”.80  Hence, large quantities of money were poured into applied and military 
research and development, particularly in strategic areas such as high-altitude flight, jet 
engines, high-speed aerodynamics, ballistics and rocket research.  Despite this, however, 
and the growth of Luftfahrtzentren (Aviation Academic Education Centres) at a number of 
technical universities, the research effort was continually constricted by a shortage of 
qualified personnel.  For example, in order to proceed at the pace and in the direction 
specified by the Nazi regime there was an estimated need for around 3,600 aeronautical 
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engineers annually: the Hochschulen managed to produce only 16 in 1937, 56 in 1938 and 
57 in 1939.  Additionally, long-term research projects were abandoned in favour of 
projects of immediate use to the war effort, with the work increasingly tightly supervised 
by military and state bureaucracy, while secrecy was dramatically intensified. Indeed, 
obsessive secrecy was a feature of most areas of scientific research under National 
Socialism and therein lay a significant problem.  Internally, an embargo on scientific 
publications prevented teamwork and blocked continuous cooperation on larger projects, 
which was particularly harmful to ‘big science’ projects such as aeronautics and atomic 
science. 81   Even more seriously, the long-term prospects, even for those scientific areas 
prioritised by the regime, were compromised by a virtual across the board prohibition of 
access to the wider scientific community.  Germany’s disconnection from international 
scientific development effectively prevented the transfer of knowledge and technology 
thus further restricting its own scientific and technical progress. 82 
 
The regime refused to recognise the traditional apolitical stance of the professoriate and 
proof of political reliability became generally mandatory.  Few resisted NS pressure.  
Some, such as physicist Pascual Jordan, frankly allowed themselves to become political 
instruments exhorting the scientific community to orient research towards rearmament and 
an increase in technological capability because of the progressively more technical nature 
of war:   
 
the ruling events of the young Greater German Reich – the four-year plan, 
rearmament and war – have shown work in the natural sciences its fixed place 
in the life of the nation83 
 
More damaging still, after 1933 more than 2,500 scholars and scientists, classed as either 
non-Aryan, with Jewish spouses or politically unreliable were expelled from universities, 
Kaiser-Wilhelm Institutes and other research centres.  This involved around fifteen percent 
of all university professors and Dozenten (associate professors)84 but accounted for 
twenty-five percent of all physicists and twenty-six percent of all biochemists, reflecting 
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the high proportion of Jews in these disciplines.  More than two thirds were forced to 
emigrate and a small number were killed or died in concentration camps.  The Jewish 
scientists had tended to work in more modern and progressive areas which challenged the 
traditional trajectory of scientific development, in large part because of a high degree of 
anti-Semitism in academia which prevented their progression in the fields of ‘pure 
science’.  Their dismissal was accompanied by the marginalisation of many of their 
innovations, either in an attempt to secure the approval of the National Socialists or to 
avoid any possible association with Judaism.85  The overall loss to German scholarship and 
science caused by the forced emigrations was immense and was, moreover, a direct cause 
of the strikingly backward state, particularly of biotechnology in Germany through the 
1970s.  By the time the significance of biotechnology to future technological development 
was belatedly realised, the gaps in the infrastructure of research and development would be 
virtually insurmountable.  Additionally, those scientists expelled numbered among the 
most gifted and most often cited scientists in the world (more than 2.4 times more often 
than those who remained) and included a large number of future Nobel Prize winners.86  
The forced expulsion also enabled the transfer of specific research programmes, for 
instance in nuclear physics and molecular biology, to the countries receiving the émigrés, 
thus benefiting their research at the expense of Germany’s.  The refinement of these 
projects would ultimately result in developments such as particle accelerators and the 
world’s first ultraviolet spectrophotometer.87   
 
 
The Aftermath of World War II 
 
After 1945, the country suffered another political, economic, social and cultural upheaval 
akin to that experienced in 1919.  The effects of almost half a century of war, preparation 
for war and huge constitutional upheaval had been accompanied by a more global change 
in the Zeitgeist which challenged the traditional distribution of status in society.  In 
German academic circles, however, the animosity of the National Socialists towards them 
had simply reinforced the professors’ perceptions of themselves as an elite.  Most 
maintained that they had preserved the purity of scientific knowledge undefiled by 
ideological distortion.  Their invocation of the value-neutrality of science reflected their 
                                                 
85
 Szöllösi-Janze, ‘National Socialism and the Sciences’, p 25 
86
 Ute Deichmann, ‘The Expulsion of German-Jewish chemists and Biochemists and their Correspondence 
with Colleagues in Germany after 1945: The Impossibility of Normalisation?’, in Szöllosi-Janze (ed.), 
Science in the Third Reich, pp 245 - 246 
87
 Ash, ‘Scientific Changes in Germany 1933, 1945, 1990’, pp 340 - 341 
 66
lack of self-criticism and denial of any responsibility for the rise of National Socialism.  
This was epitomised by the level of indignation expressed during the Allies’ attempted 
denazification of higher education which resulted in some 4,289 scholars and scientists 
being dismissed as well as the complete closure of some institutions.  Otto Hahn, for 
example, stated, “I consider it an injustice.”88 Others, such as Pascual Jordan whose 
cooperation with the National Socialists was indisputable, attempted to justify their 
actions: 
 
I thought the radicalism shown at the beginning would evade [sic] with time and a 
tolerable situation would return by steps…I hoped to be able to accelerate this 
evolution to a certain little extent…[opposition] would have meant for 
me…certainly ruin of my existence…I had to become a member of the party89  
 
The denazification process will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters.  More 
bleakly for Germany as a whole, some 2,925 of the most talented chemists, physicists, 
aeronautics experts and rocket scientists were taken from the Allied zones and removed 
mainly to America or Russia as a sort of ‘intellectual reparation’.  Moreover, though many 
who went to the Soviet Union later returned to the GDR, those who went to the USA 
tended to stay there because of the lack of career opportunities in Germany in their fields, 
though this may have been balanced to a slight extent by the return of an unknown (but 
considerably smaller) number of those scientists expelled by the Nazis.90 
 
Transcending the huge political discontinuities caused by the war and the division of the 
country, firstly into the Allied Zones of Occupation and later into East and West Germany, 
there was considerable continuity in terms of research and development.  In the Western 
zones the old Kaiser-Wilhelm Society was re-invented as the Max Planck Society, while 
the former Prussian Academy of Sciences was restructured to form the Akademie der 
Wissenschaften (Academy of the Sciences) in the East.  Name changes aside, they seem to 
have maintained a very similar programme of research to that which was being followed 
before and during the war, albeit somewhat hampered by lack of capital, equipment and the 
loss of data.  Although this continuity might have been expected to be beneficial to the 
research effort, it served, in fact, to prevent the adoption of innovative developments from 
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within and without the Germanys for a considerable number of years, arguably another 
primary reason for the backwardness and lack of international relevance of the science of 
both East and West.91   As the French government stated to the governor of Mainz in 1949, 
“The backwardness of German scholars is in effect such that one can scarcely say …if 
their work could be of any use to us”.92  To this must obviously be added the difficulties 
caused by the very precarious, impecunious and unstable working conditions which 
prevailed in the immediate post-war years, as well as the climate of mistrust in the 
international scientific community towards those scientists who had prospered under 
National Socialism which hampered Germany’s reintegration into international 
organisations.93 
 
A different sort of continuity was evident in the universities post 1945.  A rejection of 
National Socialism and everything it stood for led to a purported reversion to the ‘cultural 
tradition’ of the überzeitlich (timeless) ideal of the neo-humanistic university, even if its 
interpretation differed considerably in each of the new German states.  In the West, the 
Humboldtian ‘tradition’ with its emphasis on the classics and humanism was seen as 
representing a safeguard against the return of the practical scholarship of National 
Socialism; however, the fact that it also entailed the preservation of the previous 
organisational structure blocked all attempts at university reform and ossified conditions in 
the universities for decades.94  The genuine and universal agreement in the country for the 
development of a politically democratic German state was not matched by a similar 
conviction in the majority of professors of the need for democracy within the universities 
including the Technische Hochschulen.   As British officials noted: 
 
The power of routine justified as efficiency, of inertia glorified as loyalty to 
tradition…is surprising in Germany…both in schools and universities the same 
dislike of change, the same unwillingness to reassess the whole situation and 
modify past practice to meet it is very marked.95  
 
Eventually, the general public perception of the education system as im Kern gesund 
(sound at core) and the widely expressed wish to retain it influenced the occupying 
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authorities to permit its preservation despite their many efforts at reform.96  Thus, the 
newly democratic and capitalist West was supported by one of the most undemocratic and 
feudal systems of higher education in Europe, one which essentially remained the preserve 
of the middle classes through the disparity of educational opportunity and provision 
existing across the states, which effectively ensured that elementary school education 
constituted the only prospect for the majority and which supported academia’s position as 
a self-replicating societal elite.97 
 
The founding of the new Free University of Berlin in 1948 in response to a very specific 
situation in the divided city was, nevertheless, envisaged as providing a positive influence 
for change on the universities of the West.  This was a much more democratic institution 
with a more egalitarian population and strong student representation in its governance, 
including a say in the appointment of professors.  The university also incorporated a much 
more flexible attitude to study, with evening, part-time and distance learning courses (via 
the radio) being offered and large cohorts of mature students and students from the East 
being admitted.  Within a few years, however, rather than encouraging reform in other 
West German higher education institutions, it began instead to conform to existing trends.  
The fading of idealism, evident in changing student attitudes and the desire of its 
professors for the same status as traditional academics, was accompanied by the loss of the 
Eastern bloc students after the building of the Berlin Wall and the eventual atrophy of 
most of the reform features of the university until in 1969 its original constitution was 
revoked and it became indistinguishable from its sister institutions in the West.98   
 
In the Soviet Zone, later East Germany, the rhetoric of a return to the Humboldtian 
tradition was used to justify the politicisation of higher education policy to allow the 
diffusion of basic ‘democratic’ principles, the removal of the educational privileges of the 
bourgeoisie in favour of the proletariat99 and higher education’s ultimate transformation 
into a relatively compliant commodity industry.  The Humboldtian ethic of the pursuit of 
pure scientific knowledge also, by some alchemy, became reconciled with that of Lenin 
which dictated that the study of pure science was only valid insofar as it could be applied 
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to technology.  The aim was the pursuit of the ‘Scientific and Technological Revolution’ 
which would continually force upward the need for more and better qualifications in a 
virtuous cycle with continual technical progress, as well as demonstrating the superiority 
of a socialist system over capitalism.100  Thus, somewhat ironically, the foundation of a 
totalitarian regime with a very different conception of democracy to that of the West was 
associated with what could be regarded as a more liberal and egalitarian framework for 
higher education.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
For much of the nineteenth century, Germany’s higher education system was held in 
extremely high esteem internationally because of the excellence of its scientists and the 
wealth of scientific breakthroughs produced.  Nevertheless, the institutionally rigid and 
bureaucratic nature of the organisation of the universities and the elitist disposition of its 
professoriate hindered its coming to terms with the industrialisation of the country, 
consequent societal change and the necessary modernisation of higher education and 
research.  Much of the country’s scientific reputation and economic strength, particularly 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, was 
arguably due rather to the rise of extra-academic establishments.  These concentrated on 
applied science and technological development as opposed to the ‘pure’ or basic research 
carried on in the universities.  Both applied and basic research in Germany, however, lost 
ground to the more entrepreneurial and progressive research programmes of the American 
universities which opened up serious technological gaps between the two countries.   
 
Academia struggled to come to terms with the threat to its social status and influence 
created by an increasingly democratic political system following World War One, the 
effects of hyperinflation, the development of a larger and more egalitarian student body, 
the introduction of newer and more practically-oriented disciplines and a wider variety of 
institutions which did not conform to what it regarded as the true purpose of higher 
education.  However, in its tacit support for National Socialism as a means of rejecting 
democratic pluralism and restoring a strong society, academia became complicit in the 
further destruction of its own values and a vastly increased emphasis on technology in 
higher education in order to promote Nazi ideology and feed the war machine.  Moreover, 
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the expulsion of large numbers of the nation’s best scientists and researchers on 
ideological and political grounds exacerbated the damage to science and technology 
wrought by growing isolation from the international scientific community, leaving 
Germany far behind in what would prove to be some of the most important areas of 
research for the future.   
 
The end of the Second World War heralded the advent of more radical political change in 
society.  However, in the academic field, the effects of National Socialist policy prompted 
the ostensible reversion to the safety blanket of the pre-war Humboldtian neo-humanist 
tradition.  In the West, this involved the return of the traditional undemocratic stranglehold 
of university governance by the academic corporations, which even before WWII had 
proved unequal to the challenges of a modernising society.  The implications for 
egalitarianism, scientific and technological progress and economic growth were, therefore, 
less than auspicious.  The East, meanwhile, swapped one authoritarian regime for another.  
A heavy emphasis on applied science and technology and the stress on the universities as 
the drivers of economic growth would fail for many reasons, among them the imposition 
of a repressive and totalitarian culture which militated against the effective pursuit of 
learning and a centralised planning system which was too cumbersome and unwieldy to be 
able to respond effectively to the challenges facing the new state.   
 
In the years following the war both countries experienced a period of spectacular 
economic growth and reconstruction.  West Germany especially became a dynamic 
economic force and assumed a crucial geopolitical role in the developing European 
Economic Community.  East Germany similarly reinvented itself and became one of the 
best-performing socialist countries of East Central Europe with a flourishing GDP growth 
rate.  It has been argued, however, that the type of practical skills and labour required for 
the post-war reconstruction of both countries were those taught at lower scholastic levels.  
The state of the higher education system was thus of less relevance to immediate post-war 
growth.  Its significance for long-term economic prosperity, however, would prove to be 
much greater.  Firstly, the gaps in technology which had developed between both 
Germanys and the USA highlighted the need for a much more innovative and 
entrepreneurial approach to fundamental research in the universities in order to support the 
institutes of applied technological research.  Secondly, deficiencies in highly trained 
manpower drew attention to the inadequacy of the existing graduate population to cope 
with the demands of rapid technological advance and to sustain competitiveness 
internationally.   
 71
 
The following chapter will explore the development of the higher education system in 
West Germany until 1969. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Reform and Expansion of West German Higher Education 1945 – 1969 
 
 
At the end of the Second World War the system of higher education in West Germany was 
in a fairly poor state.  The loss of thousands of professorial staff through the purges of 
National Socialism and as casualties of war and through denazification (although a 
substantial majority were reinstated by the early 1950s) was complicated by the amount of 
physical damage to many of the institutions and the general national impoverishment 
which greatly affected plans for rebuilding in some cases, expansion in others.  The longer-
term deleterious effects of the policies of the interwar years and those of National 
Socialism on science and research has been discussed in chapter two, but they had left 
Germany isolated from the international scientific community and technologically behind 
much of the rest of the Western industrialised world in a number of important disciplines.  
The first imperative, therefore, was to re-establish a functioning and functional system of 
higher education in order to redress the damage, both physical and intellectual, and start 
the process of technological catch-up while training a new generation of academics and 
researchers and providing the appropriate highly trained personnel required by society and 
the economy in the second half of the twentieth century.   
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, however, despite the efforts of the Allied powers in 
the West, the Hochschulen re-opened in the institutional format which had existed prior to 
National Socialism.  Crucially, the academic senates were also given the freedom to draw 
up their own constitutions, giving them greater freedom to limit the extent of state 
intervention in university matters.  Thus, the new Heidelberg University constitution 
described the restored university as “an organic order of spiritual protection and learning 
…against the incursion of fanatical masses of students and instructors in the determination 
of university questions”.1  This was to include only a limited number of students, 
predominantly male, which would create a new “geistesaristokratische Ordnung” 2 
(aristocratic intellectual order).  Nevertheless, a significant expansion of the higher 
education system took place, although it would be fair to say that until the mid-1960s this 
was less the result of planning than of a combination of coincidences.  Among these were a 
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sharp increase in population following the war and the increasing egalitarianism of 
society.3  More compellingly, over time the perception of large and widening gaps in 
technology between West Germany and the USA which threatened Germany’s future 
international competitiveness and which contributed to a ‘brain drain’ of the country’s 
most talented, largely to the USA, highlighted the need for a root and branch structural 
reform of the entire education system from the primary to the post-doctoral level.  The 
result was a concerted effort to achieve the expansion of the system in order to try and 
produce, in a timely fashion, the type of graduates needed by the labour market and to 
expand the technological boundaries.   
 
It became increasingly obvious over the period under consideration, however, that the 
nature of the expansion was creating a considerable number of problems.  While the 
demand for higher education increased, the numbers of the teaching body, the facilities and 
the finances could not keep pace.  A numerus clausus had to be introduced for a growing 
number of subjects and many of those who had expected to easily find employment 
commensurate with their status as graduates were disappointed.  The humanities degrees 
with which most graduated often did not correspond to the requirements of the labour 
market.  The aim of this chapter is to explore the imperatives for the expansion and reform 
of higher education and the subsequent struggle for adjustment within the higher education 
system.  In relating the changes in higher education to the development of West German 
industry over the period in question and, by extension, to the development of the labour 
market, I aim to assess the significance of these to economic growth especially through the 
Golden Years of economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s.  
 
 
Restoration and Reconstruction 
 
One of the most obvious problems facing higher education after May 1945 was the level of 
physical damage to institutions caused by war.  Thus, a first imperative was simply 
reconstruction.  Rebuilding, however, required vast amounts of money and considerably 
more time than that needed to build domestic dwellings because of the need for 
complicated equipment and interior outfitting.  The position of the Technische 
Hochschulen was particularly difficult as, apart from war damage, many of the industry-
oriented research institutes in the technical field had been destroyed or dismantled, whilst 
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others had been limited solely to conducting research required for the Nazi war effort.4  
The cases of the Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule in Aachen (RWTH) and 
the University of Heidelberg illustrate the extremes in the situations of many Technische 
Hochschulen and universities at the time and the problems which arose during the decade 
following the war’s end.  By the end of the war, over 70 percent of the RWTH had been 
destroyed.  In contrast, the University of Heidelberg was one of the few not destroyed by 
the war, but having resumed operations in 1946, had outgrown its campus in the medieval 
part of town by the early 1950s.  By 1958, many of the new students in the summer 
semester were even being temporarily accommodated in campsites because, although the 
site for a second campus had been identified, there was inadequate funding for expansion.  
Nor was there sufficient money for the modernisation of some of the (much) older 
buildings as most state funding and scarce building materials were being allocated to the 
reconstruction of those areas which had suffered the worst of the destruction.5    
 
A second problem facing higher education as a result of the war was a lack of 
appropriately qualified teaching staff.  Very few of those expelled from Germany by the 
Nazis wished, or were encouraged, to return afterwards,6 and denazification was initially 
extensive.  For example, at the RWTH in the British Zone only one docent out of the entire 
teaching body, professor of metallurgy Werner Geller, survived the initial denazification 
process.  However, subsequent action varied somewhat depending on the zone of 
occupation.  For instance, the British brought fewer than one-eighth of former Nazis to trial 
than did the American Zone.  In consequence, although some of the accused academics 
chose to emigrate and a few were tried and found guilty, the vast majority chose to appeal 
against the decision, with the result that by 1950 37.4 percent had already been reinstated.  
Consequently, the RWTH (in the British zone) was able to resume teaching in 1947, albeit 
with only 250 students compared to a high point of 14,000 before the war.7  Nationally, 
reinstatement rose dramatically throughout the 1950s as the occupying forces somewhat 
pragmatically set aside ethical considerations given the development of the Cold War, the 
need for reconstruction and, in particular, a desperate need for more doctors in order to 
avert the threat of a public health catastrophe.8   
                                                 
4
 Paul Luchtenberg, ‘Bericht über den Protokoll über die Sitzung des Unterausschusses “Förderung der 
Forschung” im Ausschuß für Kulturpolitik’ 24.6.53 p 5, in BArch B 304/312/1 
5
 D. Wilhelm Hahn, ‘Bericht über die Situation der Universität Heidelberg vor der Sonderkommission des 
Wissenschaftsrates am 20.1.59’, in BArch B 247/30  
6
 Remy, The Heidelberg Myth, pp 116; 141 – 144  
7Geschichte der RWTH Aachen 1945 – 2003, http://www.archiv.rwth-
aachen.de/rea/Seite/geschichte_heute.htm (accessed 10.1.2007)    
8
 Remy, The Heidelberg Myth, pp 123, 128; see also Mitchell G Ash, ‘Scientific Changes in Germany 1933, 
1945, 1990: Towards a Comparison’, Minerva, Vol. 37, pp 333 – 334  
 75
 
By 1958 student numbers in the RWTH Aachen had increased to over 7,2009 and in the 
University of Heidelberg from their 1938 figure of 1,844 to 7,427, including 1,200 foreign 
students from 64 different countries drawn by Heidelberg’s reputation as “a romantic 
student paradise”.10  Consequently, there was not only a need to rebuild and re-equip with 
increasingly costly modern research equipment, there was also a dire shortage of teaching 
personnel to cope with the steadily increasing student numbers.11  In 1958 the RWTH was 
struggling to maintain a full professor/student ratio of 1:50 and an assistant 
professor/student ratio of 1:20 with particular difficulties in the areas of construction 
engineering, machine engineering, electro technology, mining and metallurgy.12  By 1962, 
however, virtually the same number of professors and docents were coping with an 
increase in student numbers from 7,200 to 10,400 (which translated to an assistant 
professor/student ratio of 1:38).  There was, nevertheless, strenuous resistance from the 
academic senate to the Wissenschaftsrat’s13 suggestion of the installation of parallel 
professorial chairs in popular subject areas to ease the teaching burden as it was felt that 
this would be too difficult administratively and would “affect the comfort (Gemütslage) of 
the professoriate”.14   
 
 
The Pre-reform Education System  
 
The reversion to the federal pre-National Socialist structure and organisation of higher 
education (re)created a highly heterogeneous assembly of higher education institutions 
where academic freedom and structural differentiation were jealously guarded.  Following 
the creation of the Federal Republic, the autonomy of the individual Länder in the 
administration of the educational system, reinforced in the Grundgesetz (Basic or 
Fundamental Law) passed in 1949, demonstrated a number of serious flaws in operation.  
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Despite a constitutional mandate to provide “equal living conditions”,15 there was a 
horribly confused patchwork of largely unregulated public, private and denominational 
schooling at the lower levels.  A study conducted in Baden-Württemberg, for example, 
identified around 110 different types of school provision in that state alone.16  This 
disparity of provision inevitably had implications with regard to access to the Gymnasien, 
then the sole entry route to higher education, in that some regions simply did not have one.  
This was accompanied by wide differences in curricula and the failure of some Länder to 
recognise the academic qualifications issued in others, making the option of moving to a 
different area to pursue upper secondary or tertiary education extremely difficult.  Some 
Länder were unable to provide the necessary foreign language tuition mandatory for 
access to Gymnasium.  For example, only 1.7 percent of school pupils in Rheinland-Pfalz 
and 3.4 percent in Nordrhein-Westfalen received this, compared to 46.9 percent in 
Schleswig-Holstein and 73.6 percent in West Berlin.17  All Länder actively discriminated 
against females in the allocation of places in secondary education.  Because the classics 
and the natural sciences were frequently deemed inappropriate for female minds, often 
their only option was a Modern Languages Gymnasium carrying much less academic 
cachet, providing that such an institution existed in the region.   Moreover, in some 
Länder, such as Nordrhein-Westfalen, all education was resolutely single-sex.  If co-
education was not tolerated within the region, the lack of funding for establishing new 
girls-only Gymnasien meant a de facto denial of opportunity to roughly half the school-age 
children in these areas.18   Thus, in 1950 the percentage of women among the students 
attending West German universities was only 19.7%.19   
 
Attempts were made to unify provision across the country, namely the setting up in 1948 
of the Ständige Konferenz der Kultusminister (Standing Committee of the Ministers of 
Culture or KMK) representing all the different Länder.   Far from achieving its aims, 
however, it was described as “a highly constraining and extremely cumbersome system of 
negotiated coordination”20 which by 1964 still could not agree even as to the 
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standardisation of the start of the academic year.21   Moreover, by 1963 still only 54 
percent of the age group 6 – 24 was in full or part-time education in West Germany 
compared to 83 percent in the USA, reflecting the availability of mass secondary education 
in both countries.22  In 1953 the federal Bundesministerium des Innern (Ministry of the 
Interior) had set up an advisory body called the Deutscher Ausschuss für Erziehungs- und 
Bildungswesen (German Commission for Education), independent of political party 
influence and ministerial bureaucracy, in order to try to create some cohesion and more 
equality of opportunity.  Unfortunately, its recommendations were purely advisory and 
there was no compulsion on the part of the Länder to adopt any of them.  Although its 
chairman, Oberbürgermeister Pfizer, acknowledged the difficulties posed by the cultural 
sovereignty of the Länder, not least by their “ever-changing political constellations with 
different demands”, he asserted that “no-one would want dreary regimentation” instead.23   
 
The necessity for conflict resolution between institutions and Länder in order to be able to 
develop an effective common stance towards the federal government, ultimately led to the 
“disproportional influence of status-quo interests”.24  The agency which should have 
facilitated the process and provided effective leadership – the Westdeutsche 
Rektorenkonferenz (Committee of West German Rectors or WRK)25 was itself subject to 
internal dissent largely because its members were constrained to represent the policy of 
their individual institutions.  Moreover, the creation of the Wissenschaftsrat in 1957, with 
its very different remit, complicated the policy-making process still further.  Policy on 
higher education thus required the cooperation of the federal government, the individual 
Land, that of every institution of higher education within it as well as the input of all the 
above organisations and numerous professional organisations, all working in a spirit of 
mutual distrust and conflicting interests described as “organised anarchy and professional 
bureaucracy at once”.26  It becomes obvious, therefore, that the defining characteristics of 
policy-making in the higher education sphere were multilevel bargaining and resistance to 
reform which ensured that a lack of cohesion and associated problems persisted.  The 
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cumulative effects led to an ongoing, nationally and internationally recognised decline in 
the national educational performance of German youth.27  
 
 
Imperatives for Reform and Expansion 
 
For its part, the immediate concern of the post-war government, inevitably, was recovery 
and reconstruction rather than revamping the higher education system – “Primum vivere, 
deinde philosophari”28 (first survive, then philosophise) – and for a time it appeared that 
the existing West German educational system was furnishing the country with exactly the 
type of labour force it required for the task.  The huge majority of pupils left the 
Volksschule (primary school) to attend Berufsschule and Realschule to learn the basic skills 
and trades which provided the type and level of skills and labour needed to take West 
Germany through the early reconstruction phase and maintain an impressive rate of 
economic recovery.   Thus, if the perceived need of the economy for lesser skilled workers 
to man the growing manufacturing and construction sectors was being met, reform and 
expansion of higher education might well have appeared superfluous.29   
Technical deficit  
 
Nevertheless, there were indications relatively early on of serious concerns about the 
higher education sector, the shortage of highly qualified personnel and the need to expand 
initiatives in basic research.  For example, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) 
president Ludwig Raiser argued that it was only the creative scientific work of sufficient 
numbers of young scientists which could “guarantee a bearable standard of living for this 
overpopulated country between the Alps and the North Sea”.  He also, rather presciently, 
pointed out that neglect of this area would lead to a serious lack of junior academics in the 
Hochschulen within ten or fifteen years.30  By the end of the 1950s, the divergence 
between the attitudes of academia and the federal government towards the expansion of 
higher education was becoming increasingly evident.  On the one hand, the 
Wissenschaftsrat was flagging up warnings of a deficit of tens of thousands of technical 
experts, compounded by institutional overcrowding and too few teaching personnel in 
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higher education.31  On the other, academia was advocating the restriction of student 
numbers in Technische Hochschulen.  The ostensible reason for this was that across the 
country as a whole, there were 55,000 students currently studying in Technische 
Hochschulen, with 8,000 set to graduate in 1962 who faced a lack of suitable employment 
opportunities.32  The federal government’s perception was altogether different however.  A 
one-year administrative agreement had already been drawn up in 1957 committing federal 
funding for the expansion of capacity in the engineering colleges because of the 
assessment of the Wissenschaftsrat that there was “an economically damaging shortage of 
engineers, particularly in the areas of mechanical engineering, electrotechnology and 
electronics”.  This agreement was subsequently prolonged and a further significant 
expansion of the engineering colleges approved in light of the increasingly urgent nature of 
the problem and because large numbers of interested students were being turned away 
every year.33  Although the discrepancy between the demand and supply of engineers was 
becoming ever more apparent, before the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 West 
Germany was able to plug the gaps in qualified manpower to a considerable extent through 
the influx of refugees from East Germany.  The following table demonstrates the extent of 
refugee flight from East Germany arranged by age group: 
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Table 3.1 
 
Refugees from the German Democratic Republic 1949 – 62 
 
  Age Group as a percentage of the total 
        
 
Year 
Total 
in 
1000s 
 
< 14 
 
14 – 18 
 
18 – 25 
 
25 – 45 
 
45 – 65 
 
> 65 
        
1949 129 - - - - - - 
1950 198 - - - - - - 
1951 166 - - - - - - 
1952 182 17.8 11.1 23.7 29.3 16.7 1.4 
1953 331 22.7 11.8 14.2 30.0 18.8 2.5 
1954 184 21.0 12.9 15.2 29.4 17.2 4.3 
1955 253 17.4 9.6 25.5 27.0 16.5 4.0 
1956 279 17.5 9.4 22.1 27.4 18.9 4.7 
1957 262 16.5 9.2 26.5 26.2 16.7 4.9 
1958 204 17.3 8.1 22.7 25.2 20.5 6.2 
1959 144 15.4 7.1 25.8 21.7 20.6 9.4 
1960 199 17.4 5.7 25.7 23.4 20.7 7.1 
1961 207 17.3 5.3 26.6 23.9 19.6 7.3 
1962 21 8.7 4.6 25.4 21.9 13.6 25.8 
        
Source: R. Rytlewski and M. Opp de Hipt, Die BRD in Zahlen 1945/49 – 1980, (München, 
Verlag C. H. Beck. 1987), p 58 
 
 
There are a number of points to be made with regard to this table.  Firstly, large numbers of 
GDR residents were leaving for the West, in some years over a quarter of a million.  Of 
these, two of the largest groups (including the largest group overall) were in the age bands 
25 – 45 and 45 – 65, a huge proportion of whom were industrial and technical specialists.  
At its height, the brain drain encompassed around 100 highly qualified engineers every 
month.34  Secondly, the second largest group is in the age band 18 – 25.  While many of 
this group may have been economically active, a significant number appear to have left 
because of the restricted educational and professional opportunities in the East.  The 
necessity and means of incorporating these into the higher education institutions of the 
West presented a further challenge to an already overstretched system.  Another substantial 
proportion of the refugees consisted of the under-14 and 14 – 28 age groups, who would 
require secondary and tertiary education.  If it can be assumed that many of these were the 
offspring of the more highly qualified refugees, it is equally likely that many of them 
would also be seeking a higher education.  Thirdly, the dramatic fall in refugee numbers 
after 1961 highlighted the extensive shortfall of West Germany’s own provision of 
engineering scientists in particular.  This was, moreover, exacerbated by the West’s own 
smaller, though still significant, migration of the highly qualified. This “voluntary 
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enlistment in the intellectual foreign legion”35 was largely to the USA.   In comparison 
with the rest of Europe, the number of scientists and engineers emigrating from Germany 
was comparatively high as the following table demonstrates: 
 
Table 3.2 
Immigration by scientists and engineers into USA by last country of residence 
1956 - 1966 
       
Source 
Countries 
1956 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
       
Belgium  18   18  24     25   33     37 
France  79   47  89     82 103   112 
Germany 339 277 353    425 370    346 
Italy  72  62  53     38   58    107 
Netherlands 105 113  72     60   80     71 
Great Britain 433 659 910 1,006 941 1,251 
Sweden 144   53  81      90 106     95 
       
Total Europe 1,679 1,617 2,085 2,277 2,231 2,715 
       
Source: OECD, Gaps in Technology, (Paris, OECD, 1970), p 55 
 
 
Bearing in mind that these are purely ‘inflow’ figures and do not show figures for 
returnees, it is nevertheless clear that, with the exception of Great Britain, West Germany 
experienced a much greater outflow of scientists and engineers over the period 1956 – 
1966 than the rest of Western Europe.  While small relative to the numbers emigrating 
from the East, there were, nevertheless, serious worries about the consequent “shocking 
vacuum among qualified researchers” in West Germany and the “squandering of 
intelligentsia potential” (Intelligenzpotentials).36  Of particular concern in the context of 
the technology gap was that of all the West German scientists in the USA in 1964, 71.1 
percent held doctorates,37 and the trend demonstrated steadily increasing numbers of 
doctorate holders emigrating over the period from 43 in 1956 to 71 in 1964.38  Moreover, 
of all the scientists and engineers emigrating to the USA, engineers outnumbered scientists 
by a ratio of more than 2:1,39 so it can probably be assumed that a similar proportion 
applied to the German emigrants.  In one sense, this could be interpreted as confirming the 
suspicions of the professoriate regarding lack of suitable employment for graduate 
engineers.  More compellingly, however, it clearly implied a net loss to the economy of its 
most highly qualified engineers and a net gain to the USA of technological potential.   
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The brain drain also had implications for higher education in that the loss of so much post-
doctoral talent was one of the reasons for a substantial and growing deficit in the number 
of teaching staff in the Technische Hochschulen, particularly of Assistenten (junior 
academics) who undertook a great deal of teaching and supervision duties.   The 
independence and salaries of the positions offered abroad made them very attractive.  The 
situation was exacerbated by the poor remuneration and promotion prospects in academia, 
especially when only the salaries of senior and fully tenured professors were able to 
compete with those of industry and the highly cumbersome professorial appointment 
procedure meant that attaining full professorship was extremely difficult.  For example, of 
the 154 who received Habilitation (advanced degree qualifying an academic to teach at 
university level) in the University of Heidelberg between 1959 and 1964, only 27 had been 
appointed as full professors by June 1964.40  Indeed, the Allgemeine Studenten-Zeitung 
pointed out that, for the vast majority of Assistenten, the idea of having the salary and 
pension entitlement of a similarly aged skilled worker in industry seemed “almost like a 
fantasy”.41  The predictable consequence was that a substantial number of professorial 
chairs remained unoccupied in subjects as diverse as administrative law, agricultural 
mechanical engineering, business economics, marketing, anthropology and theology, at a 
time when the growing numbers of students necessitated an increase.42   
 
Despite the steady increase in student numbers since WWII, (for instance, RWTH Aachen 
student numbers by the winter semester of 1962 had reached 10,40043 and Heidelberg’s 
student population had increased to 11,328 by the summer semester of 1965),44 the 
government’s fear in the early 1960s was that student numbers were at levels low enough 
to be incapable of sustaining technological and economic growth.  Moreover, even though 
only a four percent increase in Abiturienten (those with the right to proceed to higher 
education) numbers was expected by 1970 as the following table taken from Picht’s Die 
Deutsche Bildungskatastrophe demonstrates, the Kultusminister for Nordrhein-Westfalen 
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was forced to admit in 1964 that there were already 50,000 more candidates than places in 
the existing Hochschulen.45   
Table 3.3 
Predicted growth in numbers of Abiturienten till 1970 
(based on average annual growth rate from 1959) 
    
Country Abiturienten 1959 
in 1000s 
Predicted 
Abiturienten 1970 
in 1000s 
Predicted 
% Increase 
    
Yugoslavia 38.1 94.4 148% 
Norway   4.9 13.0 165% 
France 59.1 150.0 154% 
Belgium 10.4   20.8 100% 
Sweden 10.5   25.0 138% 
Italy 55.6 116.6 110% 
Denmark   3.8    8.5 124% 
Netherlands 10.0   20.0 100% 
W Germany 51.4   53.3     4% 
    
Source: OECD Third Survey of Eductional Provision in Picht, Die Deutsche 
Bildungskatastrophe, p 27 
 
 
Picht pointed out, moreover, that the predicted 154 percent increase in Abiturienten in 
France would take the absolute number there to more than that of West Germany despite 
having a much smaller population.  If, as he suggested, the intellectual potential of a 
country defines the competitiveness of its economy, the level of its GDP and ultimately its 
political dominance, then by 1970 it would be France which would be at the centre of 
Europe, while Germany would be playing a subordinate role solely because of the 
backwardness of its education system.46   Ernst Schneider, president of the Deutscher 
Industrie- und Handelstag, (German Chamber of Industry and Commerce) contended that 
the relevant authorities had been very slow to recognise the connection between spending 
on science, research and education and economic growth.47  Although until 1958 the 
funding for schools and universities had risen gradually, it had then fallen steadily from 
3.31 percent of GDP to 3.26 percent in 1959 and 2.99 percent in 1962.48  By 1964 it was at 
a low of 2.2 percent of GDP,49 causing one opposition politician to assert that West 
Germany continued to “disport itself” as if it were still on a “pre-industrial playground”.50  
Of the total spent on education in Germany, around 17.1 percent was devoted to higher 
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education putting it behind the USA (34 percent), Canada (20.3 percent), the UK (20.2 
percent) and France (17.8 percent).  Thus, a much higher proportion of young people in the 
USA were not only receiving, and graduating from higher education (7.6 percent of the 
total labour force) compared to that of Germany (3.9 percent), but Germany was the only 
one of the countries cited not to experience big increases in the graduation rates (0.2 
percent in 1955 and 0.24 percent in 1963).51   
Demographic Imperative 
 
Another factor forcing the expansion of higher education was the population boom 
following WWII.  The following table illustrates the demographic changes from 1939 to 
1980: 
 
Table 3.4 
Population of West German Länder 1939* - 1980 by age groups (in 1000s) 
       
 
Year 
 
 
Under 6s 
 
Of which 
under 1s 
 
 
6 – 15 
 
 
15 – 20 
 
 
20 – 45 
 
Total 
population 
       
1939* 4089 - 5497 3586 15848 40258 
1950 3963   750 7340 3455 16349 47674 
1955 4620   788 6698 4652 17953 53199 
1961 5281   958 6903 3682 19253 56175 
1965 5959 1032 7353 3678 20960 59012 
1970 5738   825 8321 3996 20827 60651 
1975 4232   601 9054 4520 21552 61829 
1980 3530   598 7657 5218 22112 61566 
 
      
*the figures for 1939 were adjusted retrospectively from those collected in an industrial census of 
1936 of the area covered by what ultimately became the FRG 
Source: R. Rytlewski and M. Opp de Hipt, Die BRD in Zahlen 1945/49 – 1980 p 38 
 
 
The rapidly rising numbers in the age groups for all types of education is clear, as is the 
steady increase in the birth rate from the end of the war until 1965 which would inevitably 
translate into increased demand for education a few years on.  Related to this, was an acute 
shortage of teachers at all levels of education, not only in the Hochschulen.  The number of 
school pupils was expected to increase by around two million by 1970, and with the 
eventual nationwide introduction of a ninth year of compulsory basic schooling, this was 
likely to grow by a further 500,000.  Within the same time frame, around 44 percent of 
teaching staff were expected to retire.  According to government calculations a minimum 
of 419,988 new teachers would be required by 1970, while the “pedagogically desirable” 
number was 535,426.  The former figure would only be achievable if an unfeasible 90 
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percent of all projected higher education students graduated as teachers; the latter figure 
would require a wholly impossible 120 percent.52  According to the figures of the 
Kultusministerium Konferenz, the actual number of student teachers was likely to be only 
45,000.  The desperation of the situation was such that Prof. Dr. Mikat, Kultusminister for 
Nordrhein-Westfalen, was forced to send a telegram to the Federal Defence Minister 
requesting that all teaching graduates be exempt from national military service.53   
 
Societal Change 
 
Social change and the increasing public rejection of the use of education as an instrument 
of status distribution added to the pressure for change.54  Writers such as Picht had 
highlighted the tiny proportion (six percent) of the relevant age cohort educated to higher 
education entry standard compared with other industrialised countries such as France, 
Austria, the Netherlands, Italy, the Scandinavian countries and the USA.55  He even went 
as far as predicting the abrupt end of West Germany’s spectacular post-war growth 
because the pace of international scientific and technological development increasingly 
created jobs requiring the sort of higher-level education which was not being provided by 
the existing system.56  Moreover, the rapid growth of the service sector likewise required 
an increased number of employees with the sort of higher skill levels which were largely 
acquired in higher education.  These developments had, to some extent, resulted in a 
polarisation of the employment market in that there was considerable and growing demand 
for highly qualified manpower, albeit less than that for unskilled or semi-skilled labour for 
manufacturing and construction, accompanied by a marked decline in demand for workers 
with mid-level qualifications.57  To quote Mikat again: 
 
If we say today that to survive also entails the development of industries, the 
building of roads, the energy economy, food provision, agriculture etc., we can see 
that science, research and education also [now] belong to the area of ‘first 
survive’… We have more and more social mobility, and thus more demands for 
intellectual mobility.  There are already jobs today where knowledge of English is 
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required of even Volksschule graduates.  Even [working for] the mass media 
demands extensive educational requirements which are often simply not available58 
 
The level of social discrimination inherent in the existing system was also emphasised by 
Ralph Dahrendorf, who argued that social mobility had become crucial to the structure and 
functioning of industrial societies.  He further suggested that the sort of social 
discrimination which disadvantaged the female, the poor and Roman Catholics in the 
existing education system, accompanied by the failure to fully exploit the talents of more 
of its citizens, could have serious social and economic consequences for the nation.59  A 
further major source of public discontent lay in the fact that, even for those who could 
access higher education, there were simply not enough places in the most popular and 
prestigious courses to satisfy demand.  The application of a numerus clausus was 
becoming progressively more common for courses such as medicine, dentistry, chemistry, 
biology, pharmacy, psychology, physics, mathematics and architecture, resulting either in 
the student having to wait to study the subject of choice, sometimes for years, or choosing 
another, less prestigious course.60   Academia’s reaction to change in the social structure of 
the Hochschulen, however, was not positive.  In response to the introduction of state 
support for less well-off students, for instance, the professoriate argued strongly that 
financial help “represents one-sided and inflexibly applied support for socially weak and 
academically average students”.61   
 
General dissatisfaction with the system of higher education was greatly exacerbated by the 
effects of the counter-cultural revolution.  The German roots of the social protest 
movement which made itself felt throughout the Western world in the late 1960s arguably 
stemmed from the social and cultural upheavals which took place during the 1950s due to 
the progressive westernisation, Americanisation and democratisation of the country.  Laufs 
argues that a politically bored generation who had grown up through the long Adenauer 
era and which was not bound by the post-war social consensus between labour and capital, 
which had been in no small part responsible for the stability of the country and its 
spectacular economic growth, felt itself alienated from this “economic wonderland with its 
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civilised modernity”.62  A change in the ‘Zeitgeist’ saw the emergence of a politically 
aware and angry youth movement which tuned into events such as ‘The Prague Spring’, 
the ‘Summer of Love’ in California, the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the ‘May Unrest’ 
in Paris to name a very few.  General mistrust of state authority resonated with that 
manifesting itself in North America and other West European countries in anti-Vietnam 
protest movements and campaigns against the ‘establishment’, the authoritarian structure 
of society and antiquated systems of government.   Disenchantment with Western ideals 
led many to seek models in revolutionary leaders elsewhere, such as Che Guevara, Ho Chi 
Minh and Mao Tse Tung, leading to the development of ‘New Left’, represented in West 
Germany, by the SDS (Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund) which had a quasi-Marxist 
ethos and no less a goal than social revolution.63   
 
The spiralling level of demand for higher education was accompanied by growing 
discontent at the ability of the system to provide what was wanted and a disinclination to 
be turned out at the other end as “good servants for capitalism”.64  Within the universities, 
there was increasing resentment regarding the lack of accountability of the professoriate; 
the virtual autonomy of the university senate which precluded any influence over decision-
making on the part of the students; and, not least, against those professors perceived of as 
guilty of complicity with Nazi atrocities before and during the Second World War and left 
in situ.  What initially started as token strikes and boycotts by “narcissistic, colourful and 
chaotic [youths] in alternative clothing”,65 developed momentum with criminal offences, 
violent assault, intimidation and breaches of the peace aimed at professors, other officials 
and those students unwilling to take part.  Worst affected were the universities of Berlin, 
Frankfurt, Heidelberg and Tübingen.66  In the Freie Universität Berlin, for example, 
terrorist minorities decided whether lectures took place or universities bodies met.  This 
became extended to include the right of decision on the appointment of academic staff.  
Full professors were appointed according to their declared political beliefs.  Some had still 
not even been granted their doctorates, far less completed habilitation (necessary for full 
professorship); others did not even attempt to achieve a doctorate.   University leaderships 
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‘very often’ allied themselves with these left wing terrorist groups.67  Those professors 
who chose to stand up against the groups, therefore, frequently found themselves without 
effective support from rector, dean or head of department resulting in either their early 
retirement or removal to a different university and replacement with more ‘politically 
acceptable’ substitutes.  In at least one case, that of Johannes van der Meulen of 
Heidelberg University in 1969, the end result was suicide.68   As a result, research and 
teaching were severely affected and the “quality of education has fallen by a frightening 
degree.”69  The movement shifted focus even further under the influence of young left-
wing radicals to take in anything from anti-Vietnam rallies, violent demonstrations almost 
anywhere and the burning down of department stores and subsequent death of hundreds in 
the name of the destruction of capitalism.  Ultimately, the spiral of violence was to lead 
some young protesters, such as Gudrun Ensslin, Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof into 
outright terrorism.70 
 
Within the context of this thesis, however, it is, worth pointing out that the subjects worst 
affected by the actions of the student protesters tended to be the humanities (especially 
philosophy, history and interestingly, theology), political science, sociology and 
psychology.71  The faculties of engineering and the natural sciences, which are the primary 
focus of this thesis, were much less affected; however, given the general state of ferment 
in many of the universities and the change of ethos in the leadership of some, it is unlikely 
that these disciplines escaped many of the negative consequences of these occurrences. 
 
The Technological Gap 
 
Finally, the gaps in technology which had opened up between West Germany and the USA 
and which will be discussed at greater length later in the chapter provided a further, very 
compelling factor for reform and expansion.  The graduation rate from higher education in 
science and engineering in the relevant age cohorts in the USA and Germany in 1964 
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showed huge discrepancies with that of the USA being 4.2 percent compared with 0.8 
percent for Germany.72  Lohmar highlighted the estimate of government experts that within 
twenty years (from 1964) around a third of US industry, more than half of its administration 
and a little less than a quarter of its agriculture would be fully automated, while in the 
Soviet Union top priority was being given to the funding of scientific research, automation 
and cybernetics.  He also claimed that: 
 
If we do not take stronger measures than we have done… According to the 
figures of the KMK, [in 1980] there will be some 80,000 engineering 
students…This figure is a long way from being sufficient to cover the predicted 
demand for scientifically trained personnel…73 
 
 
Reform and Expansion 
 
The signing of the Königstein state agreement on scientific research in 1949 effectively 
allowed the federal government some access into the previously exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Länder on education and increased its influence over policy-making.  This was 
extended through the creation of the federal Ministry for Scientific Research in 1962 and 
further agreements in 1964 and 1968 which again expanded the role of the federal 
government in guiding the development of higher education, albeit to a very limited 
extent.74  As a result, the federal government was able to persuade the Länder that the best 
means of tackling West Germany’s technological deficit and enhancing its international 
status was to reform and standardise the education system as a whole and expand the 
higher education system in particular.75  As Federal Minister for Scientific Research Lenz 
argued: 
 
science must simultaneously be the at the tip of the pyramid and the foundation for 
a wide and solid education system, that in its turn finds its fulfilment in science… 
the importance of science for the development of society lies not only in its 
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connection to the education system but above all in the results of scientific research.  
Scientific discoveries enrich…the lives of individuals and societies76   
 
The numbers of Abiturienten had increased from a figure of 42,737 in 1957 to 59,851 in 
1963.  By 1966, however, through the opening up of the Gymnasien this number had 
almost doubled to 95,000 and continued to increase strongly thereafter.  Of these, around 
70 percent were expected to continue on to some form of higher education.  The rise in 
numbers was helped by a doubling of the proportion of female Abiturienten to form 38.9% 
of the total in 1968, in itself something of a social revolution.77  Additionally, new routes 
to higher education were created via the Fachoberschule (vocational schools at upper 
secondary level) allowing entry to specific institutions focusing on more vocational 
training, easier progress from Fachhochschule to Hochschule and the development of the 
zweiter Bildungsweg (the second way) allowing older students, and those without an 
Abitur, access to higher education by such means as evening classes and distance 
learning.78  The following table gives an idea of the increasing numbers of Abiturienten 
over the period 1957 – 1971: 
 
Table 3.5 
 
Abiturienten numbers 1957 – 1971 (1957 = 100) 
    
Year  Males  
 
Females 
 
Total 
 
    
1957 100 110 100 
1958 108.5 111.1 109.4 
1959 117.3 26.4 120.4 
1960 126.4 138.2 130.4 
1961 130.6 143.5 135.0 
1962 132.4 145.5 136.8 
1963 133.2 153.5 140.0 
1964 126.0 140.6 131.0 
1965 110.9 119.2 113.7 
1966 (spring) 113.7 132.3 120.0 
1966 (Nov) 96.1 118.2 103.6 
1967 (spring) 140.5 163.1 148.1 
1968 157.8 196.5 170.9 
1969 165.4 210.3 180.6 
1970 169.9 223.8 188.1 
1971 174.6 242.6 197.6 
    
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Wirtschaft und Statistik, 
1974, p 621 
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Somewhat pardoxically, although many of the measures were not universally liked by 
academia, the introduction of the zweiter Bildungsweg apparently received the strong 
approval of both the Hochschulen and the Kultusministerien of the Länder, being described 
as “very important” in statements to the press.79   Thus, total student numbers in the higher 
education sector (excluding those not studying for some form of qualification), increased 
from 217,762 in the winter semester of 1963/64 to 346,045 in 1971/72.80  Between 1965 
and 1973, total spending on education rose by 183 percent (in nominal terms) compared 
with a rise in GNP of only 99 percent.81 
 
Sectoral Development 
 
The expansion took place in the face of the continuing emphatic rejection of the vast 
majority of academic senates that higher education should become in any way more 
practically oriented or relevant to modern life.82  In line with the stipulations of the 
constitution that students should have a free choice of course and institution, the expansion 
was directed by social demand.  This, however, led to an extremely uneven-handed 
development of the tertiary sector with serious implications for the government’s goal of 
addressing West Germany’s technological deficit and promoting economic development, 
as the following chart makes clear: 
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Fig. 3.1 
West German higher education students in selected subjects 
1955/56 - 1971/72
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
350,000
400,000
19
55
/56
19
61
/62
19
63
/64
19
65
/66
19
67
/68
19
69
/70
19
71
/72
Source: R. Rytlewski and M. Opp de Hipt, Die BRD in 
Zahlen, 1945/49 - 1980, p 160
Total Student Numbers
Philosophy
Mathematics and
Natural Sciences
Engineering Sciences
 
 
Despite the government’s best efforts, the proportion of Abiturienten opting for the more 
traditional disciplines at traditional universities as opposed to entering Technische 
Hochschulen never fell below 75 percent, giving rise to fears of a glut of humanities and 
social science graduates on the labour market.83   Also clear from the table is the steady 
rise in total student numbers which affected all subject areas without exception.  While the 
numbers in theology, law and medicine (not shown) at least doubled, particularly striking 
were the increasing numbers studying philosophy.  This would seem to suggest that, in part 
at least, increased access to higher education for many people translated into the desire to 
study more traditional subjects and achieve social mobility along traditional graduate 
career paths such as the civil service rather than along other, more technologically inclined 
routes.  A second reason, particularly for the increased numbers studying philosophy at the 
end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, lay in the rise of the counter-culture 
movement and the burgeoning interest in different belief systems and alternative, usually 
radically left wing, forms of social organisation.84  
 
Worse still, although the increase in enrolment in the traditional universities continued 
relentlessly, the trend appeared to be actually running backwards in the Technische 
Hochschulen, entirely defeating the objective of educating more engineers.  Speculation as 
to the reason for this included an indictment of the way mathematics and the natural 
sciences were taught in the secondary schools resulting in Abiturienten being incapable of 
the demands of engineering disciplines.  Another reason posited was the poor staffing 
                                                 
83
 Statistisches Bundesamt, Wirtschaft und Statistik, issue 1971, p 294 
84
 See Dohms, ‘Studentenbewegung und Überlieferungsvielfalt - das Beispiel Nordrhein-Westfalen’, for a 
comprehensive discussion of this 
 93
ratios caused by the tendency of those gaining a Habilitation degree to go straight into 
industry where salaries and working conditions were more favourable.  A further factor 
concerned the uncertain job prospects in engineering.  In mining, for example, the annual 
need in the whole federal area was for around 50 mining engineers.  Similarly affected 
were departments of metallurgy where increasing automation had resulted in the need for 
fewer metallurgical engineers.85  To some extent, however, it is probable that the declining 
numbers in the Technische Hochschulen were also attributable to the rising popularity of 
the Ingenieurschulen (engineering colleges), the numbers of which had increased from 82 
in 1958 to 109 in 1963 with an increase in student numbers from 39,995 to 52,472.  Much 
of their attractiveness stemmed from the lower entry requirements and shorter time 
commitment because rather than offering a theoretical technical-scientific education, their 
training focused on the solving of problems of a practical nature in construction and 
production.86  From the federal government’s point of view, however, they did not produce 
engineers capable of producing research at the cutting edge of technology.    
 
Ultimately, the solution adopted by many of the senates to the problem of falling numbers 
in the Technische Hochschulen was to open faculties of philosophy and medicine and to 
apply for recognition as a scholarly university and this pattern was followed in a number of 
Technische Hochschulen such as RWTH Aachen, Ulm, Dortmund, Ostwestfalen and 
Bremen despite very considerable and heated resistance from the westdeutsche 
Rektorenkonferenz.87  (At the same time, some more traditional universities such as 
Erlangen-Nürnberg also started to incorporate technical faculties).88  The expansion of the 
higher education system, then, appeared unlikely to succeed in addressing the issue of the 
technology gap between West Germany and the USA.  Moreover, it was creating potential 
problems regarding the employability of large numbers of graduates educated only for 
employment in a shrinking traditional graduate employment sector.  These points will be 
addressed in the following two sections. 
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Gaps in Technology: US/FRG Comparison 
 
An exchange of correspondence between the Department of State and various embassies in 
Europe highlights the growing unease of all European governments regarding the 
technology gap.89  The attitude of the US Department of State seemed to indicate that a 
number of factors were responsible for this:  
 
The technological gap exists primarily because European industrial enterprises have 
failed to organize themselves on an adequate scale of size and have not developed 
the practice of investing a sufficient proportion of their sales dollars in research90 
 
Other issues identified included inefficient management, the size of European markets, the 
availability of venture capital, the mobility of technical manpower and ideas and the 
educational infrastructure,91 as well as Europe’s own fear of being unable to compete on 
the world market with the products of advanced technology, despite retaining technological 
superiority in a number of sectors.92   Certainly, German enterprises were, on the whole, 
smaller than in the United States and thus were less able to sustain the financial burden of 
research and the time lag between product development and its commercial application.93  
Nevertheless, in the mid-1960s West Germany was committing a greater percentage of 
GNP to research and development than most OECD countries, the exceptions being the 
USA, France, the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden as the following table demonstrates: 
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Table 3.6 
Global indicators of R&D efforts in industrialised OECD member countries 
 1963 - 1964 
      
 
 
 
Country 
 
 
 
GERD* 
 
 
GERD 
per 
Capita 
 
 
GERD/GNP 
at Market 
Prices 
 
 
Qualified Scientists and 
Engineers engaged in R&D 
     
Number 
 
Per 10,000         
population 
      
 $US 
Millions¹ 
$US 
Millions 
% Full-time 
Equivalent 
Full-time 
Equivalent 
      
United States 21,075 110,5 3.4 696,500 35.8 
France    1,650   34.1 1.9   95,574 19.7 
Germany   1,436   24.6 1.4 105,010 18.0 
Italy     291     5.7 0.6   30,280 6.0 
Japan  1,060   10.9 1.4 197,225 20.3 
UK  2,160   39.8 2.3 159,538 29.4 
Austria       23     3.2 0.3     3,220 4.5 
Belgium     137   14.7 1.0   15,600 16.8 
Canada     425   22.5 1.1   23,850 12.6 
Netherlands     330   27.2 1.9   31,310 25.8 
Norway       42   11.5 0.7     3,820 10.4 
Sweden     257   33.5 1.5   16,530 21.6 
      
Industrialised 
Western 
Europe² 
 6,326   24.3 1.6 460,882 18.3 
      
*GERD: Gross National Expenditure on Research and Development 
¹ at the 1970 exchange rate 
² excluding international organisations 
      
Source: OECD, Gaps in Technology: Comparisons between Member Countries in Education, Research 
and Development, Technological Innovation and International Economic Exchanges, (Paris, OECD, 
1970), p 120 
 
 
Moreover, more qualified scientists and engineers were engaged in research and 
development in West Germany than in any OECD country other than the USA, the UK and 
Japan.94  Over the period 1958 –1964, public as opposed to private funding for research 
grew disproportionately in the USA accounting for 63.5 percent of total R&D funds by 
1964 compared to West Germany’s 41 percent.95  However, the comparison is difficult in a 
number of respects.  For instance, a substantial proportion of this difference is due to the 
extraordinarily large proportion of the US R&D budget devoted to the defence, space and 
nuclear sectors.  This amounted to well over half of total R&D expenditure in the period 
1963 – 1964 and accounted for all but 7.2 percent of government research funding.  Only 
16 percent of German public funding, in contrast, was spent on space, defence and nuclear 
                                                 
94
 OECD, Gaps in Technology, p 120 
95
 OECD, Gaps in Technology, p 123 
 96
R&D.  That said, however, of the results obtained from space, defence and nuclear 
research a proportion is generally available to the economy for industrial technology or 
exploitation in the commercial sense.  This amounted to 51.2 percent in the USA, but only 
13.5 percent in the FRG.  Thus, it is possible to argue that that the FRG was benefiting far 
less from what was, in essence, radical or cutting edge technology.  Nevertheless, the type 
of R&D generally considered as most specific to industrial activity and development tends 
to be financed by and performed within firms themselves.  This research, largely taking the 
form of the incremental development of existing products or services, accounted for only 
32 percent of total US R&D spending, but 56.5 percent in West Germany.96  The 
implication of this, then, is that the FRG’s strengths lay far more in incremental innovation 
to existing products, rather than in the discovery of groundbreaking new technology. 
 
A second problem in interpreting the figures for publicly funded R&D arises from the very 
different organisation of the research effort in West Germany to that in the USA.   This had 
developed from Allied attempts to divide up research expertise and disconnect it from 
direct government control after the war.97  Basic research in Germany was the exclusive 
province of the Hochschulen, which were required to sustain a very broad research agenda, 
and the Max Planck institutes which were able to select priorities according to perceived 
scientific needs.  Both received core funding from the Länder governments and public 
contracts, while the contribution of industry was tiny.   They were also independent of 
either federal government or corporate funding.98  A particular problem arose as a result of 
basic research being performed in the Hochschulen.  The almost total research autonomy 
of the institutions and of the individual professors resulted in the greater part of the 
research in the Hochschulen, which was paid for with large sums of public money, not 
being made public.  Thus, it was not only unavailable for general exploitation for the good 
of the economy; the system was inefficient in that it was liable to result in considerable 
fragmentation and duplication of effort throughout the country.99   
 
‘Paradigmatic’ or strategic research on ‘big science’ projects of national or strategic 
importance was carried out in large laboratories, government research institutes and the 
‘Blue List’ task-oriented and large-scale research institutes funded on a 50:50 basis by 
federal government and the Länder.  Finally, applied research was the province of 
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technology transfer institutes, most particularly the Fraunhofer institutes.  These were 
funded on a joint basis by the federal government and industry.  They had developed 
considerable experience in the transfer of technology from the basic scientific research to 
the final application; however, their expertise was inevitably strongest in more traditional 
areas, with the result that these tended to be reinforced rather than new fields being 
developed.  The result was a system with rigidly delineated areas of research and an 
inflexible and hierarchical funding structure which was slow to respond to rapidly 
changing technology.  It proved to be a disincentive to entrepreneurial activity and did not 
favour groundbreaking new innovation, instead supporting incremental innovation based 
on existing technology.  Hence, it has been convincingly argued that “the German 
economy has historically proven itself resilient to major shifts in techno-economic 
paradigms”100 and that it “continues to make the best nineteenth-century products on 
earth”.101 
 
In terms of rates of innovation in research-intensive products, therefore, there is no doubt 
that the USA predominated in new product groups with rapid rates of technological change 
such as computers, semi-conductors and the manufacture of titanium and satellite 
communications as well as numerically controlled machine tools, specialised plastics and 
analytic and electronic-test instruments.  In terms of older established product groups, 
however, such as machine tools, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals, Germany’s economic 
performance remained strong.  The same pattern repeated itself with performance 
indicators such as patent registrations and manufacturing licences, where Germany’s 
manufacturing export performance was robust, particularly in chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals.102  This was reflected in the comparatively large proportion of German 
industrial R&D expenditure devoted to the chemical industry (34.7 percent), which far 
outstripped that of the USA (13 percent).  Abelshauser makes the point that in research-
intensive industries, such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, German firms had never lost 
their competitive edge.  In contrast to the standardised mass production of the US, the 
cooperative production regime of this industry, based on diversified high-quality 
production and the customised production of prototypes and short production runs allied to 
a well-developed system of customer care, ensured its continuing strong presence 
internationally.  He does, however, also point out that where the market permitted, the 
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chemical industry in particular was well placed to achieve high output levels of quality 
goods because of its distinctive production regime which in some respects was more akin 
to the American production model than much of German industry.103  West Germany also 
committed relatively more (31.2 percent of) industrial R&D to the research-intensive 
electronics industry than all other western industrialised countries, although its 
performance in this area was considerably less strong.104  That said, however, the FRG did 
prove adept at adopting high level technology from other countries and incorporating it in 
the sectors and products in which it had a comparative advantage, once again following the 
pattern of incremental, rather than radical innovation.105 
 
 
Graduate Employability 
 
OECD figures demonstrated that the percentage of graduates among professional workers 
in the USA was 53.2 percent compared to 41.1 percent in Germany.   Conversely, the 
proportion of graduates amongst scientific and technical personnel was approximately the 
same in both countries (USA 54.5 percent, Germany 54.3 percent).   However, the OECD 
makes the point that a large “reservoir” of German engineering graduates ended up in the 
services sector as opposed to being deployed elsewhere in the manufacturing industry106 as 
happened in the USA.  Moreover, a substantially higher proportion of German graduates of 
all hues went into public administration, (the traditional employment for German graduates 
along with law, the church, the civil service and medicine), compared with the USA, where 
more graduates became managers in private industry (ca. twelve percent) as opposed to ca. 
ten percent in Germany.107   
 
There are three points to be made here.  The first is that the evidence presented by the 
OECD does not indicate that all US graduates were employed in graduate-level jobs; 
Germany was unlikely to have been alone in producing more graduates than there was 
suitable employment for.  However, Ben David argues that the easier absorption of US 
graduates into the workforce was largely due to the more open organisation of the 
universities and the development of curricula which adapted more flexibly to the changing 
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demands of business and industry as well as to the challenges posed by scientific and 
technological advance.  In contrast, both the organisation of German higher education and 
the curricula owed much to a system dating from before World War One.108  The second is 
that, if the contention that more highly qualified individuals make a disproportionate 
contribution to output is accepted, the greater participation of US graduates in private 
industry and manufacturing may well have had a positive impact on productivity and 
growth (though not necessarily on the advance of technology).  Employment in public 
administration, the traditional destination of German graduates,109 offered less opportunity 
to influence these directly.  The third relates to the fact that despite the West German 
federal government’s drive to increase the number of highly qualified engineers in the 
economy to address the gaps in technology, a significant proportion of those graduating in 
engineering were not employed in it.  The question, therefore, is whether there were 
suitable employment opportunities for the engineering graduates and if so, why so many 
chose to pursue their careers in other avenues?  It also raises questions as to whether the 
teaching in the engineering faculties was sufficiently oriented to modern industrial practice 
and the changing patterns of industry.   Certainly, organisations such as the Deutscher 
Verband Technisch-Wissenschaftlicher Vereine (German Association of Technological and 
Scientific organisations) were extremely critical of the lack of a future-oriented dynamic in 
the higher education system.110   Other luminaries, such as Friedrich Edding, recommended 
the wholesale root and branch reform of the entire education system including a different 
distribution of research, intellectual scientific activity and training for higher-level 
employment between university and non-university establishments.111   
 
For their part, the Hochschulen remained adamant in asserting that only the continuation 
and reinforcement of the “fundamental legal guarantee of the freedom of research and 
teaching” and the autonomy of the universities could address the problem.112  There was 
recognition that some changes were necessary, although most of their favoured measures 
simply focused on limiting entry to higher education.  The westdeutsche 
Rektorenkonferenz, for example, advocated the more intensive use of numerus clausus; that 
university entrance examinations should be more generally applied; that new forms of 
further education offering higher-level qualifications be developed; and that Gymnasien 
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should not automatically steer their successful Abiturienten towards university.113  At the 
end of the 1960s, the Kultusminster Konferenz drew up a number of action plans to address 
the problems of institutional overcrowding and guidance on course choice including the 
development of new forms of higher-level education, the year-round utilisation of existing 
facilities, the removal of some of the administrative burden from teaching staff, the 
creation of rigorous student counselling/advice services, the closer observance of the 
minimum duration of courses of study, and the reinforcement of distance learning 
opportunities.  However, as a later report of its Unterausschuss für quantitative 
Berechnung (sub-committee for quantitative calculation) in 1975 indicated, action on the 
plans had been patchy at best and was frequently non-existent.114  In the case of the Länder 
governments, the motive was possibly as much financial as political.  In the case of the 
Hochschulen, however, given that a frequent response was that action was considered 
unnecessary, it is hard to escape the impression that the protection of tradition and of 
professorial and institutional autonomy was the primary guiding force.   
 
In any case, the main problem was one of graduate underemployment rather than 
unemployment because there was very little overt unemployment in West Germany over 
this period.  1963 had witnessed the beginning of a new export-led upswing in the 
economy resulting in an increase of the growth rate in real GDP in 1964 from 2.8 percent 
to 6.7 percent, which it has been suggested, was largely due to the influx of unskilled and 
lower skilled Gastarbeiter (immigrant labour) from Southern Europe and Turkey from 
1960 onwards.  By 1970, Gastarbeiter would comprise 10.8% of the workforce and of 
these, around 80 percent (1.4 million) were involved in the manufacturing and construction 
sectors, allowing these to continue to grow in contrast to the experience of most highly 
industrialised countries.115  Inflation in West Germany, however, began to rise dramatically 
partly as a result of powerful inflationary pressures from abroad imported via the exchange 
system.  There was a fall in the growth of output and a sharp fall in investment from 1964 
to 1965 of almost 50 percent with further falls to come, which eventually led to recession 
in the years 1966 - 67.   Nevertheless, with the sole exception of 1967 (when as Leaman 
points out, only the removal, voluntarily or otherwise, of thousands of women and around 
300,000 migrant workers from the labour market kept the unemployment figure at less than 
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one million116), for twelve out of the fourteen years between1960 and 1973, the 
unemployment rate ran at less than 1.5 percent, and for nine of those, at less than one 
percent.  Moreover, the level of vacancies consistently surpassed the level of registered 
unemployed despite the surge in the indigenous birth rate and the arrival of the 
Gastbarbeiter. 117  
 
The late 1960s appeared to signal a definite change in the attitude of the federal 
government to the role of human capital development with respect to the idea of planning 
higher education to conform to labour market demand.  In  1965 the OECD published a 
report which described as “rather disquieting”118 the fact that up until 1965 no 
comprehensive study had been made of the employment prospects for graduates, so that 
educational planning was based solely on demographic projections which took no account 
of likely or desirable economic or technological development.  Partly in response to this, 
but mainly to increasing concern over rising student numbers, cost and graduate 
employability, several manpower demand studies were commissioned over a number of 
years,119 and a meeting of international ‘experts’ on the subject arranged in May 1969 to 
share experiences in this area.  The latter included academics from the London School of 
Economics, Ghent, The Hague, Stockholm, Vienna, Oslo and Paris, and representatives 
from the OECD and L’Institut National d’Études Démographiques.120  An earlier meeting 
of German academics in January 1969 to discuss the same subject, however, had resulted 
in a wholly negative reaction to the idea of manpower planning and the tailoring of higher 
education to suit, highlighting the difficulties inherent in trying to reconcile the views of 
differing factions in policy-making for higher education.121  This reaction ultimately 
appeared justified in one respect at least, as all the manpower demand studies demonstrated 
significant discrepancies, most notably in their respective estimates for graduates required 
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in the cultural sciences, medicine and engineering sciences.   Despite this, there was 
consensus among them that by 1980/81 that there would be a need for at least double the 
1961 figure for graduates in the workforce in order to keep pace with the federal 
government’s economic priorities and the pace of technological change and thus strong 
grounds existed for investing in a further expansion of the system.   
 
Federal regulation to enforce the restructuring of entry to Hochschulen would, in any case, 
have been impossible to implement due to Länder sovereignty over education.  The reform 
ethos of the 1960s, economic developments and the creation of a ‘Grand Coalition’ of the 
major political parties at federal level from 1966 to 1969 had persuaded the Länder to 
accept a substantial degree of federal guidance, participate in the creation of institutions for 
the joint planning of education, research financing and university construction, and 
develop federal framework legislation for higher education.  However, the end of the 
‘Grand Coalition’ and the coming to power of the SPD in 1969 led to serious political 
differences regarding education planning between the federal government and a number of 
the Länder, as well as between some of the Länder themselves.  From then on, legislation 
on higher education became a political battlefield where the different political parties 
fought out their ideological differences with regard to university reform.  The only new 
institution to survive the process was that concerning the joint financing of research.122  
The more egalitarian approach of the SPD led to the virtual across-the-board rescinding of 
entry restrictions and the consequent opening up of higher education to the masses set the 
scene for a spectacular explosion in student numbers in the early 1970s.  While this may 
well have resonated with one of the tenets of human capital development theory – that 
increasing the general educational level of a population leads to enhanced economic 
growth – it also created even more severe logistical problems with regard to 
accommodation, financing and maintaining the quality of the education provided, as well 
as the employment prospects for increasing numbers of graduates over the next two 
decades.   
   
 
Conclusion 
 
Following the end of WWII there was an obvious need for the restoration of the 
institutions of higher education and the resumption of teaching and research.  The long 
                                                 
122
 Scharpf ‘No Exit from the Joint-Decision Trap?’, p 5 
 103
years of the Weimar Republic, National Socialism and war had left German science and 
technology much behind that of the rest of Europe and the USA especially in more modern 
and interdisciplinary fields such as biotechnology.  However, while one academic stated 
that “The once flourishing German physics had been forced down to a parochial level”,123 
the same was not necessarily true of more traditional areas such as chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals where German expertise still flourished. 
 
Reconstruction and the initial expansion of the sector along traditional lines was, on the 
whole, generally welcomed.  However, the rapidly expanding post-war population and the 
changing structure of the West German economy highlighted not only the social inequity 
of the existing system, but its increasing inability to provide sufficient numbers of the type 
of highly educated graduates demanded in an increasingly technological age.  Demand for 
professional training, which had never previously been seen as the remit of universities, 
was seen as threatening the tradition of the unity of research and teaching and incurred the 
active resistance of academia.  However, reform of pre-university education and changing 
social attitudes reinforced the idea that higher education was the right of everyone who 
wanted and was capable of it.  More people demanded the chance of social mobility and a 
more lucrative career, while the country’s increasing prosperity meant that more families 
had the private income to support their offspring through higher education and state 
funding was available for those who did not. 
 
Perhaps the greatest pressure for expansion and reform of the system came in the form of 
the perceived gaps in technology which existed between Germany and the United States.  
While, to some extent, this was attributable to the demands of post-war recovery, the USA 
also cited the institutional features of European capitalism, insufficient investment in 
research and development and the educational infrastructure as causes.  The USA invested 
far more in its education system at all levels both absolutely and relatively.  
Proportionately more of its young people entered higher education, graduated successfully 
and promptly from it and appeared to be absorbed more effectively into the economy.  Any 
gaps in the US provision, especially for engineers, appeared to be filled by ‘brain drains’ 
from other countries, including West Germany.  This had serious implications for German 
industry and technology, particularly after the building of the Berlin Wall which closed off 
a major source of engineering expertise entering the West, and also for academia where a 
shortage of doctoral graduates posed serious problems with regard to staffing in the 
Hochschulen and consequently to the quality of teaching and research. 
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Reform was more difficult because of the extremely cumbersome and multi-layered joint-
decision-making process resulting from Länder autonomy in education.  While a number 
of reforms to the higher education system were enacted throughout the late 1960s in 
particular, aided by the existence of a ‘Grand Coalition’ of political parties in the federal 
government, the ending of the latter and the accession to power of the SPD led to serious 
ideological differences in the approach to higher education and the overturning of much of 
the institutional reform which had been achieved.  Moreover, the more egalitarian 
approach to higher education introduced by the SPD government enabled a huge expansion 
of the sector in the ensuing decades.  
 
In the next chapter we turn to East Germany to explore the development of higher 
education in a socialist society with its very different interpretation of the function of the 
sector with respect to society and the economy.  
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Chapter 4  
 
Reform and Expansion of East German Higher Education 1945 – 1971 
 
After the conclusion of WWII, the reestablishment of a fully functioning system of higher 
education and its attendant research facilities in the Soviet Zone was a high priority for the 
Communist Party for a number of reasons.  The damage caused to academia by the 
Nationalist Socialists in terms of expulsions, structural change within the system, academic 
priorities and international scientific isolation had been compounded by the loss of senior 
scientific and technical personnel to the war and to the United States and the Soviet Union 
in the form of intellectual reparations1 and had exacerbated the gaps in technology which 
had appeared between Germany and the United States.  Unlike the other Allied Zones, 
however, the Soviet Zone was also subject to punishing levels of physical reparations 
demanded from it by the Soviet Union.  Moreover, the region needed to establish itself as a 
fully-functioning national entity with a very different vision of democratic legitimacy from 
that of the West.   
 
Changes in the perception of the role of science and technology with the consequent 
reorganisation of higher education and research systems were common in all industrialised 
countries; however, in Eastern Germany the training of new cohorts of scientists and 
technologists was critical in order to create the modernising force necessary to achieve this 
within the parameters of a Marxist-Leninist dialectic orientation.  Lenin had stated that 
knowledge of the laws of natural science was essential in order to understand modern 
technology and, in turn, science itself could only be understood fully when applied in the 
form of technology.  He deemed it essential “that science genuinely enter [our] flesh and 
blood, that it be transformed into a component of [our] lives, fully and genuinely”.2   
Hence, the management and regulation of science became increasingly politically 
important in the pursuit of technological and economic growth.  However, it appeared that 
in socialist societies the solution of economic problems always remained subject to the 
overarching political aims of that society.  For instance, as one East German politician 
                                                 
1
 Raymond G. Stokes, Constructing Socialism: Technology and Change in East Germany 1945 – 1990, 
(Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 2000), pp 36 – 37  
2
 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, cited in Margrete Siebert Klein, The Challenge of Communist Education, (New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1980), p 54 
 106
stated, “economic activity can be nothing but the realisation of political aims. It can never 
have a purpose in itself”.3   
 
The first two major reforms of higher education in the late 1940s and early 1950s can 
arguably be regarded as the “political socialisation”4 of higher education and its 
participants.  The third reform of the late 1960s demonstrated the increasing economisation 
of technical and professional training in higher education,5 acknowledging the role of 
science as a force of production and the innovative force behind the economy.  Moreover, 
it also had the effect of establishing complete central control and thus finally removing the 
last vestiges of the traditional German higher education system.  The purpose of this 
chapter is to explore the reasons for, aims of, and methods employed to achieve the 
reforms and the effects of the reforms on the East German higher education system.  I will 
also reflect on their effectiveness in terms of achieving the economic aims of the 
government until 1971 when the leadership and ethos of the regime changed. 
 
 
First Higher Education Reform 
 
Denazification 
 
The two key processes which affected the higher education system of the Soviet zone of 
occupation were denazification and democratisation.  In the first, or “anti-fascist, 
democratic higher education reform”,6 denazification was seen as the crucial element in the 
elimination of fascist influence in the institutions, curricula and student body in the 
“irreconcilable warfare against all bourgeois ideologies, bourgeois objectivism and 
cosmopolitanism7…in all universities and Hochschulen”.8  Initially, the universities 
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themselves were left to carry this out.  However, the reluctance of the professoriate to 
admit that any more than a very few of their number were true believers in National 
Socialism, coupled with the desire of the overwhelming majority of the professoriate to 
return to the ‘German University Tradition’ resulted in more radical intervention on the 
part of the Soviet authorities.  For instance, the Senate of the University of Greifswald 
expelled 78 of their number, leaving 84 in post.  Of those remaining, however, 55 had been 
members of the NSDAP, which prompted the complete closure of the university by the 
Soviets for a time and the appointment of a more malleable rector.  Some other 
universities, such as that of Leipzig, were extremely reluctant to pursue denazification 
because of the large numbers of teaching staff who had already been removed by the 
Americans on leaving the now Soviet zone and by the Soviets themselves to boost their 
own research efforts.  Nevertheless, by the end of 1945, of the 252 professors at Leipzig at 
the end of the war only 49 remained.  The medical and natural science faculties were 
particularly badly hit with only 9 left out of 83 and 7 from 57 respectively.  By 1947, of the 
1,633 professors, professors emeriti and docents working in the Soviet zone of occupation 
in 1944, only 17.5% remained.9   
 
Connelly argues that this level of denazification was sufficient to create a complete break 
with the previous system and create within academia a strong affinity with the aims of the 
new regime.10  However, such was the deficit of experienced teaching staff following 
denazification that from 1948 the authorities were forced to reinstate a considerable 
number of those expelled whom they considered to have been less active National 
Socialists.  Consequently, by 1954 around 28 percent of professors and docents consisted 
of former NSDAP members, mainly in the technical sciences (41.9 percent), medicine 
(45.9 percent) and the natural sciences (31.2 percent).  Interestingly, however, the SED 
(Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands or German Social Unity Party) adopted much 
of the same rhetoric with regard to the contribution of scientists to the Nazi regime as did 
the professoriate in West Germany.  An emphasis on the “higher morality” of those 
employed in the practice of selfless and disinterested scientific research not only permitted 
the SED to ignore a scientist’s previous attachment to the National Socialists, but allowed 
it to maintain the stance that science was “essentially humane and progressive”.  Moreover, 
the SED’s stance with regard to science largely echoed what the existing professoriate 
thought of itself and thus was a means of encouraging it towards acceptance of the new 
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regime.11  The reinstatement figure was much lower in philosophy and the social sciences 
(Gesellschaftswissenschaften), however, which were considered to be the wellsprings of 
the new socialist proletarian elite of the future and were thus much more politically 
sensitive.12   
 
There is, therefore, a strong case to be made that within the professoriate at least some 
measure of the traditional university system persisted.  The scarcity of academic talent, 
along with strong competition from the West for what there was, combined to ensure that 
the authorities could not be too rigorous in their attempts to destroy the existing system, or 
the elite institutional structure which ran it, at least initially.13  Certainly the first education 
bill strongly emphasised the promotion of independent scientific thought and academic 
freedom in higher education,14 while frequent reference was made to the mastery of the 
rational principles of mathematics and the natural sciences as fundamental to the resolution 
of the problems of society and the economy.  Moreover, SED Party membership remained 
very low among scientists and mathematicians until the late 1950s (when the SED became 
more aggressive in its drive to promote the ideological integration of the scientists and 
technical intelligentsia).  For instance, only five out of 36 mathematics professors had 
joined by 1958, in contrast to around 90 percent of historians and even higher figures for 
economists and legal scholars.15  However, the government also appointed a considerable 
number of new professors following denazification, most of whom had no prior academic 
experience, two-thirds lacking the customary Habilitation degree necessary for teaching 
and many lacking even a doctoral degree.  Their attraction for the authorities was both 
Party loyalty and their background in industry, as considerable pressure was placed on the 
academic sector even in the early stages to work in close collaboration with local industry 
in order to supply graduates suitably trained to work in specific milieu and to develop the 
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type of innovation which would lead to increased productivity.16  For this new breed of 
professor, therefore, higher education and research were tools of economic development in 
the service of the nascent nation; however, their lack of academic experience can only be 
assumed to have contributed to a lowering of the standard of teaching in the Hochschulen 
which was already compromised by low teacher numbers.  
 
The process of denazification and the removal of bourgeois influence also included the 
content of university courses.   State and academic libraries were purged of all literature 
which might be considered anti-Soviet or anti-Communist.  In some subjects, the new 
course content was translated directly from its Russian counterpart; in others, such as 
history and philosophy, study plans were completely re-designed with the emphasis on 
Marxism-Leninism.  In practice, however, the insufficient numbers of Russian translators 
and the considerable lack of interest in the matter displayed by Soviet officials resulted in 
confusion among East German educators, a shortage of teaching materials and resources 
and a less than unified approach to higher education in the region.17 
 
Democratisation 
 
Equally as important as denazification was the creation of a new, socialist intelligentsia 
from the worker/peasant class whose loyalty would be bought as a result of upward social 
mobility,18 because “no ruling class has ever survived without its own technicians”.19  
Indeed, as early as 1944, the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) had begun 
considering how to change the system in order to eliminate “fascist and imperialist 
influences” and remove the educational privileges enjoyed by the bourgeoisie in the 
previous rigidly class-based and elitist German structure.20  The goal, therefore, was to 
engineer a substantial increase in the proportion of children from working class families 
undertaking university-level education.   Because the working classes made up roughly 60 
– 70 percent of the population, this figure was to be reflected in the university population 
and a target of 60 percent was set.21  Given the lower qualification level of most of these 
candidates, special worker preparatory institutes (Vorstudienanstalten) providing 
preparation courses for university were established, which were ultimately incorporated 
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into the universities as ‘Worker-Peasant’ faculties (Arbeiter-Bauern Fakultäten or ABF). 
The policy was backed up by the preferential allocation of scholarship funds for the 
worker-peasant students.   
 
Ideological enthusiasm, or at least political reliability, was the other major criterion for 
entry to Hochschulen; therefore, any candidate who had in any way served the Nazi party 
(by serving in the army, for instance) was obviously barred from higher education.  Trade 
unions, the ‘democratic’ parties and various youth and women’s committees referred 
candidates to the ABF.  All applicants were subject to rigorous checks regarding both 
background and their “antifascist democratic convictions”, with the easiest ‘proof’ of 
political reliability being membership of the increasingly strong SED.   Hence, in the 
winter semester of 1946/47 almost 52 percent of the student body at Leipzig University 
were members.   Other ‘suitable’ organisations included trade unions and the Freie 
Deutsche Jugend (FDJ)22, membership of which subsequently became virtually mandatory 
for university admission.  Membership was encouraged in part because extra pressure 
could be put on the students via the various organisations to conform and work harder.23  
Moreover, the checks concerned not only the candidates’ activities and political affiliations 
but those of their parents, thus also providing an effective instrument of control over that 
generation.   
 
The make-up of the student population, therefore, changed significantly in a relatively 
short space of time.  Despite considerable initial difficulties in finding sufficient numbers 
of workers/peasants who were willing to give up an early entry into paid employment, by 
the mid-1950s the number of students at university of ostensible working-class origin had 
reached 53 percent.  This figure was much greater than in any of the other new Eastern 
Bloc countries and considerably greater than that of West Germany at four percent.24  
Political reliability, however, was no guarantor of academic ability or technical expertise.  
Ultimately, the policy of preferment for working-class students was to be dropped in the 
early 1960s and the worker and peasant faculties discontinued (except for two token 
institutions at Halle and Freiberg).  This was, in part, because rigid ideology was at that 
point giving way to a more pragmatic approach to the economy in the form of Ulbricht’s 
New Economic System (NES), which will be discussed later.   Hence, because of the less 
                                                 
22
 The FDJ was the official socialist youth movement of the SED and the GDR.  Membership comprised both 
males and females between the ages of 14 and 25 and though ostensibly voluntary, those who did not join 
found a great many difficulties put in their way especially in terms of university entrance and job selection 
23
 Connelly, Captive University, pp 226 – 231  
24
 Kurt Sontheimer and Wilhelm Bleek, Die DDR: Politik, Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, (Hamburg, Hoffman und 
Campe Verlag, 1972), pp 177 – 178.  Exact figures vary depending on the source consulted 
 111
than satisfactory performance of many ABF students and graduates, academic merit again 
replaced background as the arbiter of university entrance for a time, thus effectively 
permitting the re-emergence of a middle-class elite.25   
 
The Primacy of Science and Technology 
 
Given the ideological focus on the interdependence of science and technology and that the 
main function of higher education was seen as serving the needs and goals of the economy, 
there was considerable extra emphasis laid on these and related disciplines such as 
mathematics and economics at the expense of the humanities, particularly in the 
worker/peasant faculties.  The function of academic basic research (except for that into 
classical engineering) was largely removed from the Hochschulen and placed in the remit 
of the elite Academy of Sciences (Akademie der Wissenschaften) which became the largest 
research institution in the country, performing the functions of the Max Planck 
Gesellschaften and the Fraunhofer Gesellschaften in the West.   There were a number of 
consequences of this.  One was that a considerable amount of state funding which would 
otherwise have gone to the Hochschulen was diverted to the Academy; another stemmed 
from the allocation to the Academy of the right, previously reserved for Hochschulen, to 
supervise doctorates and Habilitations, which had an impact on the number and quality of 
doctoral students choosing to remain in the Hochschulen after taking their first degree;26 a 
third was the loss of a significant degree of scholarship from the Hochschulen because the 
research projects remaining there consisted largely of applied research geared towards the 
“socialist reconstruction” of East German industry,27 particularly in the leading branches of 
the economy (defined in 1949 as metallurgy, light technology, electrotechnology, synthetic 
fibres, plastics, the utilisation of coal, construction, agriculture and the increase of food 
reserves).  All Hochschulen were obliged to commit a substantial proportion of their 
research capacity to these areas.  Apart from the direct benefits to industry derived from 
these projects, a secondary aim was that all graduates would be able to carry over the most 
modern scientific and technical knowledge into production and social practice.28   
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Quite apart from the tenets of Marxist-Leninist ideology, there were three very practical 
reasons for prioritising science and technology.  Firstly, there was an urgent need to 
compensate for deficiencies in raw material resources.  Apart from the obvious destruction 
of around 15 percent of productive capacity as a result of war damage and the loss of a 
further 26 percent of capital assets in the form of Soviet reparations, the division of the 
country agreed at Potsdam had separated Eastern Germany from virtually all its traditional 
sources of raw materials and semi-manufactures for its more advanced industrial processes, 
confining it to an area which had previously produced only five percent of the Reich’s total 
production of iron ore and 2.3 percent of the hard coal which had formed the basis for so 
much of the Reich’s manufactures.29  Thus, research into processes for product substitution 
was crucial; for instance, a critical shortage of building timber resulted in the design and 
development of terraced concrete apartment blocks.  The sourcing and synthesis of reliable 
fuel/energy sources was also vital.30  Secondly, scientific advance was seen as the means of 
helping to increase worker productivity levels; the first five-year plan required an increase 
of 60 percent in these by 1955 accompanied by a simultaneous reduction in costs of at least 
23 percent.31   
 
The third was the attempt to establish self-sufficiency in scientific and technological 
research in line with Stalinist principles.32  In part, at least, this was in order to confer 
legitimacy and status on the GDR and demonstrate the efficiency and superiority of the 
socialist system over that of the West; although a second interpretation is that autarchy 
would preclude any danger of economic and technological reliance on the West which 
might prejudice its identity as a separate nation.33  The process, however, was not 
successful.  The example of the chemical industry is illustrative.   During the decade 1945 
– 1955 the chemical industry in the GDR fell far behind that of West Germany.  Although 
some of this was attributable to the wholesale “industrial disarmament” undertaken by the 
Soviet occupying authorities immediately after the war, historians argue that the sudden 
radical disruption of trading partners and the need to restrict imports from the West, along 
with the weaknesses inherent in a centrally planned economy (which will be discussed in 
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more depth later) were equally responsible.  Moreover, the East continued to fall further 
behind the West even after the sanctioning in 1958 of a special programme designed to 
double chemical production within seven years and promote even greater production of 
synthetic materials and plastics.  The decline of the industry was, however, partly 
attributable to the failure of other socialist countries and the Soviet Union in particular to 
deliver less than half of promised raw material imports from 1959 – 1961.34  This latter 
was also a contributory factor to the slow development of other manufacturing industries 
resulting in the non-fulfilment of Plan targets and a perceptible worsening of product 
choice and living conditions for the populace.35 
 
 
Second Higher Education Reform 
 
A fuller implementation of Soviet pedagogy was addressed through the “socialist 
revolution of higher education” in the second or “democratic” higher education reform 
which took place from 1951 – 1952,36 and was declared by the politicians responsible to be 
the logical further development of and fulfilment of the German humanistic tradition of 
higher education in that “Humboldt’s ideas and deeds belong absolutely to the humanistic 
traditions of the socialist university and socialist system of education”.37  In part this 
reform was intended to rectify what was seen as the tendency of GDR academics to 
continue to look to the West for intellectual leadership.  Additionally, despite the fact that 
all the education ministries were staffed by members of the SED, they were accused of 
being too cautious in their application of Marxist-Leninist principles to pedagogical 
problems.  The reform measures were also regarded as the means of training the future 
generation of East German socialists and further ‘technicalising’ higher education in the 
service of the state.38   
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Measures of the Second Higher Education Reform Bill 
 
The State Secretariat for Higher Education was created in 1951 and the following year saw 
the abolition of education ministries in the individual Länder thus effectively centralising 
control of the education system.  In contrast to some other socialist countries the 
Hochschulen mostly retained their traditional structure; however, the new higher education 
institutions which were created were much more specialised and narrowly focused such as 
the Institute for the Construction of Heavy Machinery in Wildau and the Institute for Post 
and Telecommunications in Leipzig.  Moreover, almost entirely technical in nature, they 
were usually sited close to an area of relevant industrial production in order to break down 
the traditional exclusivity of higher education and tighten the links between research and 
practice. 39   The content of the teaching was completely restructured in order to promote 
the creation of a new, socialist type of (wo)man later defined by Ulbricht as possessing a 
high level of education and demonstrating “enthusiasm for responsibility, creativity and 
boldness…[and] ... business competence, sober calculation and iron work discipline”. The 
(wo)man formed through socialism would reject characteristics such as envy, egotism and 
the striving for possessions (Besitzstreben), fulfilling his/her own interests only if they 
accorded with greater societal and political interests.40   In theory, moreover, through 
productive work the individual would achieve not only self-fulfilment but the fulfilment of 
a humane society.41   
 
‘Basic studies in social sciences’ (gesellschaftswissenschaftliches Grundstudium), typically 
dialectical and historical materialism, scientific socialism, the political economy of 
capitalism and socialism and the history of the German working class movement, became 
compulsory as did military training exercises, Russian language and sport.  The study of 
the principles of Marxism-Leninism was regarded as the “foundation for the theoretical 
and practical solution for the development problems of our socialist society” and “the basis 
of all specialised study”, at that point occupying twenty percent or more of the student 
curriculum.42  Together with very tightly scheduled curricula which taught much more 
narrowly defined specialisms than previously, the students were required to spend a 
minimum of 28 to 32 hours per week in the classroom, while a further twelve to fourteen 
hours of independent study, policed by the Freie Deutsche Jugend (Youth Brigade or 
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FDJ), was necessary in order to be able to keep up with the study plans.43  In addition, the 
academic year was extended from seven to ten months, following the Soviet pattern.  This 
was ostensibly to ensure that students had time during their studies for a ‘practical’ 
placement in their chosen line of work;44 however, in practice this was extended as the FDJ 
sent students for a further spell of work experience during their two-month vacation 
period.45  In addition to this, the FDJ organised fortnightly propaganda activities which 
involved groups of students in such projects as the renovation of apartments and improving 
environmental hygiene by making dustbins.  The goal was to increase trust in the socialist 
system among those renting the apartments and to set “a significant example” to the 
West.46 
 
Effects of the Second Higher Education Reform 
 
There are a number of points to be made here.  Firstly, the curricular changes and 
extension to the academic year were implemented within a very rapid time frame causing 
often quite severe organisational and timetabling problems and frequently adding hours to 
the students’ day because of the necessity to travel between different campuses.47  
Secondly, the necessary materials for the teaching of a number of subjects, historical and 
dialectical materialism in particular, were either in short supply or altogether unavailable, 
leading to poor instruction in the subject.48  Thirdly, the main aim of Marxist-Leninist 
teaching was to establish the doctrine as a credible philosophy, the theories and methods of 
which were equally applicable to all academic disciplines.49   However, the vast majority 
of students did not take Marxist-Leninist studies seriously, in part because of the 
“atrocious”50 standard of teaching: on average there were 350 students per lecturer and 
much of the teaching was very formulaic.  Moreover, it had no academic respectability.  
For a time at least, there was no career structure in place for Marxist-Leninist specialists 
and there was strenuous resistance to its introduction from the East German professoriate, 
which also initially declined to administer the examinations.51   
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Fourthly, many of the students were completely overloaded by the amount of work 
demanded of them.  Even those students in the worker/peasant faculties who might have 
been expected to be the most loyal, felt compelled to state that: 
 
A large proportion of our friends are being seriously over-burdened in terms of 
work – this leads to ‘over-nervousness’ and eventually to illness, forcing them 
to give up their studies for long periods52 
 
Indeed, by early 1950 more than fifty of the worker/peasant students at the Humboldt had 
suffered nervous breakdowns and a further eighty had contracted tuberculosis.  The causes 
included overcrowding and stress arising from the application of a selection process which 
took little account of ability or previous training while the curriculum required them to 
complete preparatory courses for university-level studies, which would previously have 
taken years, within a matter of months.  The curtailing of vacation and leisure time could, 
therefore, only exacerbate the situation.53  Underfunding was another problem.  Building 
programmes were insufficient and there was a lack of even the basic equipment necessary 
for scientific training and research.   In addition, student residences were wholly 
inadequate.  For example, students in the ABF at the Humboldt University in Berlin 
complained of rooms never being cleaned; bad and insufficient food; the equally filthy 
state of dining areas and kitchen staff; and facilities designed for 200 people having to 
house 900.  Moreover, student grants were inadequate: after paying for basic living 
expenses in the residences and travel costs, they were left with only around fifteen marks 
per month with which to buy books and supplies.54  Facilities for teaching personnel 
appeared little better.  It is hardly surprising then that students did not perform as well as 
they otherwise might, nor that teaching or research were compromised.   
 
Fifth, the revision of the curriculum and the expansion of the school year was accompanied 
by a doubling of the number of students between 1950 and 1955.  This was mandated by 
the First Five-Year Plan in order to train a total of 33,500 engineers and technologists for 
industry, 10,000 for construction and 10,000 for transport and to increase the number of 
graduates in the labour force by more than 113 percent before 1955.55  Thus, an already 
overstretched teaching body had to take on even heavier teaching loads resulting in a 
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further decline in the quality of teaching and much less time for research.   For example, 
where there had been 54.5 students per full professor in 1948, this rose to 74.5 in 1952, 
considerably in excess of the West German professor/student ratio of 1:50 in 1958 (see 
chapter 3).56  This was compounded by natural wastage, emigration westwards, the loss of 
the brightest academic talent to the Akademie der Wissenschaften and the tendency of 
many young assistant professors and other junior academics to leave academia altogether 
for the better salaries on offer in industry.57  As a consequence, graduate students 
increasingly taught many of the courses58 and increasing numbers of young and 
inexperienced ‘socialist’ academics were employed.    There appeared to be a general 
underestimation of the role of individual talent in the scientific process by the authorities 
and an assumption that professional shortcomings could, with a little effort, be easily 
overcome providing that the political fundamentals were in place.59  Thus, the percentage 
of teachers without even a doctoral qualification rose from 18 to 28 percent and the 
number of non-academics on the teaching staff also rose exponentially leading to a further 
dilution of teaching standards,60 while research programmes were, at best, subject to 
significant disruption.  Moreover, since most of the academic research in classical 
engineering still took place within the Hochschulen,61 student overcrowding, lengthy study 
periods and high teaching and administrative loads all contributed to the impairment of 
research potential in this most crucial of the GDR’s priority areas.   
 
Finally, prior to the reform, there had been a constant tension between the need to let the 
scientists and technologists perform their craft and the desire of the Party to intensify 
control over them on behalf of the new system.62  The reform increased the control of the 
central political administration over all aspects of scientific work from deciding which 
scientific papers could be published and the allocation of funding, through to the monopoly 
it exercised on the recruitment, training and placing of personnel.  Thus, political leaders 
could and did intervene increasingly in scientific and scholarly investigations, the 
development of scientific theory, the distribution of scientific information and decisions as 
to which areas of scientific investigation were ideologically appropriate.  Attempts to 
deviate from the prescribed path were liable to result in dismissal at best, prison at worst.  
However, along with greater control went the possibility that the interference of the state 
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was incompetent or at least unhelpful.  Förtsch argues, for example, that the wrapping of 
scientific endeavour in such an ideological and bureaucratic straitjacket inevitably had the 
effect of stifling creativity and innovative activity.63   
 
Brain Drain 
 
The second five-year plan demanded the enrolment of yet a further 23,000 distance 
learners and 84,000 fulltime students.64   In part, these increases were needed to 
compensate for the constant stream of those leaving for the West.  Of well over 2,200,000 
emigrants, roughly two thirds were of working age65 and at least one third held academic 
degrees.66   Large numbers of the dispossessed and former bourgeoisie left, taking with 
them expertise in farming, industrial leadership and science and technology despite efforts 
to retain the latter in the form of improved pay and working conditions. 67  At the height of 
the exodus around 100 engineers were leaving every month, compromising critical 
research projects and causing near crisis in some industries.  By 1958, a shortfall of 30,000 
engineers was being predicted for the future.68  Although the exodus was somewhat 
counteracted by an influx of around half a million from the West which included a number 
of the original refugees from the East, virtually none of the returnees belonged to the 
scientific and technological intelligentsia.69  One solution to the shortfall was to encourage 
greater female participation both in higher education and the workforce.  In order to 
increase female participation in the workforce to 42 percent, a rise in female university 
admissions to forty percent was mandated.70  In practice, the proportion of female students 
in technical colleges rose to 12 percent in 1961 and 17 percent in 1964, and in universities 
to six percent and 9 percent respectively.  The women were particularly encouraged to 
adopt a career in science or engineering and in 1965 a quota system was introduced to 
ensure that female admission levels to university engineering programmes increased.71 
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Technology Transfer 
 
By the time of the third Party Conference of the SED in 1956, West Germany had joined 
NATO and the GDR was a member of the newly founded Warsaw Pact.  This 
intensification of the Cold War led directly to the foundation of the Research Council of 
the GDR, attached directly to the council of Ministers, with the remit of controlling the 
main directions of research in order to focus science and technology on the task of 
producing the GDR’s “economic miracle” and outperforming the industrial production of 
the West.72  In light of the failure of a number of industries such as mechanical 
engineering, the foundries, metallurgy, light industry and agriculture to achieve their 
planned targets in terms of production and worker productivity rates, increased pressure 
was placed on higher education to produce a technical intelligentsia and the research 
capable of making this happen.  At the third Party conference, however, Ulbricht pointed 
out that despite the development of innovative production processes for several economic 
areas, very little of it had actually been introduced into East German firms.73   
 
There were many reasons for this anomaly, one being that despite the creation of bilateral 
commissions in an attempt to ensure the transfer of information between government and 
the sciences and the development of ‘friendship contracts’ and partnerships between the 
Hochschulen and firms, the uptake and exploitation of scientific advance in the production 
processes was often hindered through the failure of the central planners to transmit the 
scientific data and/or to come to a decision as to its introduction in the workplace.74  
Another was the frequent lack of relevant technical knowledge and adequate experience in 
planning in the majority of those responsible for the central planning of R&D, leading to 
time and money being wasted on non-essential and frequently useless projects.75  There 
were, moreover, few material incentives for firms to put process innovations or new 
designs into production.   State investment funding was rarely adequate to cover the costs; 
moreover, the ‘downtime’ in production caused through a changeover of processes would 
imperil the achievement of monthly/yearly production figures and thus lead to the potential 
non-payment of bonuses.  In any case, inadequate and inferior equipment and machinery 
along with the usual East German problems of obtaining materials and components and a 
chronic shortage of personnel combined to render the adoption of innovations extremely 
difficult.  Ulbricht also highlighted the wholly unsatisfactory level of cooperation between 
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production and markets which resulted in industry frequently producing goods which did 
not correspond to what people wanted.  This lack of coordination was again due, at least in 
part, to the strongly bureaucratic central planning process which largely ignored market 
research into consumer and industrial needs and appeared to dictate priorities regardless of 
cost or economic usefulness.76  The upshot was a system of production which tended to 
hold on to the old, only very slowly permitting the introduction of innovation in goods and 
working and production methods, thus hindering progress. 
 
By the time of the fifth SED party conference in 1958, the party had abandoned the second 
five-year plan with its ‘Stalinist’ emphasis on heavy industry, supplanting it with the first 
seven-year plan covering the period 1959 – 1965.   The new goal had become to overtake 
West Germany in the per capita consumption of the most important food and consumer 
goods within a few years.  In the Hochschulen this translated to even greater concentration 
on these specific areas of the economy, demands for the achievement of more rapid 
progress in science and technology to compensate for the poverty of domestic raw 
materials and to ensure the production of high-quality goods, a greater degree of 
specialisation within disciplines and the more extensive use of contract research from large 
industrial firms.77  Not surprisingly, the statistics for the number of academics fleeing to 
the West showed a sharp rise from this point as the following table demonstrates, almost 
certainly reflecting the pressure under which they found themselves: 
 
Table 4.1 
Numbers of academics emigrating to the 
West 1955 – 1960  
  
Year Numbers Fleeing 
  
1955 56 
1956 43 
1957 58 
1958 208 
1959 188 
1960 142 
  
Source: Rexin, ‘Die Entwicklung der 
Wissenschaftspolitik in der DDR’, p 119 
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Rexin also makes the point that this was at a time when the general level of flight to the 
West had been falling due to improved living conditions and the end of rationing.  The 
building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 may have prevented the escape of any more of its 
technical intelligentsia to the West; however, it also had the secondary effect of virtually 
ending any further academic contact or exchange of ideas with western scientists for any 
but a very few trusted professors.  In an echo of the situation during the years of National 
Socialism, the inevitable effect on East German science was impoverishing. 
 
 
The New Economic System 
 
Concerned about deteriorating economic performance, the effect that comparison with the 
living standards of West Germany was having on the population and its political morale 
and believing that the viability of socialism in his country depended on its ability to out-
perform West Germany economically, Ulbricht introduced a measure of economic 
liberalisation in the form of the New Economic System (NES) in 1963.  In what was a de 
facto recognition of the inability of conventional socialist doctrine and practice to create 
the necessary level of economic growth,78 the NES involved a decentralisation of 
responsibility to the industrial associations, reform of industrial prices, the re-evaluation of 
enterprise capital stock as well as the introduction of the use of profit as the main 
enterprise performance indicator as well as a source of investment over and above state 
loans.  Contractual relations between enterprises were restructured and incentives provided 
for enterprises through contracts, capital taxation and the ability to distribute some of their 
profits in the form of bonuses.  While the use of central planning was in no way 
diminished, its role was to be re-directed to technical development rather than, as it so 
often was, crisis management.  However, the control of the structure-determining 
industries (those defined as important in the bid to overtake the West in the key sectors of 
chemicals, machine-building and electronics) remained firmly in the hands of the 
planners.79 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
78
 Hubert Laitko, ‘The Reform Package of the 1960s: The Policy Finale of the Ulbricht Era’, in Macrakis and 
Hoffman, Science under Socialism, pp 45, 56; Steiner, Von Plan zu Plan, pp 128 - 133 
79
 Jeffrey Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany 1945 – 1989, (Chapel Hill, 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997), pp 48 – 50; see also Steiner, Von Plan zu Plan, pp 129 – 142   
 122
The NES and Academia 
 
The NES also had implications for academia.  The previously discussed abolition of most 
of the ABF was accompanied by a shift in criteria for university entrance to academic 
performance, with particular emphasis on the promotion of the especially gifted.  This 
ultimately led to a sharp drop in the proportion of working class students to around 36.6 
percent in 1967 with a corresponding increase in those from white-collar or intelligentsia 
backgrounds.80  Allied to this was another great push to triple the numbers of graduate 
engineers and industrial scientists in order to try and remain competitive with the West in 
the pursuit of the ‘scientific-technological revolution’.  However, a significant problem 
was posed by the very poor uptake of engineering graduates by industry: even by 1964 
only 30 percent of engineering graduates were actually being placed in positions consistent 
with their qualifications.81  The regime argued that its utilisation of graduates in the 
workforce lagged very considerably behind that of Russia and many western nations and 
that there was a chronic shortage in industry of degree-holders capable of research and 
product development.82  Moreover, in the key area of electronics and semiconductors, there 
was a grievous lack of “scientifically grounded work, technological discipline and 
qualified personnel”83 which was in large part responsible for the poor quality and 
insufficient production of electronic components which, in turn, seriously affected the 
standard of high-tech research in the GDR.   Some of the fault lay within the firms where, 
Augustine argues, management subscribed to the view that qualifications were of less 
importance than experience in the workplace and refused to employ graduates in more 
senior positions.  Others specifically discriminated against the hiring of young graduate 
engineers because of resentment towards the Party’s policy of granting special treatment to 
the older technical intelligentsia in an effort to keep them in the GDR, while the older 
engineers distrusted the quality of training received by the new.84  Whatever the reasons, 
the failure to exploit the talents of the graduate engineers amounted to a considerable waste 
of human capital. 
 
By 1967 the Party was calling for one in four school leavers to undertake some form of 
tertiary education in order to cope with the rising level of mechanisation and automation in 
production processes, the extensive use of electronic data processing, the increasing use of 
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chemicals in industry and agriculture, the introduction of new production materials 
including plastics and the use of atomic energy. 85  Ten new engineering colleges were 
built between 1967 and 197186 and the numbers of higher level engineering science 
students increased by 62.2 percent from 28,344 in 1965 to 45,967 in 1970, while those in 
mathematics and natural sciences rose by 45.6 percent from 9,313 to 13,563 over the same 
period.87  Just as in West Germany, the expansion allowed a considerable number of 
graduates of Fachschulen a chance of social mobility by progressing to Hochschulen and 
attaining a higher-level degree.  Some younger factory workers were ‘delegated’ to attend 
Hochschulen on a full-time basis, while older workers were encouraged to undertake part-
time, distance or correspondence courses.  Additionally, admission standards to 
Hochschulen were lowered, as were the marking standards in a number of Hochschulen in 
order to increase the retention of poorer students and raise pass rates.88  The implications 
for the standard of education attained by many students and for their subsequent 
effectiveness in the workplace are obvious.  
 
More stress was also laid on the need for academic science to support industry by 
increasing the amount of contract research conducted for individual firms.  Even in 1963 
forty percent of research funding for higher education was coming from industry and VVB 
contracts, although in the technical sciences this reached sixty percent.  Additionally, thirty 
percent of GDR state funding for research in higher education was also directed towards 
projects of direct relevance to industry.89  For the sake of comparison, the highest 
proportion of industry-financed research in the OECD countries was in Spain (6.8 percent) 
and Ireland (5.1 percent).90   
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Third Higher Education Reform  
 
The third reform was touted as “a contribution to the class war with West German 
imperialism” and as a “historically necessary alternative to West Germany”91 and was, 
arguably, the most transformative of the three.  Ever since the passing of the second higher 
education reform bill the SED had been seeking ways to finally destroy the last remnants 
of the traditional German higher education system and break the power of those professors 
who had contrived to maintain academic freedom and autonomy and were thus considered 
a threat to the authority of the political establishment.92  There had been consistent 
complaints that “old practices were still being followed” and that “many teaching staff still 
teach precisely what they want to”.93  Active resistance had been especially strong in the 
medical schools and faculties of natural sciences with, for instance, the universities of 
Greifswald, Jena, Dresden and Karl-Marx-Stadt proving particularly truculent.94  There 
seemed to be some diversity of opinion regarding the objectives of the reform, reflecting 
the increasing divisions within the government as a result of the introduction of the NES 
and Ulbricht’s increasingly extravagant plans for the pursuit of the scientific-technological 
revolution.  One faction of government seemed to see it as the logical extension of the 
NES, instigated because the sort of ideas representative of the NES were being developed 
too slowly and hesitantly in the decisive areas of teaching and education.95  More recent 
historiography, however, seems to concur with the view that the reform was “an intraparty 
counter-reform” by the more Stalinist faction of the Party: part of the movement to claw 
back the partial autonomy which science and the economy had enjoyed since 1963 and, 
through organisational and structural change, reinforce centralised control and firmly bind 
university teaching and research to industry and the economy.96  The reform finally 
confirmed the central control of the SED, virtually removed any remaining vestige of 
autonomy and completed the economisation of technical and professional training. 
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Measures of the Third Higher Education Reform Bill 
 
The reform (put out for consultation in 1966) reduced undergraduate study time to four 
years and divided it into two stages: basic study (Grundstudium) and major subject study 
(Fachstudium).  Grundstudium consisted of general and some specialist knowledge of the 
natural and social sciences; foreign language training, particularly in Russian, in order to 
be able to read scientific and technical texts; basic instruction in scientific work 
methodology; sport and military training.  Study plans consisted of a maximum of 32 hours 
per week of compulsory lectures with the acquired knowledge being deepened and “firmly 
established through practice”.  As early as 1963, experiments had been conducted at the 
Technical University of Dresden, with regard to students spending much longer spells on 
practical placements because industrial enterprises consistently complained that, despite 
the good scientific grounding of the graduates, many found it hard to translate their skills 
into practice, introduce new innovations and cope with the training and management of the 
collectives.97  Thus, the Fachstudium included a placement in an engineering or industrial 
complex.  The rest of the time was taken up by core compulsory and elective lectures in the 
particular subject area, its theoretical bases and related problems in the areas of 
mathematics, natural and social sciences, technology and economics.  Success in the 
Hauptprüfung or final examination entitled the successful candidate to bear the title of 
his/her profession (Berufsbezeichnung), i.e. Diplom-Juristen, Diplom-Ingenieur. 
 
Postgraduate study took three different forms.  Spezialstudium (special study) was a one-
year course of independent study which rewarded the student with a faculty diploma in a 
branch of science and ostensibly allowed the student to enter industrial practice armed with 
the most up-to-date science in the specialist area.  Forschungsstudium (research study) was 
a two – three year course leading to a doctoral degree in an individual branch of science.  
The aim was to produce doctoral cadres for industry, and to this end the students were 
required to spend a prolonged period of time in a collective of socialist employees as a 
manager.  The doctoral work could be pursued either in the Hochschule, the Akademie der 
Wissenschaften or in the chosen firm; moreover, it was also possible to achieve a doctorate 
as an external candidate.98  The third degree category, that of Doctor of the Sciences, 
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comparable to the designation of Dr.Sc. in the USA or Russia, required very high 
achievement levels and a considerable level of experience in the field.99    
 
The structural reforms also encompassed a sweeping re-organisation of university 
institutions.  The traditional institutional grouping around ‘chairs’ was abolished, with 
nationally, 190 departments replacing around 960 institutes. Faculties were combined into 
much larger units called Sektionen (sections), under the management of a single director, 
and described as: 
 
The collecting together of the scientific potential of the institutes of one or 
many scientific areas for the development of concentration and cooperation 
in teaching, training and research across previous faculty boundaries 100 
 
The idea was to obviate the danger that the same things were being researched at different 
places with the same objectives and achieving the same results at considerable cost to the 
state.101  Along with this went the ‘profiling’ of higher education institutions.  This 
involved the development of complex centres of teaching and research in specific scientific 
areas or special foci (Schwerpunkte) determined by the Five-Year Plan and based on the 
type of industry in the immediate area of the university or Hochschule concerned.102  In 
theory, this would aid the development of complex collaborative and interdisciplinary 
projects utilising the research capability of universities and Hochschulen, the Academies of 
Science and Agriculture, industry and agricultural collectives.103  Thus, national scientific 
potential would become much more closely integrated while specialisation would 
concentrate scientific and material resources and funding, lead to better cooperation 
between research institutes, state organs and ‘partners’ such as the Volkseigener Betriebe 
(‘People-owned’ enterprises or VEBs), make easier focused-based research and, finally, 
permit rationalisation in the use of instruments, materials, libraries and work stations.104   
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Virtually all research in the Hochschulen was to be undertaken on the basis of a contractual 
agreement with an industrial enterprise, in effect, allocating academic research and 
development facilities to those firms which lacked their own.105  Nevertheless, as the 
Minister for Higher Education made clear, research was to be concentrated on the 
‘structure-defining tasks’ (strukturbestimmende Aufgaben) of socialist Großforschung 
(large-scale research).  Arguments in defence of small-scale practical research projects 
contracted with and financed by industrial or agricultural ‘partners’ were dismissed as 
unworthy of the true socialist researcher, whose aim should be the success of the socialist 
common research projects which were considered “the only possible way to top 
achievement at international level”.106   
 
Problems in Implementing the Third Higher Education Reform107 
 
Ulbricht had intended that the reform should be a major contributor to the GDR’s 
overtaking of top international levels of science and technology, even improving on the 
USA’s productivity levels and standard of living.108  While many of the ideas, such as 
increased cooperation in teaching, training and research, the rationalisation of cost and 
effort and investment for the future appeared both logical and laudable, many of the 
shortcomings apparent in the reform’s implementation can be attributed to the same issues 
which hampered the general economic development of the country: the inefficiencies 
inherent in a centrally-planned economy and the primacy of political loyalty over ability.  
When well planned, the new structure was extremely effective, especially in the pursuit of 
highly complex research and in enhancing the university education derived from it.  It was 
also a means of encouraging the collaboration of scientists of all ages and academic 
degrees.  In other cases it was wholly counter-productive, the new Sektionen consisting of 
little more than a collection of unrelated institutes linked by nothing more than 
bureaucratic decree.  They also appeared to be relatively unsuccessful in fostering 
interdisciplinary work.  Moreover, many smaller, more peripheral fields of research ended 
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up being “structured out of existence” altogether because they could not demonstrate their 
relevance to the state plans, thus increasing the inflexibility of the system.109   
 
There was a great deal of initial opposition from academics, some referring to profiling as 
the work of “political dilettantes” and ‘socialist competition’ in science as 
“unacademic”.110  In comparison to other faculties, mathematics/natural sciences faculties 
again appeared to be particularly resistant to restructuring and the encroachment of state 
influence on teaching and research.   The situation at the University of Greifswald was 
illustrative of a widespread trend.  The planners were extremely keen to expand provision 
in biology, mathematics, physics and chemistry but these, according to the SED, were the 
areas where “political/moral education and training are the least far advanced”.  Only a 
small group of junior academics was apparently able to recognise the “qualitative” virtues 
of the new system, while many others in the mathematics/natural sciences faculty tried to 
move into medicine instead which remained less strictly ideologically controlled, partly 
because of a chronic shortage of medical personnel.111  The response of the Party was to 
instigate a comprehensive programme of re-education within the university for staff and 
students alike in order to help them grasp “the deeper concepts and complexity of the 
international class war”, while the top positions in the new set-up went to those younger 
academics who demonstrated “understanding of the guiding principles”.112  The obvious 
danger of this course of action was twofold: the demotivation of the more experienced 
professors and the promotion of those with less academic ability and experience but a more 
opportunistic approach to career-building, allowing them to guide academic development 
in the Hochschulen, albeit under the control of university administrators answerable 
directly to the state and the SED.113 
 
Dissent at the passing of the bill was widespread, however, and was heightened by the fall-
out from the suppression of the Prague Spring uprising in August of the same year, 
Western student unrest and by the increasing influence of Western media and the counter-
culture movement on the university population.114  Other complaints from academics were 
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that the new structure of studies was too inflexible to suit all disciplines.  This was 
particularly so in engineering, where they argued that it was impossible to design the 
mandated one basic study plan which would conform to all engineering sectors because 
teaching plans required to be continually re-worked based on emerging technology in the 
different fields.  There were also, unsurprisingly, numerous complaints about the poor 
educational standard and motivation of new student entrants.115  Another widespread and 
ongoing problem concerned the work placements: in practice, enterprises were frequently 
unable to place students either in the type of work they were qualified to do or the area in 
which they were studying, while the economic pressure of having to earn a living did “not 
always support the combination of practical work and theory”.116   
 
The third reform also suffered from the traditional East German vices of poor planning and 
execution aggravated by underfunding.  There was a substantial ‘raking back’ of money by 
the government for new building projects, which it had previously guaranteed as part of the 
reform, without any corresponding reduction in the tasks of the Hochschulen.  For 
example, building delays at the TH Karl-Marx-Stadt were caused because the government 
did not pay the agreed money to the building firm.117  The resultant failure to complete the 
new Section building for electronics, information processing and automation technology 
meant that instead of the planned 4,010 entrants, only 750 could be admitted, “with 
obvious consequences for the development of the economy”.118  Letters regarding the 
planned new building of the Ingenieur Hochschule für Elektronik in Dresden indicated that 
the ground area was simply not big enough and also forecast delays in completion of at 
least two years incurring a financial loss of at least 600,000 marks.119  The Politbüro also 
suggested that the building programme of the Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena-Lobeda 
be abandoned altogether and that the research facilities at VEV Carl-Zeiss be used instead, 
meaning that student numbers could be increased without any expansion of educational 
capacity.  It was acknowledged, however, that this might have “political and ideological 
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implications for the building workers and the university population” and “would not 
strengthen the trust of the people in the decisions of the party and of government”.120   
 
It is, therefore, unsurprising that most Hochschulen were having difficulties in achieving 
their recruitment targets despite the planned expansion of student numbers.  One stated, for 
example, that “many of those most suitable for this are opting instead to do a Fachdiplom 
(skilled worker qualification), not least because of the better pay prospects in industry”.121  
Professorial numbers also continued to be eroded, despite planned increases in their 
number, as they too “left for other areas of the economy because of unfairly higher salary 
offers in industrial firms and institutions”122 and the implications of the new regulations.   
Additionally, there arose a serious dichotomy with regard to research.  Because enterprises 
were expected to be financially responsible for the research in the Hochschulen, they 
expected to have their particular requirements prioritised.  Many firms showed a marked 
disinterest in drawing up contracts for long-term research or in their financing.123  They 
complained that the Hochschulen were not taking their needs into account and that their 
research effort was too fragmented: for example, the Section for Shipbuilding at the 
University of Rostock was dividing its efforts between five different industrial complexes.  
Conversely, many Hochschulen complained of badly formulated and ill-thought out 
contractual proposals from their partner firms and expressed the fear that they were simply 
being used to service the needs of industry.124  Moreover, despite Ulbricht’s belief that 
industry’s financing of research would lead to an increased translation of research results 
into production processes, the indications were that the industrial partners were still 
refusing to implement any innovations which were not of immediate, short-term financial 
benefit.   
 
The End of the New Economic System 
 
There were, moreover, continuing clashes between the structural development demanded 
by the leadership and the conflicting goals of many of the enterprises, resulting from the 
introduction of the NES.  Because the goals of industry did not necessarily coincide with 
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the longer-term aims of the planners, in an effort to steer technological innovation in the 
desired direction the planners increasingly allocated preferential access to supplies and 
labour to ‘structure-determining’ projects designated as important in the plan to overtake 
the West in the key sectors of chemicals, machine building and electronics.  The number of 
these multiplied and absorbed increasing amounts of investment and time to the detriment 
of the contractual obligations negotiated independently by the enterprises.125  There were, 
nevertheless, some notable successes and at the end of the 1960s the GDR was still 
counted amongst the ten most industrialised nations of the world.  Moreover, although 
standards of living lay well below those of West Germany, they were by far the highest in 
the East European bloc.  However, productivity continued to decline even in comparison 
with that of other Eastern European countries as the following table demonstrates:   
 
Table 4.2 
Level of output in selected socialist countries 1950 – 69 (average annual % 
rates of growth) 
   
 Output (GDP at 1963 
factor cost) 
Output per person 
employed 
     
 1950/52-
195860 
1958/60-
1967/69 
1950/52-
1958/60 
1958/60-
1967/69 
     
Bulgaria 6.4 7.4 5.7 7.0 
Czechoslovakia 5.7 4.8 4.7 3.5 
GDR 7.1 4.5 6.4 4.4 
Hungary 4.1 5.5 2.9 4.8 
Poland 6.2 6.0 4.4 4.0 
Romania 6.3 8.0 4.8 7.6 
Soviet Union 8.3 6.9 6.3 4.7 
Yugoslavia 6.4 6.1 5.9 5.0 
     
Source: Derek Aldcroft, The European Economy 1914 – 1990, 3rd Ed., (London, 
Routledge, 1996), p 174 
 
 
A 1968 report from the Sector for Higher Education Policy of the Institute for Marxism-
Leninism condemned a serious loss of momentum in the economy leading to labour 
productivity being half that of Japan, with a growth rate since 1960 less than that of both 
Japan and the USA.  It also reported an increase in the material intensity of GDR 
production, a time-delay in paying bills of over one and half times that of the USA and a 
rate of development in important, structure-defining branches of industry that lagged 
behind planned targets.  The report concluded that in terms of scientific achievement the 
GDR remained ten years behind the rest of the world.126  Certainly, there were other 
contributory issues, like the Western embargo on the export to the Eastern block of a 
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number of products capable of having military application, such as microelectronic 
components, which seriously affected the development of high-tech industry in the GDR.  
Furthermore, the Soviet Union, on which the GDR relied for technical assistance, proved 
reluctant to cooperate with the GDR on technological projects.  Ultimately, however, it 
appeared that Ulbricht’s technological dreams for the GDR proved to be far beyond the 
country’s capability to achieve.    
 
By the end of the 1960s, it became obvious that far more engineers, in particular, were 
being trained in the Hochschulen than the economy could possibly absorb.127  Also 
increasingly apparent were the divisions created by Ulbricht’s policies within the Party.  
The NES was distrusted by the more hard-line elements who resented the introduction of 
‘capitalist-style’ economic levers.  Additionally, the huge increase of research into 
cybernetics, semiconductors, computers and systems theory aroused the antagonism of a 
number, who recognised in the introduction of computerisation to planning systems a 
potential shift of power from the planners to the scientists and mathematicians, something 
the more conservative Party members were not prepared to accept.128  Ulbricht’s policy of 
importing Western machinery, for which he planned to pay by using the machinery to 
create industrial products for export to the West, had led to substantial trade deficits, 
turning what had been a surplus of $400 million with Western Europe in 1968 into a deficit 
of $248 million.129  Moreover, it had involved the development of such close economic ties 
with the West that the SED hardliners saw it as a step too far.  In the end, Ulbricht was 
forced from power, not least as a result of political pressure from the Soviet Union which 
was increasingly concerned that Ulbricht’s “technocratic dream” of overtaking the West 
would lead him not only to accumulate large debts in order to do it, but to sacrifice the 
GDR’s ties with the Soviet block if need be.130 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In a time of heightened international political tension, the desire to differentiate itself from 
the FRG and adopt Marxist-Leninist values in the creation of a superior socialist society 
lay behind the three reforms of higher education in East Germany.  In some respects this 
was no bad thing; for example, the GDR could legitimately claim the moral high ground 
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with respect to its democratisation of higher education long before its Western neighbour.  
University autonomy disappeared along with the old hierarchical, patriarchal elite which 
had controlled it and the Party placed its hopes on the creation of a new, loyal, proletarian, 
technical intelligentsia.  In addition to the need for specialists to push forward the 
technological frontier, the Party was well aware that a well-educated, highly skilled 
workforce was critical for the successful adoption of technological advances and 
innovative practices.  Logically, there was every reason to suppose that a concentration on 
particular economic sectors would substantially assist the country’s economic 
development.  Higher education was, therefore, continually expanded and focused on 
chemistry, engineering, mathematics and the natural sciences in order to produce the 
required number and type of socialist cadres for industry calculated by the central planners.   
 
The problems lay less in the idea, than in its implementation.  Because of the financial 
difficulties of the state and the inefficiencies of the central planning system higher 
education expansion was always under-funded and under-resourced, compromising both 
the quality of teaching and research.  In the drive to create the new socialist intelligentsia, 
ideological conformity was usually prized more than academic merit because the Party 
required “specialists who functioned according to the Plan’s discipline”, not well-rounded 
scholars who would be inclined to question the broader social and political questions.131  
Research projects were frequently designed and ranked in priority by inexperienced central 
planners with little knowledge of the fields in question.   With virtually all basic research 
removed from the remit of the Hochschulen to the Akademie der Wissenschaften, higher 
education research became progressively more oriented towards agricultural and industrial 
production.  By making the collectives responsible for research financing, however, 
discrepancies arose between the shorter-term aims of collectives and the demands of the 
government for pioneering technological breakthroughs and longer-term perspective 
planning.  Additionally, there were constant and seemingly insurmountable difficulties in 
translating innovation into production.   
 
The technological status of the GDR was never in any danger of even ‘catching-up with’, 
let alone ‘overtaking’ that of the West.  There is general consensus that, until the 
introduction of the NES, the research and development effort was concentrated too heavily 
on the lower technology sectors and heavy industry, with too little emphasis placed on 
more ‘modern’ areas such as plastics, data processing and electrical machine and apparatus 
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construction.132  The subsequent reversal of policy with a sharp increase of research into 
the development of high technology resulted in disproportionate economic development 
and a scarcity of many basic consumer goods.  Ultimately societal discontent, the unease of 
large sections of the party and of the Soviet Union were enough to kill the experiment and 
see the demise of Walter Ulbricht as leader, heralding a return to the more ideologically 
comfortable ground of highly centralised economic planning and the end of the pursuit of 
the scientific-technological revolution. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Change and Reform in West German Higher Education 1969 - 1990 
 
 
The general perception of higher education in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 
during the 1970s and 1980s is of the unstoppable momentum of its expansion.  This, in 
turn, gave rise to fears regarding the increasing cost to the public purse, the quality of 
teaching, the damage caused to the research process by over-burdening the professoriate 
with teaching and administration duties, the impact of vast numbers of over-educated 
graduates in the ‘wrong’ disciplines on the labour market and the inability of the higher 
education system to orient itself sufficiently to the needs of society.  Although student 
numbers had been steadily increasing in response to demographic development and social 
changes since the end of WWII, it was not until the mid-1960s that really sizeable 
quantitative expansion was actively encouraged through reform of the education system in 
response to concerns detailed in a previous chapter.  The transition from ‘élite’ to ‘mass’ 
higher education which took place in the 1970s was far from being unique to Germany; 
rather the phenomenon was common to most of the industrialised countries of the West 
including the USA and Great Britain.1   The process in the FRG, however, was influenced 
by the persistence of the formalised structure and autonomous status of the Hochschulen 
and complicated by a highly decentralised federal framework with responsibility for 
education in the remit of the individual Land governments, making the process of 
developing a national educational policy a rather complicated and long drawn-out affair.   
 
1969 arguably represented a turning point in the development of West German higher 
education.  Not only did the end of the ‘Grand Coalition’ lead to a breakdown in 
cooperation between the Länder and the federal government on education policy, the 
advent of the first government led by the SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) 
since the end of WWII heralded an ostensibly new approach to higher education.  To some 
extent directed by the violent student unrest which was taking place in most of the 
country’s Hochschulen, SPD/FDP policy guaranteed entry to higher education to all who 
reached a certain standard of education as a constitutional right.  In human capital terms, 
the coalition’s argument ran that higher education was, in general, the best preparation for 
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personal development and employment opportunities, while a generally higher level of 
qualifications would, in a virtuous circle, lead to changes in the structure of the 
employment system and of the economy creating a corresponding demand for even higher 
qualifications.2   This was the antithesis of previous policy initiatives which had attempted 
to limit higher education expansion by means of restricting entry because of a perceived 
oversupply of graduates in disciplines which made them hard to employ.3  The policy was 
not always observable in the actions of ministers in the first few years of SPD government, 
as will be demonstrated.  However, the constant tension to reconcile economic goals with 
their social agenda was a predominant feature during the tenure both of the SPD- and the 
CDU/CSU-led administrations of the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the impact of the sudden acceleration of student 
numbers on the educational infrastructure, the labour market and the research effort of the 
institutions of higher education.  It will analyse the policy decisions taken and their 
implementation through the 1970s and 1980s and offer some tentative hypotheses as to the 
relationship between higher education and economic growth in the FRG.  I propose to deal 
with the decades separately, examining the policy changes enacted in the 1980s as a 
response to events in the 1970s because of the restrictions on the use of much archival 
material beyond the mid-1970s and because of the return of CDU/CSU led administrations 
in 1982. 
 
 
1970s  
 
Rapid Expansion 
 
The rise in student numbers in the FRG was swift and appeared largely uncontrolled in 
comparison to the carefully planned East German experience, leading to pressure for 
significant internal reform of, and better coordination and cooperation between institutions 
of higher education.  Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft (Minister for Education 
and Science) Klaus von Dohnanyi argued that it was impossible for large, modern, open 
universities to try and function to the same rules as the old ‘elite’ universities.  An 
industrial society, which was aiming for a better standard of living, needed “discerning” 
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higher education institutes which were more practically oriented and adapted to the world 
of work and science.  In order to achieve this, he suggested that the Hochschulen work 
with employers to create suitable courses of study for specific areas of employment.  
Additionally, he argued the need to improve the effectiveness of scientific studies and 
contact between higher education institutions through the systematic publication of the 
results of research projects.4  The RWTH Aachen, however, provides a fairly typical 
example of what transpired in practice.   Although it claimed to be working toward the 
creation of more employment-oriented courses “in the sense of a constant adjustment to the 
position of teaching and learning”, there was little appetite for the involvement of industry 
in the process: “[the courses] should not depend on the selection of … industry”.  As for an 
increase in interdisciplinary and/or cooperative research, the RWTH argued that a new 
organisational form would have to be created in order to finance it, because “there is no 
classification for such a thing in the budget of the Technische Hochschule”.5 
 
From 346,045 in the winter semester of 1971/72, total student numbers in the FRG rose to 
726,900 in 1972/73 and to 946,800 by 1978/79.6  The process was expedited by the 
progressive reduction of the number of numerus clausus then in place and the decision to 
limit its future use in line with a constitutional ruling of 1972 and the conditions of the 
Hochschulrahmengesetz of 1976.  Instead, an agreement with the Kultusminister Konferenz 
led to the introduction of an “over-capacity” quota for limited periods in order to satisfy 
demand in years where a high birth rate had swollen the age cohort.7  Despite protestations 
to the contrary and amid mutual recriminations from Land and federal authorities, it 
became obvious both at home and abroad that the system was failing.  An OECD review of 
national policies for education with the German title “Bildungswesen: mangelhaft” 
(Education: unsatisfactory), came to the conclusion that the West German education 
system as a whole was dangerously backward.8  More specifically, at the 16th Semestrial 
Conference of Rectors and vice-Chancellors of the European Universities (CRE), the rector 
of Mannheim University stated that “the rapid growth of the universities in the sixties and 
early seventies lowered the standards, measured by any criteria”.  Much of this he blamed 
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on the huge increase in the teaching and administrative load of the teaching body which 
left little time to develop research projects and created “severe role dissatisfaction”.  He 
claimed, moreover, that matters had been exacerbated by the issuing of “literally hundreds” 
of full professorships to junior academics without convincing demonstration of scholarly 
ability, leading to lowered standards of teaching and research and, because these were 
lifetime appointments, to a “dead wood problem”.  Moreover, since the average age of a 
full professor had fallen from 54 in 1960 to 40 in 1974 and the rate of growth in the 
numbers of higher education teachers slowed markedly from that point on, the potential 
existed for the creation of a severe bottle-neck in career prospects for junior academics.9 
 
Funding Problems 
 
The rapid expansionist policy brought with it a considerable number of other problems, not 
least the cost of paying for it given that virtually all higher education institutions were 
publicly funded.  In the two years from 1967 to 1969, funding for higher education had 
increased by one third (including the building of seven new Hochschulen in Bielefeld, 
Bochum, Bremen, Regensburg, Dortmund, Konstanz and Trier-Kaiserslautern.10  
Numerous hotly-fought battles raged for months on end between the various responsible 
bodies regarding the amount of new building and equipment required to cope with the 
expansion.  As an example, the Technische Hochschule Stuttgart calculated that an 
increase in ground area from 53,000m² to 88,600m² was required, while the 
Wissenschaftsrat, using what it claimed were “methodologically more robust methods” 
estimated the necessary figure at only 71,575m². This in turn led to claims from officials of 
the Ministry for Culture that the lower figure would result in a 20 percent deficit in student 
places. 11 
 
Growing concern was expressed at federal government level about the cost of the 
increasingly rapid expansion at a time when the nation was recovering from a period of 
economic recession, with Von Dohnanyi referring to it as a financial “Faß ohne Boden” 
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(bottomless pit).12  The effects of the 1973 oil crisis and subsequent deep economic 
recession, which saw terms of trade worsening by fourteen percent in two years,13 strained 
the public purse even further.  As a result, in terms of new building and expansion, for 
which the federal government was jointly responsible, the mid-1970s became a time of 
virtual stagnation.  Hochschulen in three Länder halved their spending on building, thus 
reducing their overall costs by 10 – 18 percent.  In four others the increase in spending was 
only between three and five percent with building costs for the engineering sciences 
suffering particularly badly.14  Subsequently, the federal contribution towards the co-
financing of the higher education building programme showed a progressive fall from 
1,015 million DM in 1978 to a low of 797.8 million DM in 1981 until the newly elected 
CDU administration began raising the amount again in 1982.  Nevertheless, despite the 
ongoing expansion, it would be 1985 before building programme funding recovered to its 
1978 level.15  As student numbers continued to climb steadily throughout the 1970s, the 
implications in terms of overcrowding and for the quality of teaching and research are 
obvious.  
 
The financial situation was exacerbated by the requirement to pay student support, the 
main artery for which was the Bundesausbildungsförderungsgesetz (Bafög).  Introduced in 
1971, it was intended to provide a more equal chance for higher education among the 
lower and middle classes who might otherwise have been excluded on the grounds of cost.  
65 percent of the Bafög, which covered living costs and tuition fees, was paid for by 
federal government and 35 percent by the Länder.  Joint costs amounted to around 1.6 
billion DM for 493,000 students in 1972, 2.6 billion DM for 665,000 students in 1975 and 
3.7 billion DM for 830,000 students in 1980.  The more meagre financial help for doctoral 
students, which reached its height at 61 million DM in 1975, was issued in the form of a 
loan from 1976 onwards, following which applications for postgraduate funding dropped 
sharply.16   
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On a different tack, the Bund-Länder Kommission für Bildungsplanung und 
Forschungsförderung (BLK)17 highlighted the economic effects of the expansion of higher 
education on the structure of labour market.  It projected that the increased numbers 
attending Hochschulen would mean a loss from the workforce of over 600,000 employees 
up to the year 1985.  This, in turn, would affect industrial production and lead to a slowing 
of economic growth and hence of public revenue in the short to medium term, although 
there would ultimately be long-term economic benefits to the country in terms of the 
increased productivity which would arise from the general raising of the education level of 
workforce.18   
 
Course Selection  
 
In addition to the pressure on finances, accommodation and the teaching body, the 
expansion policy also inevitably led to an inability to provide all students with their 
preferred course of study.  There were a number of reasons for this.  Firstly, the education 
reform of the 1960s had led to the creation of around twenty different types of Gymnasien 
and a system of special course choice in upper secondary level education which greatly 
increased the numbers of Abiturienten equipped only to study what were considered the 
‘soft options’ of philosophy and the humanities, as opposed to more rigorous scientific 
disciplines.19  Additionally, a somewhat equivocal ruling from the Federal Constitutional 
Court in 1972 stated that the existing use of entry restrictions to tailor higher education 
admission to conform to labour market demand was incompatible with the constitution 
except under very specific circumstances.20  The Hochschulrahmengesetz of 1976 further 
constrained the educational authorities to severely limit the use of entry restrictions with 
the result that by 1980 only eleven courses (among them medicine, dentistry and 
electrotechnology) were subject to a numerus clausus restriction to fit with predicted 
demand levels, in comparison with the 56 which existed in 1976.21  The apparent reasoning 
behind this decision was partly because competition for places in the highly popular 
numerus clausus subjects was considered to impose too much strain on young minds and 
partly because their removal would enhance the educational chances of those “belonging to 
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the demographic heap [sic]”.22  Applications for many courses, therefore, frequently 
exceeded available capacity and a considerable number of students were forced to study a 
second choice subject. 
 
Related to this was a second reason: the steadily increasing tendency for students to extend 
the length of their study period well beyond the minimum, leading to bottlenecks in a 
number of subjects.  As an example, with an ‘overlong’ study period defined as being four 
semesters or more over the minimum necessary, in the University of Frankfurt 18.4 percent 
of chemistry students, 14.3 of sociology and politics students and 13.7 of 
biology/geosciences students over-extended their period of study.23  Between 1979 and 
1982, the average age of a university graduate had increased by 0.3 years to 27.3 years and 
the average duration of a first degree was 11.4 semesters.24  Von Dohnanyi argued on 
behalf of the federal government that the constitutional guarantee of ‘freedom of teaching’ 
did not excuse higher education teaching staff and faculties from the need to so construct 
courses of study that students could not exceed the standard study period, nor did ‘freedom 
of study’ permit students to neglect and draw out the duration of study to the detriment of 
other applicants.25  Reasons for extended periods of study included changing courses mid-
stream; staying on to take a second undergraduate degree, sometimes as a result of entry 
restrictions on first choice and changes in the curriculum which increased the compulsory 
duration of many courses.   However, it has also been suggested that in a time of greater 
uncertainty regarding employment, for many students the idea of remaining at university as 
long as possible was a means of ‘putting off the evil day’ or buying time while looking for 
suitable employment.26   Improved student guidance to preclude this situation had been a 
federal government priority from the beginning of the 1970s.  Nevertheless, by 1978 there 
still existed only one advisor per 5,000 students nationally.  Their work consisted of 
advising on courses and forms of study, but they were also required to counsel students 
with learning and behavioural problems.  There were, moreover, considerable regional 
differences in provision between Länder; waiting times for guidance interviews were 
frequently very long; there was a lack of suitably qualified personnel to undertake the task; 
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and all the offices were characterised by high staff turnover resulting in a generally 
inefficient service.27    
 
Graduate Employability 
 
In 1974 a meeting of the Unterausschuss für quantitative Berechnungen of the KMK 
reported that “the number of cases of those graduates who are difficult to employ is piling 
up”.  Apart from the effects of the general economic downturn, there appeared to be two 
main reasons for this.  The first was an increasingly obvious discrepancy between the 
traditional humanities courses preferred by the majority of students in the Hochschulen and 
the changing demands of the employment market.28  Schramm has argued that this was an 
issue which had been largely neglected and that the vast majority of students were 
receiving the same sort of academic training for employment as had existed for the 
previous 200 years.  Nor were market conditions influencing the type of employment 
which students saw as consistent with higher-level qualifications.29  An enquiry by federal 
government reported that many of the existing courses of study lacked a manageable 
structure, had insufficiently defined educational goals and lacked both diversity of content 
and clear links to fields of employment.  The government therefore demanded that courses 
be better oriented towards new developments in science, technology and to the working 
environment, taking new employment areas into consideration even if they crossed the 
traditional boundaries of subject disciplines, something the different faculties and 
departments of the Hochschulen appeared to find difficult to reconcile with traditional 
departmental, facultative and institutional autonomy.30   Additionally, it reiterated, yet 
again, the need for Hochschulen to initiate a continuous dialogue with state bodies and the 
employers in order to address the imbalance between graduate qualifications, acquired skill 
levels and the labour market.31   
 
The second reason was that serious impasses were appearing on the employment market as 
rising numbers of graduates competed for work.  Graduate employment expectations did 
not appear to have changed substantially despite the changing economic and technological 
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climate.  Unsurprisingly, in view of the prolonged national shortage, still one of the most 
popular study options in the early 1970s was teacher training, which in 1971 was the 
choice of an impressive 39.1 percent of all Abiturienten (28.7 percent of males and 56.6 
percent of females).  This was despite the warnings of the BLK that falling school rolls 
would rapidly result in a national over-supply of teachers.32  Interest in teaching did begin 
to show a decline as the decade progressed; however, between 1975 and 1985, the number 
of successful teaching graduates who were unable to find a teaching post of any sort had 
risen to 65,000 of whom 25,000 were still on the unemployment register in 1985.33  
Teaching aside, between 1966 and 1976 the number of graduates in medicine increased by 
one third; in engineering science by fifty percent; in economics and social sciences by two 
hundred percent; in the humanities by five hundred percent; and in mathematics and the 
natural sciences by seven hundred percent.  These latter two groups accounted for 75 
percent of all degree exams passed in 1976 compared to 45 percent in 1967.   The total 
figures are as follows: 
 
Table 5.1 
University and Fachhochschule diplomas achieved in West 
Germany 1976  
  
Subject Area* Number 
  
Humanities  57,280 
Mathematics and Natural Sciences  26,442 
Economics and Social Sciences  18,434 
Medicine and Veterinary Medicine    7,008 
Engineering Sciences    8,485 
  
Total  119,820 
 
* From 1973 all teaching qualification exams were included in those figures for 
the appropriate subject area 
 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Wirtschaft und Statistik, issue 1977, p 795 
 
 
Hence, around half of all students in the FRG graduated in the humanities.  This picture 
remained consistent until the 1980s although the number of degrees awarded in both the 
humanities and the natural sciences decreased slightly, while those in economics and the 
social sciences slowly increased.   The motives for students’ choice of subject, however, 
were not always clear although Sandberger and Lind’s 1969 – 1976 study appeared to 
                                                 
32
 Wirtschaft und Statistik, issue 1971, p 611 
33
 Heister, ‘Notes on Current Planning for Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany’, pp 258 - 
259 
 145
show that students continued to rate development of the personality as considerably more 
important than either enhancement of social status or professional career motives.34   
 
By 1978 the Wissenschaftsrat was reporting saturation in some areas of the labour market, 
most particularly in the civil service which had traditionally absorbed two thirds of all new 
graduates (90 percent of these in the areas of education, science and the arts).  Moreover, 
the number of ‘graduate-equivalent’ positions in the economy was also expected to 
decrease rather than increase in the medium to long term.  This was in part because of the 
general economic trend, but also because the majority of graduate jobs took the form of 
long-term, often life-time, employment contracts which had the effect of reducing 
turnover, particularly in a relatively young workforce.35  A study carried out by the Institut 
der deutschen Wirtschaft (German Economic Institute) in 1978 found that although around 
88 percent of graduates did manage to find employment appropriate for their qualification 
level, many had to wait a considerable time to get it.36  This depended, though, on the type 
of graduate.  The number of registered unemployed engineers, chemists, physicists and 
mathematicians, reached a height of 16,430 in 1976 then fell to a low of 8,386 in 1980, 
although it rose to stabilise in the mid-11,000s thereafter.37   In general, however, the total 
number of unemployed Hochschule graduates demonstrated a tenfold increase from around 
10,000 in 1973 to over 100,000 in 1983.38  Unemployment among Fachhochschule 
graduates was lower, although again this varied by type of qualification with social 
sciences graduates suffering particularly badly.39  These figures were set against the 
background of a sharp increase in unemployment figures nationally between 1972 and 
1975 from around 246,000 (1.1 percent of the working population) to around 1,074,000 
(4.7 percent), although the level then stabilised and showed a slight downturn until 1980 
(ca. 888,900) before increasing again (ca. 1,271,600 or 5.5 percent in 1981 and 
ca.1,833,200 or 9.1 percent in 1982).40  Proportionately, therefore, the graduate 
unemployment rate was worse than the general rate (an increase of less than 7.5 fold) 
between 1972/73 and 1982/83 and had maintained an increasing trend during the second 
half of the 1970s even during a period when the national rate of unemployment had 
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stabilised.  In absolute numbers, however, the burden of unemployment fell 
overwhelmingly on lower- and unskilled workers. 
 
Manpower requirement studies commissioned by the federal government predicted that 
economics, law and sociology graduates were less likely to be badly affected due to the 
greater flexibility of employment afforded by their training; nevertheless, a surplus of ten 
to fifteen percent of graduates in these disciplines was expected by the mid-1980s.  As has 
been highlighted previously, however, the accuracy of manpower forecasts was very 
debatable.  The same studies also predicted an over-supply of engineers and natural 
scientists.  As an example, despite the introduction of a numerus clausus on 
electrotechnology in 1971/72, a 1975 report indicated that there were two percent more 
graduates in electrotechnology than vacancies for them and that this was expected to 
increase to around twenty percent by 1990.41  In 1979, however, the Association of 
German Electro-Engineers was forced to completely reverse this assessment when a study 
based on the enrolment figures for 1979 indicated an alarming decline in enrolment for 
electronic engineering at a time when industry was demanding hugely increased 
numbers.42   Nevertheless, as Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt emphasised in 1977, such 
was the employment situation that it was obvious that academic studies no longer 
guaranteed graduates a high level professional career or even a higher salary than that of a 
skilled factory worker.43   
 
 
Government Initiatives  
 
A number of measures were initiated in order to address both the problem of overcrowding 
in the Hochschulen and the shortage of professional vocational training.  One, based on a 
recommendation from the Deutscher Verband Technisch-Wissenschaftlicher Vereine 
(German Association of Technological and Scientific Organisations), was the elevation of 
existing Fachhochschulen44 to the higher education sector, thus creating two study options 
at the higher level.  These ‘enhanced’ Fachhochschulen would offer tightly managed 
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courses of study of a fixed length (three and a half years) which would be much more 
strongly oriented to the specific demands of industry, while study in the Hochschulen 
would remain more theoretical and research-oriented.  Despite strenuous resistance from 
academia and others who regarded this as “academic drift”,45 the dual system was 
introduced in 1971 resulting in a 34.9 percent rise in numbers studying at Fachhochschulen 
between 1974 and 1980.  The most popular courses were the engineering sciences.  Over 
the period 1971 – 1981, around 41.3 percent of students studied mechanical/process 
engineering, electrotechnology, architecture/internal architecture and construction 
engineering.  Around fourteen percent chose social studies and 9.1 percent economics.  A 
further ten percent opted for the newly created Verwaltungsfachhochschulen or 
Beamtenfachhochschulen (administration or civil service colleges) which trained students 
specifically for work in the civil service. 46 
 
By 1981 Ludwig Gieseke of the Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft could 
report that at least 30 percent of the student intake of the Fachhochschulen consisted of 
Abiturienten.47  However, despite the introduction of heightened entry qualifications and 
more flexible study options, the Fachhochschulen never quite managed to escape the 
stigma of institutional hierarchy, nor were employers willing to pay the same salaries to 
graduates of Fachhochschulen as to Hochschule graduates.  Hochschule engineering 
graduates, for instance, started their careers at salary levels which the Fachhochschule 
graduates could generally only hope to be earning by the end of theirs.48   Additionally, the 
continuing perception of greater social cachet in graduating from Hochschule resulted in 
many students looking on graduation from the Fachhochschule simply as an alternative 
route to gain admission there.  The proportion of Fachhochschulen graduates who made 
this transition in 1975 ranged from around ten percent in Bavaria to around 30 percent in 
Nordrhein-Westfalen.  This presented more of a worry to some Länder than others; for 
example there was a serious lack of available student places in Ost Bayern.49  Suggestions 
that this option should be made more difficult, however, ran up against the argument that 
this would simply increase the numbers applying directly to the Hochschulen.50   
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Another government initiative involved the attempted conversion of all Hochschulen to 
become Gesamthochschulen (comprehensive universities covering both university level 
and non-university level higher education, offering part- or fully-integrated courses for 
student groups at both levels and facilitating easier transfer between the two).  The 
introduction of these, however, proved extremely difficult with most of the institutions 
concerned raising so many logistical and technical objections that the effort was usually 
abandoned.  For example, the attempt at the RWTH Aachen was undone by the insistence 
of all three institutions concerned (the RWTH Aachen, the Pädogogische Hochschule and 
the Fachhochschule) on the maintenance of their individual institutional identities within a 
cooperative rather than an integrated structure.  The Pädogogische Hochschule also 
refused to cooperate altogether unless the representation of all three institutions on the 
ruling Senate was equal, something considered infeasible by the Technische Hochschule in 
view of the difference in size of the institutions and the lack of experience of the others in 
the running of a large, university-level organisation.  Other fundamental disagreements as 
to the type of teaching staff required, course design and examination timetabling were 
compounded by insufficient funding to build more accommodation for the vastly increased 
numbers of students expected and the effort was ultimately aborted.51  There were some 
successes nevertheless, and the number of Gesamthochschulen nationally reached a 
maximum of eleven from 1975 – 1980.   They never quite achieved the goals envisaged for 
them, however, and did not have much of an impact on the numbers of students opting for 
more traditional Hochschulen as the following table demonstrates:   
 
Table 5.2 
Percentage of student beginners West Germany 1977/78 – 1981/82 by type of institution 
      
 
 
Year 
 
 
Hochschule 
 
Fach-
hochschule 
 
Gesamt-
hochschule 
 
Pädagogische 
Hochschule¹ 
 
 
Other² 
      
1977/78 66.6 17.7 5.4 8.4 1.9 
1978/79 67.5 18.2 6.5 5.8 1.9 
1979/80 67.5 18.4 6.8 5.3 1.9 
1980/81 71.0 16.5 6.4 1.7 2.0 
1981/82 69.7 17.1 6.7 1.7 1.9 
      
¹Very few Pädogogische Hochschule were stand-alone entities.  Most were incorporated either into 
Hochschule or Gesamthochschulen 
²Kunsthochschulen and Theologische Hochschulen 
 
Source: Wirtschaft und Statistik, issues 1977 p 595; 1979 p 276; 1980 p 262; 1981 p 733; 1982 p 379 
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Moreover, the number of Gesamthochschulen was progressively eroded over several years 
as the individual institutions comprising them individually sought re-classification to full 
university status, as reported in successive issues of the statistical journal.52  
 
A further policy initiative was the extension of the programme of Weiterbildung 
(continuing education) and professional development courses primarily to counter the 
difficulties of keeping professionals abreast of rapid technological change.  The concept 
was particularly important for the small and medium enterprises which had limited 
resources of their own for the training of staff.  It was also seen as a means of promoting a 
symbiotic relationship between the academic and the wider community, improving links 
between the two and countering public perception of higher education as alienated from 
pressing social problems.53  The Hochschulen, however, appeared to experience great 
difficulty in the planning and execution of these courses.  Part of the problem lay in the 
specifically professionally oriented nature of the courses which were very different from 
the traditional courses offered by the Hochschulen.  In 1980, for example, of all the courses 
offered as part of the programme, only 27 percent could be delivered directly from existing 
curricula and a further 23 percent had to be developed from scratch.  Moreover, the course 
material required continual up-dating in order to remain current.  Other problems 
encountered were that many Hochschulen simply refused to participate.  Of those which 
did, some demonstrated very individual interpretations of the concept of continuing 
education, offering courses which were unlikely to “enrich, modernise or render more 
flexible the traditional contents of higher learning”.54  Overall, the volume of continuing 
education offered was tiny in comparison with the amount of courses offered outwith 
Hochschulen which were sponsored by industry, various administrative bodies, trade-
unions and private education associations.  These, however, were frequently offered only 
to upper level professionals including medical doctors, economists, judges, lawyers and 
attorneys as well as engineers and scientists.55   From the perspective of the Hochschulen, 
however, there is no doubt that the professoriate felt that its already heavy teaching and 
administrative load was simply exacerbated by the extra commitment which was  not 
accompanied by a corresponding extension of facilities or teaching personnel.  Moreover, 
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the increasing pressure on time caused by the teaching load resulted in a corresponding 
restriction in the amount of time available for research. 
 
Despite the fact that there was obviously a decisive move to obtain ‘more employable’ 
qualifications in an alternative institutional setting, most particularly the Fachhochschulen, 
the somewhat limited success of the measures outlined above can be seen as continued 
evidence of resistance to change.  However, this manifested itself not only in the reluctance 
of academic circles to embrace organisational and structural change and in the protracted 
negotiations required at all levels to institute changes in higher education; it also existed in 
the mindset of the students, employers and of the German populace in terms of the level of 
regard in which they held the different forms of academic study and the perception of the 
financial and social benefits to be had from acquiring a degree in a Hochschule as opposed 
to from any other source.    
 
1980s 
 
Changing Trends 
 
By 1981, nevertheless, a changing trend was becoming evident in the subject choices of 
Abiturienten.  The numbers opting for the arts and humanities were beginning to decrease; 
conversely the numbers choosing economics, social sciences and, most particularly, 
engineering sciences were beginning to climb, as demonstrated by the following table: 
 
Table 5.3   
 
Desired course of study in West German Hochschulen by subject 
area 1972 – 1981  
    
Subject area 1972 1980 1981 
    
Engineering 19.1% 21.6% 22.3% 
Economics and Social Sciences 21.1% 21.6% 21.6% 
Languages and Humanities 20.5% 15.9% 15.7% 
Maths and Natural Sciences 17.6% 13.4% 13.0% 
Art, Aesthetics and Art History   4.3%   6.9%   7.2% 
Human Medicine   7.9%   6.2%   6.4% 
Agriculture, Forestry and Dietetics   1.9%   5.0%   4.8% 
Sport and Sport Science   2.3%   1.9%   1.7% 
Veterinary Medicine   0.4%   1.0%   6.3% 
Not stated   4.9%   6.4%   6.3% 
    
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1981, p 730 
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In the Fachhochschulen, the engineering sciences remained by far the most popular option 
(41.3 percent) with students choosing to study mechanical/process engineering, 
electrotechnology, architecture/internal architecture and construction engineering.  The 
next most popular options were social studies (14 percent) and economics (9.1 percent).56 
 
By 1985, there was a visible decline in interest in the humanities among student beginners 
in both Hochschulen and Fachhochschulen, although they still remained by far the 
preferred option of female students (33.5 percent).  Engineering sciences were the first 
choice of the males (28.8 percent), with much of the rapid growth of interest in these from 
1980 – 1985 due to a strong expansion of the Fachhochschulen where the shorter and more 
employment-oriented nature of the courses were more attractive from the point of view of 
finding employment afterwards.  The least popular options were mathematics and the 
natural sciences with 17 percent of males and 13.1 percent of females enrolling for these.57  
In part at least, this was due to a decline in interest in teaching as a career, and in part 
because of the relatively problem-free access to study engineering sciences and the 
multiple employment possibilities offered by these courses.  The change also reflects a 
realisation of the changed economic and employment situation in West Germany and a 
much more pragmatic approach to higher education.  Not only were the traditional 
graduate employment opportunities narrowing, following the two oil crises of 1973 and 
1979 higher levels of unemployment had become a permanent feature of the West German 
economy.  Additionally, technology, especially in the form of microelectronics, was 
transforming virtually all sectors of the economy.  Thus, it was seen as offering new, 
exciting and financially lucrative career prospects as well as the best chance of secure 
employment at graduate level. 
 
At the same time, proportionately fewer Abiturienten were expressing the desire to study at 
either Fachhochschule or Hochschule level.58  From a figure of 87.2 percent in 1970, this 
had fallen to 68.7 percent in 1981, 62.5 percent in 1983 and 59.2 percent in 1984.  
Moreover, there was a proportionately much greater decline in interest among those 
possessing a Hochschulreife as opposed to those with a Fachhochschulreife.  Nevertheless, 
despite this picture of falling interest, the numbers actually undertaking study at a higher 
level consistently exceeded the numbers stating their willingness to do as demonstrated by 
Figure 5.1: 
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Figure 5.1 
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The rising absolute numbers are the consequence of the demographic increase in the 
relevant age cohorts.  Student numbers continued to climb from 1,008,000 in 1981 to over 
1.5 million in 1989. 59  Peisert makes the point, however, that in 1983 at least five percent 
of those enrolling in Hochschule did so “faute de mieux” because there were insufficient 
places available in the lower level vocational training establishments.60  This would appear 
to be confirmed by a report from the Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft 
(BMBW) which stated that rapidly increasing numbers of those qualified for higher 
education were opting for employment training instead, demonstrating a “more realistic 
assessment of the rapidly worsening employment prospects for graduates”, and welcoming 
the trend despite the strain this placed on existing facilities.  In language eerily reminiscent 
of that of the Honeckers in East Germany in 1971, the BMBW stated that the overvaluation 
of higher level education as opposed to employment training in the past had led to the 
unbalanced development of educational and labour market policy.  As a result, graduates, 
who had formed one-sixth of the workforce in 1982, were expected to constitute one third 
of it by the early 1990s.  The need for the future, therefore, was to concentrate educational 
policy on producing the type of manpower needed by the economy, which all the 
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manpower prognoses of the time stated unequivocally was for far more skilled workers 
than graduates.61  
 
Nonetheless, by 1987 there were roughly 1,806,000 Hochschule graduates and 976,000 
Fachhochschule graduates forming 10.3 percent of the workforce compared to 3.8 percent 
in 1970.62  A comparison of the unemployment figures for 1976 and 1987 reveals that 
unemployment levels of Fachhochschule graduates rose from 1.7 to 1.8 percent and those 
of Hochschule graduates from 2.3 to 3.4 percent.  This, however, was in the context of an 
increase in total unemployment from around 944,000 (4.6 percent) to around 2,376,000 
(7.9 percent), the major proportion of which (70.4 percent) consisted of those with minimal 
or no post-compulsory education or training.  The lower unemployment rate for 
Fachhochschule compared to Hochschule graduates appears to confirm that the more 
practical nature of the Fachhochschule courses led to better employment prospects.   
Statistics also show that unemployment was generally much higher among women than 
men and that this was particularly noticeable at the upper end of the educational 
spectrum.63  Women had much greater difficulty in finding suitable first positions after 
graduation than men and this increased over time.  It may be partially explained by the 
propensity among women to study the humanities instead of more specifically 
professionally-oriented courses, but also reflected a prevalent and persistent trend of 
prejudice against women in the competition for jobs and the tendency for the female half 
of a partnership to tolerate career disadvantages when family duties intervened.64   
 
According to human capital development theory, the employment market should be 
capable of absorbing increasing numbers with progressively higher levels of qualification 
and to some extent at least, this appeared to be happening.  A small but growing proportion 
of graduates was taking over positions previously held by non-graduates, confirming that 
some measure of ‘skills bumping’ was taking place and shifting the burden of 
unemployment towards the lower end of the labour market.65  As well as being responsible 
for the general upskilling of the West German workforce, therefore, the expansion of 
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higher education seemed to have led to some measure of qualifications inflation whilst 
managing to absorb the greater majority of graduates produced.66   
 
 
Reform Initiatives 
 
Because it was constitutionally unable to actively reduce Hochschule recruitment, the aim 
of the CDU/CSU-led administration which had come to power in 1982, was to force the 
higher education system to make the necessary structural and qualitative changes needed to 
cope with the quantitative expansion and to develop closer links with the employment 
system.67  Moreover, the BMBW continually emphasised the growing need for 
Hochschulen to synchronise their teaching and research goals with the rapid development 
in many scientific areas in order to keep abreast of ever-intensifying global competition.  
At the same time, the increasing costs of doing this had to somehow be reconciled with the 
limited funding available.  Laitko has highlighted the level of interest expressed by the 
FRG in the Third Higher Education Reform Bill passed in East Germany, and in particular, 
its emphasis on science as the means of developing innovations for use in the economy and 
the wider society.68   
Academic Competition and Profiling 
 
The parallels between the Third Reform Bill and some of the new policy initiatives 
announced by the West German federal government are astonishing.  In a strong echo of 
the GDR’s Third Reform Bill, the 1982 report on target setting for higher education of the 
new CDU/CSU/FDP government stated that intensification and rationalisation was to be 
achieved through the introduction of the principles of competition and differentiation 
between the individual institutions in the form of profiling.   
 
Competition, based on generally recognised (if then still undetermined) standards for the 
assessment of performance in teaching and research, was envisaged as taking place 
between individual institutions, professors and students and even between Länder.  The 
competition for individual professors as a means of raising the quality of education, 
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training and research as well as for research funding was seen as particularly significant, as 
was the ability to compete for students in the longer term.  The removal of the function of 
the central distribution office in allocating students to Hochschulen would have the double 
benefit of allowing students a freer choice of institution and individual Hochschulen the 
right to decide which students to accept, based on their ability and on the institution’s 
educational and research profile.  There was, moreover, encouragement for sponsorship in 
the form of privately funded research institutes or professorial chairs which would increase 
the income of Hochschulen and encourage new fields of research.   The ministry suggested 
that an extension of the number and type of courses offered by the Fachhochschulen was 
necessary to reflect new developments in the field of employment and that these should 
include some entirely new areas of study.   In addition, students in Fachhochschulen 
should be offered more choice in the structure of courses, including part-time study and 
enhanced cooperation with industry.  New initiatives were to be developed, including the 
development of longer periods of practical training within firms, leading to a qualification 
which would be more attractive to both candidates and employers because of its more 
practical orientation. The position and status of the Fachhochschulen vis-à-vis the rest of 
academia was also to be strengthened through greater representation on educational bodies.  
Thus, through this and a more comprehensive, practical educational and research profile, 
they would be in a better position to compete with Hochschulen for funding, personnel and 
students.  Additionally, the new government actively welcomed competition in the form of 
privately run Hochschulen, on the grounds that these could be run with greater flexibility 
than state institutions and thus might stimulate new forms of teaching and learning and 
develop new economic solutions.    
 
Institutional differentiation was to take the form of the creation of individual institutional 
profiles for teaching and most especially for postgraduate opportunities and research 
through the development of centres of excellence and the pursuit of special research foci 
(Schwerpunkte) in particular subject areas.  Other facets were to include the strengthening 
of the links between the Hochschulen and the industry and services in their immediate 
geographical regions; interdisciplinary and inter-Hochschulen cooperation in specific areas 
of research; the development of thematically defined research centres; and cooperation 
with research institutions outwith the Hochschulen and with ‘third-party’ organisations 
such as government departments and external foundations which financed research 
(Drittmittelforschungsförderung).69  The Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft had already 
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been involved in promoting a number of priority programmes involving cooperative 
research between researchers from several different Hochschulen while the 
Wissenschaftsrat had instituted a series of “Special Collaborative Programmes” involving 
scientists from different disciplines in one university collaborating on interdisciplinary 
projects, of which over one hundred were running by 1981.70  The aim of the schemes was, 
at least in part, to defray the heavy costs of replacing research machinery and equipment 
with an increasingly short technical shelf-life (such as nuclear research reactors or 
computer equipment) through its more intensive use within the Hochschulen and indeed by 
several Hochschulen.71  Additionally, new forms of teaching, cooperative research and 
student and staff exchanges with foreign academic institutions, and much more intensive 
cooperation with the economy in the area of knowledge and technology transfer were to be 
developed.  
 
Technology Transfer  
 
In complete contrast to the GDR was the almost exclusive focus on basic research in the 
FRG’s Hochschulen.  Technology transfer, particularly from the Hochschulen to the 
market, was an area of particular concern to the federal government because of the 
implications for the promotion of innovation and enhanced economic growth.  This 
became particularly important as West Germany, in order to boost its international 
competitiveness, moved towards the more flexible and specialised production of 
customised goods in the 1980s, many of them using sophisticated microprocessor 
technologies.  Moreover, increased flexibility demanded more technological sophistication, 
not only in product development but also in finding ways to cut the costs of customised 
production.72  Numerous efforts to promote better technology transfer had been initiated 
variously by the federal Ministry for Education and Science, Research and Technology, the 
Ministry for the Economy and the Ministers for Science and for the Economy of the 
Länder.  These had two main purposes.  One was aimed at tackling the lack of 
communication and interaction between the Hochschulen and key production centres of the 
economy which was leading industry to display an increasing lack of confidence in higher 
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education.73  The other was to facilitate the transformation of new scientific discoveries 
into industrial innovations and introduce a more praxis-oriented approach into the 
Hochschulen and other research institutions.  The new policy initiatives enabled the 
establishment of a range of technology advisory and communication posts in the 
Hochschulen and in institutions of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce, support for 
cooperative research, and the introduction of a technology transfer prize as well as the 
creation of funding sources such as “Auftragsforschung und –entwicklung” (Contract 
Research and Development) which Hochschulen and Fachhochschulen could access to 
develop cooperative partnerships with industry.  Schemes included, for example, the 
creation of the Garching Instrument Society for the industrial use of research results (a 
subsidiary of the MPG)74 and the establishment of an innovation and technology centre, 
based around the Ruhr University in Bochum, for the exploitation of the research capacity 
of all of the Hochschulen and Fachhochschulen of the Ruhr area for the solving of the 
practical problems of the region.75  On the one hand, the latter was a real success in 
bringing together engineering, natural, economic and social sciences with politics, 
administration, regional associations, enterprises and trade unions to solve cross-
disciplinary and multi-dimensional problems.  Small collaborative projects included titles 
such as “The mountain economy”, “Innovation oriented regional policy” and “Information 
technology and new forms of communication”.  On the other hand, the centre was 
prevented from carrying out larger regional projects by the failure of both Land 
(Nordrhein-Westfalen) and federal authorities to fund it adequately.  The plan to establish 
similar projects in other Länder was abandoned for the same reason.76 
 
The microelectronics field, however, provides a wholly successful illustration of 
cooperation between academia and industry.  Whilst the development of computer 
hardware originally took place mainly in industrial organisations, Hochschulen such as the 
University of Hamburg, which had developed a nationally important centre for artificial 
languages, played a leading and continuing role in the development of software and 
particularly of computer languages which required intensive basic research in the fields of 
logic, mathematics, linguistics and artificial intelligence.77  Other areas in which the 
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government was particularly keen to establish cooperation included health, environmental 
protection, resource conservation, industrial robot technology, satellite technology and 
communication, catalyst and membrane technology, biotechnology, fast breeder 
technology and atomic fusion research, all of which involved a large component of basic 
research coupled with “high-risk procedures” in applied research.78  Finally, the exchange 
of personnel between industry and science was considered a particularly efficient form of 
technology transfer and was facilitated through the creation of a new financial support 
measure entitled “Forschungskooperation zwischen Industrie und Wissenschaft” 
(Research Cooperation Between Industry and Science).  This supported the work of 
scientists from commercial enterprises, including small and medium enterprises, who, with 
the R&D priorities of their employers in mind, were sent to Hochschulen and other 
research institutions to work for a limited time.  The Fachhochschulen, in particular, with 
their research emphasis on applied rather than basic science were encouraged to intensify 
their efforts especially with respect to small and medium-sized business in their own areas.  
 
 
Higher Education and Economic Growth 
 
The effect of these changes in higher education policy on economic growth is, inevitably, 
much harder to quantify.  The largest proportion of the German workforce was employed 
in the manufacturing sector as the following table demonstrates: 
 
Table 5.4 
Employment in West Germany by economic area 1970 – 
1989 in 1000s and % 
     
Area 1970 % 1989 % 
     
Agriculture, forestry 
and fishing 
  2,262 8.5   1,066 3.9 
Manufacturing 
industry 
12,987 48.9 10,950 39.6 
Trade and transport   4,755 17.9   5,159 18.7 
Service industries   2,933 11.0   4,978 18.0 
State, private 
management etc. 
  3,623 13.6   5,470 19.8 
     
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Wirtschaft und Statistik, issue 
1990, p 251 
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Despite an obvious trend from both the primary and secondary sectors to the tertiary sector 
over the time period, the manufacturing industry remained by far the largest employer, and 
was, moreover, the largest contributor to gross domestic product and gross national 
product.  The most profitable area was the capital goods industry, in particular the 
machine-tool industry, the motor industry, electrotechnology products and the chemical 
industry.  Indeed, during the 1970s and early 1980s the machine tool sector was Germany’s 
single largest employer and exporter with an industry trade surplus more than one and half 
times larger than that of total trade surplus.  Together, the four industries accounted for 
55.4 percent of income from exports in 1975 and their growth maintained a fairly steady, if 
slowing, upward growth trajectory with the exception of a blip around 1975/76 and another 
from 1981 – 1982, both of which were a direct reaction to the effects of the oil crises on 
export demand.79  The downturns, however, were considerably less severe in these 
industries than in gross national product as a whole and they remained the best performing 
groups in terms of exports.80   
 
Initial perceptions, then, might indicate that economic growth depended more on the 
efforts of skilled, lower skilled and unskilled workers in the manufacturing industries than 
on graduate production from the higher education sector.  However, as Abelshauser has 
pointed out using the examples of the chemical and car industries and mechanical 
engineering in particular, in comparison to the large scale standardised production of much 
of the rest of the industrialised world, much of West Germany’s economic success was 
built on scientifically-based production regimes which manufactured short runs of 
diversified, customised high quality products.81  West German exporters were successful in 
building market share on the basis of technological advance as well as a highly developed 
system of direct sales support.82   
 
The increasingly customised nature of steel, microprocessor technology and speciality 
chemicals and plastics production also led to the development of highly sophisticated and 
more cost effective production processes and, in turn, to the need for a much more flexible 
workforce and the continual upgrading and intensification of training at all levels.83  The 
need, therefore, was for employees combining technological excellence with a sound base 
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of applied technical knowledge, the ability to combine technologies and to constantly 
innovate.  This required a steady supply of high quality graduates for employment in the 
Technischenberufen [sic], (which include chemists, physicists, mathematicians, engineers 
and technicians).  Indeed, graduates of either Fachhochschulen or Hochschulen occupied 
91.2 percent of all such posts in 1987,84 although the Technischenberufen accounted for 
only six percent of the total workforce.  However, increasingly high levels of technical 
skill were also required both for developing and using increasingly sophisticated 
production processes, for example in automotive electronics, which permitted Germany’s 
continuing dominance of the performance sections of the luxury car market.  The 
proportion of jobs requiring high-level skills (high and medium level white-collar jobs) in 
other areas of the economy, including the expanding services sector, also continued to 
increase as a result of the effects of technological progress on the organisation of work and 
in management.    
 
Thus, the effort to improve the market orientation of higher education could be argued to 
have had a beneficial economic effect.  Certainly market forces appeared to be having an 
increasing effect on the study choices of new student intakes in the 1980s, while policy 
efforts to tie higher education more closely to the needs of industry, both in terms of 
encouraging regional differentiation between institutions and reorienting research efforts 
towards more practical innovative joint ventures and contract research, could be argued to 
have paid off in terms of enhanced technological achievement, enabling Germany to 
maintain a strong economic position within Europe and globally.  In terms of employment, 
in 1989 one in seven graduates were self-employed.  Of the rest, the majority (around 63 
percent) described their positions as at the upper level with around eight percent at the very 
top of their professions. 11.4 percent of graduates were employed in science and 
technology, around 19.3 percent, predominantly male, in the areas of mining, construction, 
industry and the craft professions, usually at a senior level.  Education and theology 
employed 19.9 percent and 7.4 percent were involved in business management, commerce, 
commercial administration, trade, banking and insurance.  Of the rest who worked in the 
tertiary sector, 907,000 were civil servants with more than one third of them involved in 
teaching (at all levels).   
 
A number of issues, however, were inconsistent with this picture of the success of the 
higher education policy.  Amongst these was the ever-lengthening time taken to achieve a 
degree in the Hochschulen.  From an average 11.4 semesters in 1982, by 1987 the average 
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duration of study had increased to 12 semesters.  The percentage of students undertaking a 
fifteenth semester at university had increased from thirteen percent in 1982 to 17 percent in 
1989, 57 percent of whom had still to complete their first degree.85  A survey undertaken 
by the University of Konstanz in 1982/83 involving over 7,000 students at eight different 
Hochschulen indicated that one possible reason for this was the continuing problem of 
poor student guidance.  As late as 1988 commentators were still asserting that professional 
career guidance “leaves much to be desired”.86  Another reason for extended study times 
was the tendency of many students to change disciplines mid-stream in response to fears of 
poor employment prospects.  Employment prospects appeared worst in law and the natural 
sciences, but much less so in engineering, economics and medicine (where the numbers 
studying were considerably lower).87   
 
Equally worrying were the increasing levels of skills obsolescence attested to by industrial 
employers between 1979 and 1992, which were attributed to the slow response of 
educational curriculum designers to the rapidity of technical and organisational 
developments in the economy.88  A different argument suggests that insufficient funding 
on the part of the Länder to cope with mass education was the primary reason for a decline 
in the quality of both teaching and research and thus of lowered standards of achievement.  
This was largely attributable to the economic situation prevailing in the 1980s, in part at 
least as a result of the oil crisis of 1979, which had discouraged long-term investment in 
public spending and the educational services in particular.89  Conversely, it is also possible 
to argue that the downturn in student numbers in higher education expected from the mid-
1990s onwards did not constitute a pressing incentive to invest heavily in higher education 
during the 1980s.   
 
Others argue, however, that the problems represented a failure of the attempted reforms of 
the higher education system.  This, in turn, was largely ascribed to the persistence of the 
traditional structures of German universities, their didactic patterns and jealously guarded 
departmental and faculty autonomy.  Schimank and Meier have argued that deep, bilateral 
mistrust existed between the professoriate and the state with ministers regarding the 
professors as narrow-minded defenders of their privileged position and a wholly outdated 
idea of Wissenschaft.  On the other side, the professors accused the ministers of yielding 
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too readily to “alleged financial pressures” and of turning higher education into an 
economic instrument.90  The antagonism between the factions is illustrated by the outrage 
of the Hochschulen and associated professional bodies in reaction to the federal 
government commissioning the Frankfurter Allgemeine newspaper to write a report on the 
problems of the higher education system, based on evidence provided by the federal 
government without any consultation with either the Hochschulen or the Ministers of 
Culture of the Länder.91  Additionally, higher education reform was seen as having been 
substantially hindered in its execution by the Bund-Länder relationship which was 
instrumental in the maintenance of the traditional university structure and encouraged the 
use of higher education policy reform as a political bargaining counter.92  The counter 
argument to this is that the decision-making process guaranteed a voice to all agencies 
involved whereas a centralised authority would carry the danger of education policy being 
subject to constant adaptation with each change of ruling ideology and through public 
pressure based on fashionable whim.   Moreover, one of the conditions considered by the 
federal government (or successfully negotiated by the representatives of the Hochschulen) 
as an essential pre-requisite to facilitate the development of competition, profiling and 
Schwerpunkte in higher education was an extension of institutional autonomy.  This, 
however, also had the effect of further reducing the influence of the federal government on 
the Hochschulen.  Because of this, planning instruments within government, and 
organisations such as the Wissenschaftsrat and the BLK were hindered from fulfilling their 
purpose, resulting in the failure to effectively assimilate policy decisions into the higher 
education sector.  As one FDP politician stated: “The discrepancy between factual 
necessity and constitutional possibility in the reorganisation of education is simply 
unbearable”.93   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The changes which took place within the West German system of higher education from 
1970 were radical.  The huge and apparently uncontrolled nature of the expansion of 
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student numbers had a number of consequences.  It soon became evident that 
untrammelled expansion was not only financially unfeasible, but also undesirable in the 
sense of producing large numbers of graduates for whom there was a lack of suitable 
employment, which in itself represented a waste of resources.  As the public purse strings 
tightened in response to both internal and external economic pressure in the form of the oil 
crises and subsequent inflation and recession, successive federal government coalitions, 
both SPD-led until 1982 and CDU/CSU-led thereafter, argued increasingly strongly for a 
change to the traditional academic format and a much closer orientation to the needs of the 
economy in terms of improved student career guidance, improved curriculum planning, 
constant course revision to reflect the most modern scientific discoveries and increased 
vocational and professional training in the areas most necessary for economic growth.  At 
the same time, there was no leeway for government to actively restrict entry to higher 
education, something which would have been both politically unpopular and 
unconstitutional.  Initiatives in the form of the development of new institutional formats, 
competition between Hochschulen and differentiation of institutional education and 
research profiles were introduced to try to increase efficiency, connect Hochschulen with 
their immediate geographical environment, encourage interdisciplinary and inter-
Hochschulen cooperation in research and develop cooperative projects with extra-
academic research institutions and industry.   
 
While there was a rise in graduate unemployment over the two decades, it was relatively 
small in comparison to the very much higher number of low- and unskilled workers who 
were affected by unemployment.  It appeared that graduates were readily employable, even 
if not always in traditional graduate sectors such as the civil service, nor always in 
positions suited to their qualification level.  The effect of the changes on economic growth 
is considerably harder to quantify.  Despite a perceptible change to the tertiary sector, 
unlike many other industrialised countries the manufacturing industries remained the 
country’s economic driver, in particular the capital goods industries.  These required large 
numbers of skilled, lower-skilled and unskilled workers, but also depended heavily on 
constant innovation and increasingly sophisticated technology in both product 
development and production processes.  Consequently, a steady supply of well-trained 
employees at graduate level or above was required to maintain their global dominance of 
niche markets.  The students’ choice of subject was, therefore, particularly significant and 
the evidence suggests that the economic situation, coupled with lowered employment 
prospects encouraged a slow change from the humanities to the engineering sciences and 
other practical disciplines which were of more direct benefit to the economy   From that 
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point of view, the structural changes enacted in the higher education system over the 
twenty years under consideration appeared to have been at least somewhat effective. 
 
On the negative side, the sheer cost of expanding higher education in line with social 
demand had a massive impact on both federal and Länder budgets.  Overcrowding and the 
necessity to trim costs as much as possible led to what is generally agreed to be a lowering 
of academic and teaching standards and of the standard of research produced in the 
Hochschulen.  Industry continued to complain about the level of technical obsolescence of 
graduate knowledge caused by the inability of the Hochschulen to keep pace with the 
rapidity of developments in the relevant disciplines.  It could be argued, moreover, that the 
technological advances which powered the growth of West Germany’s main growth 
industries, and thus the economy as a whole, were far more the result of applied research 
carried out within industry itself or in institutions such as the Fraunhofer Societies, rather 
than stemming from the basic research carried out in the Hochschulen.  Exacerbating this, 
there was a history of extreme reluctance to share research results thus inhibiting the 
process of technology transfer, and to participate in interdisciplinary projects or those with 
agencies outwith academia.  There were, nevertheless, some outstanding successes with 
regard to this as the example of Hamburg University’s contribution to the microelectronics 
project proved.  Moreover, despite the fact that West Germany’s strength appeared to lie in 
incremental innovation to existing technology stemming from applied research, not in the 
basic research carried out in the Hochschulen, it was the Hochschulen which were 
responsible for the scientific training of those who performed the applied research.  
Finally, the extreme bureaucratic hurdles created by the highly centralised political system 
and the entrenched inflexibilities of the higher education system itself, not least the 
reluctance of academia to adopt a more vocational orientation and subscribe to a modern 
vision of ‘Wissenschaft’, proved to be fairly high barriers to overcome in the pursuit of 
economic progress. 
 
The parallels between the policy aims and initiatives of the West German government and 
some of the aims and principles of the Third Higher Education Reform bill in East 
Germany are plain.  The following chapter will explore the effects of the implementation 
of this bill on the higher education system and the economy of the GDR. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Change and Reform in East German Higher Education 1971 – 1990 
 
The end of Ulbricht’s reign as Party leader saw the emergence of a new ethos in the GDR 
with a very different emphasis and an ostensibly more ideologically focused approach.   
New leader Erich Honecker claimed that “only by paying attention to socialist principles 
can socialist outcomes be achieved”1 and very quickly began implementing policy 
decisions which differed radically from those of Ulbricht.  All areas of GDR life, including 
the higher education system, became subject to increased levels of centralisation under the 
control of the SED because only the “tightly organised center …has the necessary insight 
into the laws of social development to scientifically plan and direct this mission”.2  
Funding for research into high technology and the pursuit of the scientific and 
technological revolution were immediately downgraded in favour of developing 
Honecker’s ‘unity of social and economic policy’,3 which was intended to narrow the gap 
in living standards compared to West Germany and thus increase acceptance of the new 
regime, and the development of a consumer society of a standard equal to, or better than, 
that of West Germany. 4 
 
Consequently, the education system, and higher education in particular, were restructured 
in order to conform to what were seen as the new social and economic priorities.  The 
expansion of the higher education sector was summarily stopped and post-compulsory 
education was directed towards the training of lower-skilled workers to man the 
production lines in the factories.  The result was a considerable level of underemployment 
in the workforce and social discontent.  By the late 1970s, moreover, it became evident 
that the new programme was not having the desired effect and high-tech research, 
particularly into microelectronics, again became seen as the only viable route to increased 
productivity and economic growth in the increasingly impoverished country.  The abrupt 
switch of emphasis left the lower-tech, more traditional industries to decline.  Strenuous 
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attempts were made to expand higher education once again and it became the focus of 
efforts to turn around the nation’s decline through the development of industrial 
innovation.  Honecker’s policies were characterised by two watchwords in particular – 
Intensivierung and Rationalisierung (intensification and rationalisation).  This chapter will 
examine the effects of the change of leadership and ideological emphasis on the system of 
higher education, exploring the successive changes implemented and the consequences for 
higher education and scholarship in the GDR.  I will also analyse the impact of the 
changes of direction in R&D on higher education and attempt to assess the implications of 
this for the GDR’s economic position during the final twenty years of its existence. 
 
Restructuring Higher Education  
 
A Change in Emphasis 
 
As suggested in chapter four, there was little doubt that by the beginning of the 1970s 
there was a considerable surfeit of graduate engineers in the GDR.  Education Minister 
Margot Honecker stated that, during the Ulbricht era, the false impression had been 
created that the function of high school, and the EOS (Erweiterte Oberschule)5 in 
particular, was to prepare young people for higher education.  This had led to entry figures 
for the Hochschulen which were unjustifiable on social and economic grounds and which 
had also signalled a marked decline in the representation of young people from working 
class homes.6  At the 8th Congress of the SED in 1971, Erich Honecker reported that over 
250,000 graduates had taken up employment during the previous Five-Year-Plan period 
while the numbers studying had increased from 225,700 to 302,400.7   The planners 
therefore believed that any further increase would exceed the available employment 
opportunities and the current needs of the economy.  The expansion of the higher 
education sector had, moreover, led inevitably to a serious shortage of apprentices in many 
sectors of industry and of skilled and lower skilled workers on the production lines.  This 
was a situation which had also arisen in West Germany; however, there it posed a 
considerably smaller problem firstly because of its fast-growing population and secondly 
because of the large numbers of Gastarbeiter who had been encouraged into the country to 
perform many of the lower skilled jobs in the economy.8  The population of the GDR, 
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however, was at best static and suffered a downward trend for most of the country’s 
existence.  Moreover, while there had been plans to ‘invite’ a large number of foreign 
workers from other eastern bloc countries and eventually also Africa and Asia to work in 
the GDR, these had been put on hold immediately following the building of the Berlin 
Wall which was expected to end the requirement for them.  Towards the end of the 1960s 
there was an increase in the number of foreign “contract workers” in the country, but their 
numbers remained comparatively limited.9 
 
A number of changes took place very rapidly.  One was to reduce the dependence of 
academia on industry for its research funding which had been a source of some criticism 
and dissent in the previous administration.  This allowed a greater concentration on basic 
research in the Hochschulen than had previously been possible, although the Akademie der 
Wissenschaften still performed the majority of basic research.  The funding of basic 
research became the task of the state, while the Akademie and the Ministry of Higher 
Education were handed the responsibility for its planning and execution.10  The second was 
the attempt of the economic and educational planners to achieve a correlation between 
educational qualification and the demands of the workplace by forcing youngsters into the 
factories where the shortages of labour existed.  The education system was reconstructed 
accordingly.  The expansion of higher education and of the EOS was summarily stopped 
with the numbers permitted to prepare for the Abitur showing a continuous fall thereafter 
from 27,928 in 1973 to 22,156 in 1980.  Additionally, the numbers permitted to prepare for 
the Abitur while undergoing vocational education also decreased rapidly, falling from 
43,975 in 1970 to 31,949 in 1980.  Further training opportunities for adults and qualification 
for higher education by means of evening classes and distance learning were likewise 
severely restricted.11  Finally, the proportion of working class students in the Hochschulen 
was reengineered upward from 38 percent to form a more ideologically acceptable 55 – 60 
percent.12   
 
It was anticipated that by cutting higher education provision, more funding would be 
available for the extension of lower-level vocational education in the Fachschulen 
(technical colleges), including the development of 28 new courses in subjects such as 
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electronics, BMSR technology13 and data processing which would help address the deficits 
experienced in industry.  By 1980 all households were to possess a refrigerator, 80% a 
washing machine, and 97% a television set.  The production of the ministry for general 
machinery, agricultural machines and vehicles was to increase by at least 125%; that of the 
ministry for electrotechnology and electronics by at least 144%; that of the ministry for 
light industry by at least 123%; and that of the ministry for the chemical industry by at 
least 130%.  In order to increase production capacity in industry to achieve these goals, the 
planners estimated that, a further 130,000 extra workers were required for consumer goods 
production and other key sectors of the economy with the ultimate aim being to train 
around one million school leavers as skilled workers by 1980.14  As a result there was 
decline in the number of those studying at Hochschule level from 1972 until 1979, both in 
terms of absolute numbers and as a proportion of the population.  However, while there 
was an initial rise in numbers attending the Fachschulen, this began tailing off almost 
immediately.  The following table shows the changing pattern of study in the Fach- and 
Hochschulen over the decade:   
 
Table 6.1 
 
Student numbers in East German Fach- and 
Hochschulen 1970 - 1980 
     
 
Fachschulen 
 
Hochschulen 
     
 
Year 
 
Total 
% 
female 
 
Total 
% 
female 
     
1970 167,158 48.6 143,163 35.4 
1971 178,883 50.1 158,014 37.1 
1972 176,867 50.8 160,967 40.7 
1973 162,25 53.4 153,558 44.5 
1974 154,528 59.2 144,606 47.0 
1975 156,384 65.3 136,854 48.2 
1976 159,955 69.0 130,201 47.7 
1977 162,460 69.9 129,615 47.5 
1978 164,632 70.5 127,473 47.6 
1979 169,608 71.3 129,055 48.2 
1980 171,825 71.9 129,970 48.7 
     
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik, 1989, p 58 
 
                                                 
13
 Betriebs-, Mess-, Steuerungs- und Regelungstechnik (technical equipment, installation, measurement, 
control engineering) 
14
 Direktive des IX. Parteitages der SED, (Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1976), pp 7, 47, 59, 140, 146; by the end of 
the regime’s existence the proportion of GDR households with a television set had risen from 17 percent to 
69 percent; with a refrigerator from 6 to 56 percent; and with a washing machine from 6 to 54 percent, from 
Mike Dennis, German Democratic Republic: Politics, Economics and Society, (London, Pinter Publishers, 
1988), p 33 
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Immediately obvious is the decline in the number of those studying at Hochschule level 
from 1972 until 1979.  The figures for those studying in the Fachschulen also seem to 
indicate a reduction from their zenith in 1971 until 1974, from when there was slow growth 
until 1980.  The initial reduction in numbers is even more noteworthy because within the 
time period 1971 – 1980 there was an increase of eighteen percent in the numbers of the 
relevant age cohorts.15  One reason suggested for the decline in student numbers in the 
Fachschulen was the progressive downgrading of theoretical content of most Fachschule 
courses in favour of a more practice-based approach.  Practical training was shifted to, and 
heavily oriented towards, the work benches of local production collectives and so closely 
oriented to a particular collective that the fifth semester was devoted exclusively to the 
tasks which would be met within that firm.  The whole of the sixth and final semester was 
then spent in the firm.  The lowered theoretical content and new structure of the courses, 
however, diminished the possibility of using graduation from a Fachschule as a route to 
higher education, which, in turn, dissuaded some from the idea of applying to study there.16   
 
At the same time, there was a significant rise in the proportion of female students in both 
Hochschulen and Fachschulen.  In the Hochschulen, this reflected the much greater intake 
of women into previously male employment bastions such as engineering and science and 
the quota system which had been introduced in 1965 to ensure this.  By 1981, for example, 
almost one third (31.1 percent) of GDR engineers were female compared to only 7.5 
percent in 1964.  Of these, Augustine states that the majority were employed in chemical 
engineering, pharmaceutical and textile engineering, constituting over forty percent of 
chemists in industry.  From 1975 onwards they represented over half the engineers 
employed in computer science, particularly in information processing.17  In the 
Fachschulen, the rise in numbers of female students (from 48.6 percent of the student 
population in 1970 to 71.9 percent in 1980) was probably reflective of the increasing 
number of courses in more traditionally female occupations being offered there such as 
nursing and clerical work, although many women wishing to study engineering were also 
attracted to the Fachschulen because of the shorter duration of the courses there which 
were more easily assimilated with familial obligations than those in the Hochschulen.18   
                                                 
15
 Statistisches Jahrbüch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1981, p 64 
16
 Dietmar Waterkampf, ‘Das Einheitlich Bildungssytem der DDR in den Siebziger Jahren’, in Oskar 
Anweiler and Frierich Kuebart (eds), Bildungssyteme in Osteuropa Reform oder Krise?, (Berlin,Verlag Arno 
Spitz, 1983), pp 49 – 52, 54 
17
 Dolores L. Augustine, Red Prometheus: Engineering and Dictatorship in East Germany 1945 - 1990, 
(Massachusetts, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007), pp 261 and 267 
18
 Augustine, Red Prometheus, p 98 
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The planners, however, failed to attract the planned number of applicants in a number of 
subjects.  In particular, there was a substantial fall in admissions to study the technical 
sciences, agriculture and economics between 1970 and 1980.   In 1978, for example, there 
were complaints that the admissions quota for design engineer training at the Technische 
Hochschule Karl-Marx-Stadt had not been fulfilled for several years.19  The following 
table demonstrates the extent of the fall: 
 
Table 6.2 
Admissions to study technical sciences, agriculture and economics in East German Fach- 
and Hochschulen 1970 – 1980 and % change 
       
 Technical sciences Agriculture Economics 
       
Year F/schulen H/schulen F/schulen H/schulen F/schulen H/schulen 
       
1970 21,370 15,443 4,256 1,530 17,652 6,772 
1975 13,458 10,512 3,695 1,821 10,792 4,977 
1980 13,147 9,413 3,436 1,815 10,206 4,692 
       
    % 
change 
1970 – 
1980 
 
 
- 38 
 
 
- 39 
 
 
- 19 
 
 
+ 19 
 
 
- 42 
 
 
- 31 
       
Source: Statistische Jahrbücher der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1971, 1976, 1981 
 
 
One possible reason for the decrease in the numbers studying these disciplines in the 
Fachschulen was the subject choices of the increased intake of female students as 
described above.  Another potential reason is because these subjects had previously been 
the main conduits for moving from Fachschule into higher education.  The inability to do 
so for a time after 1971, therefore, may have had an impact on the numbers choosing to 
study these subjects.20  The reason for the downturn in Hochschule numbers in the 
technical sciences and economics is a little less clear, although may be reflective of 
planning decisions based on a perceived over-supply of graduates in the technical sciences 
and economics.  The nineteen percent rise in figures for the study of agriculture in the 
Hochschulen is very low in absolute numbers and thus probably not very significant. 
 
Effects on the Labour Market 
 
The restructuring attempt did not appear to be particularly effective however.  From the 
middle of the 1970s it became obvious that a substantial disproportion still existed 
                                                 
19
 ‘Auswertung der Konstrukteurkonferenz am 19. und 20.5.78 an der TH Karl-Marx-Stadt’, SAPMO DY 
53/687 
20
 Waterkampf, ‘Das Einheitlich Bildungssytem der DDR in den siebziger Jahren’, p 54 
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between qualification levels and workplace demand.  At least 25 percent of those with 
skilled worker qualifications were employed in occupations below their level of ability and 
studies in 1978 and 1980 confirmed that around 40 percent of all industrial jobs were 
being carried out by Fachschule graduates although only ten percent required that level of 
expertise.21  The situation appeared even worse for graduates of higher education.  A 1973 
survey demonstrated that 56 percent of these were working in positions below their 
qualification level.  Because of the GDR’s system of central planning, this trend cannot be 
attributed to labour market adjustment and the desire of employers to employ more highly 
qualified workers in order to improve productivity levels.  Indeed, the same survey 
indicated that 41 percent of positions which technically did require workers with a degree-
level qualification were held by those with a lower qualification and follow-up surveys in 
1980 indicated little change.22  Some of the reasons for graduate underemployment were 
discussed in chapter four.  Others include an oversupply of engineers in the labour force 
and the switch from the pursuit of the scientific-technological revolution which had left 
some graduates in a number of engineering specialties surplus to requirements.  However, 
another factor concerned the almost blanket job security offered in GDR firms, so that 
despite a clear need for those with degree-level qualifications in new spheres of 
technology at senior levels in the workplace, those already in position remained where 
they were regardless of ability.   
 
A further issue with respect to this concerns the continuing resistance to the employment 
of highly qualified women in supervisory roles over men in industry.  While there was a 
much greater degree of gender equality in the East German engineering profession than in 
the West, at least in terms of numbers, despite increased day care provision and the 
introduction of incentives to study, work and produce offspring, gendered job selection 
prevailed strongly.  Women were very often under-employed in administrative jobs or 
performed other office-based jobs such as engineering economics or technical design 
rather than working with heavy machinery.23  It should be pointed out, however, that 
gender bias was not limited to industry.  Within academia the position of women was very 
little better.  While much rhetoric was expounded about the need to “use more effectively 
the large intellectual potential of female cadres” in order “to continue the creation of the 
                                                 
21
 Anna-Jutta Pietsch, ‘Reaktionen im Ausbildungs- und Beschäftigungssytem auf Probleme der 
Bildungsexpansion in der DDR under UdSSR’, in Anweiler and Kuebart (eds), Bildungssyteme in Osteuropa 
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 Raymond Bentley, Research and Technology in the former German Democratic Republic, (Boulder Col., 
Westview Press, 1992), pp 93 – 94  
23
 ‘Probleme der Qualifizierung und Förderung von Frauen’ pp 13 – 14, SAPMO DY 30 IV A 2/9.04/618; 
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developed socialist state”, the proportion of higher education teachers who were female 
increased from 3.4 percent in 1971 to only 8.2 percent in 1985, the vast majority being 
employed at docent level.  In the whole country there were only 127 female full professors 
and 374 docents.  Most of the female cadres in higher education were employed as 
scientific assistants on short-term contracts.24 
 
Social Consequences  
 
The consequences of chronic graduate underemployment were mounting levels of job 
dissatisfaction, high job turnover rates and poor motivation in the workplace.25  These were 
heightened by the ideological shift from support for the intelligentsia and back towards the 
promotion of the working class under Honecker, one manifestation of which was a marked 
narrowing of the pay differentials between scientists and technologists and unskilled 
production line workers.  The negative impact on professional identity and pride this 
created was exacerbated by the knowledge of the greater status of, and very much greater 
salaries earned by graduates in West Germany.26  It would be wrong to underplay the 
effects of this policy on worker productivity and commitment to the cause of socialism.  It 
caused a serious undercurrent of discontent and dissent in the population partly stemming 
from the obviously inefficient utilisation of their creative potential, and partly from 
intellectual frustration at the prospect of spending their lives working at below their level 
of intellectual capability with no prospect of upward mobility.27   
 
Moreover, the policies of the GDR educational planners ran counter to USSR guidelines to 
the socialist states issued in 1974.  These stated that substantial sums of money should be 
set aside for educational expansion because the rapidly progressing scientific-technological 
revolution demanded a constant and swift increase of the general level of qualification in 
the population.  Moreover, because science had become officially recognised as a direct 
force of production, the expansion of the higher education system and of the scientific 
institutions was regarded as particularly important.28  The GDR authorities were not 
unaware of the huge gulf between this and the reality in their own state.  The western idea 
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 ‘Information über das Rundtischgespräch zu Ergebnissen, Erfahrungen und weiteren Aufgaben bei der 
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 D. Glowka, cited in Oskar Anweiler, ‘Bildungssyteme in Osteuropa – Reform oder Krise?’,  in Anweiler 
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of ‘de-coupling’ the qualifications of graduates from their future employment status, which 
was being extensively discussed in some other socialist countries, was politically 
unacceptable to a GDR leadership wedded to the idea of manpower forecasting and central 
planning in all spheres. Günter Mittag, for example, argued that: 
 
Greatest economic efficiency in socialist mass production can only be achieved if 
a harmony of the interests of society with those of the collectives and individuals 
is continuously re-established on the basis of the central plan29 
 
Despite their lack of success in correlating educational provision to the demands of 
industry, however, the planners realised that they could not effect further reductions in 
further and higher education numbers without completely belying the essential concept of 
socialist educational policy and further disaffecting the population as a whole.  As it was, 
the restrictive policies already introduced appeared to be leading away from a unified to a 
two-tier education system.  The constraints on, and more selective streaming for, entry to 
higher education meant that virtually the only route into a Hochschule was via the EOS.30   
This, in turn, limited the possibility of social mobility for many, reinforced social 
stratification and was a further cause of demotivation among the young.   
 
Economic Consequences 
 
The change in emphasis from higher to lower-level vocational education, moreover, failed 
to have the desired effect on the economic fortunes of the GDR, although this must be seen 
in the light of the very short time period in which it was expected to take effect.  There was 
certainly a large increase in retail turnover from 64.1 to 82 billion marks from 1971 – 1976 
and in the provision of all types of consumer goods; however, a substantial proportion of 
these had had to be imported from the West.  By 1974 there had been a rise of 79 percent 
in the imports of consumer goods and those of machinery and intermediate products had 
also increased resulting in a considerably widened balance-of-payments deficit.31   By the 
end of the 1970s the GDR was running dangerously high trade deficits with both the West 
and with the Soviet Union32 as the following table demonstrates: 
 
                                                 
29
 Günter Mittag, quoted in Betz, ‘East Germany: The Primacy of Dogma over Reform’, p 90 (Translation by 
Betz) 
30
 Waterkampf, ‘Das Einheitlich Bildungssytem der DDR in den Siebziger Jahren’, p 54 
31
 United Nations Economic Bulletin for Europe, 1981, Vol. 27, 1976 – 1978, p 43 
32
 ‘East Germany, Foreign Trade’, http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-5103.html p 6 (accessed 
20.2.2008) 
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Table 6.3 
GDR foreign trade by groups of countries* 1971 - 1980 
 
  
As percentage of total 
 
1971 – 75 
 
1976 – 80 
 
  
Total Imports   
Centrally Planned Economies¹ 65.0 65.8 
     Eastern Europe 62.1 62.8 
     USSR 33.9 35.0 
Developed Market Economies² 30.9 29.1 
Developing Market Economies 4.1 5.1 
   
Total Exports   
Centrally Planned Economies 72.7 72.4 
     Eastern Europe 68.9 68.9 
     USSR 36.6 35.4 
Developed Market Economies 23.2 21.9 
Developing Market Economies 4.1 5.7 
   
In Valuta Marks Billion³ 
  
 
  
Trade Balance -7.00 -28.00 
Centrally Planned Economies +6.06 -3.34 
     Eastern Europe +4.94 -3.83 
     USSR +1.22 -9.06 
Developed Market Economies -12.84 -25.27 
Developing Market Economies -0.21 -0.21 
 
  
*Based on statistics of GDR trading partners as GDR statistics give figures for 
foreign trade turnover only 
¹Soviet bloc countries plus China, Yugoslavia, North Korea and Laos 
²OECD countries 
³Unit of account for GDR foreign trade purposes.  For 1982: VM 1 = DM 0.713  
Source: Frowen, ‘Economy of the GDR’ in David Childs, Honecker’s Germany, 
(London, Allen and Unwin, 1985), p 42 
 
 
By 1979 total hard currency debt had reached 39 billion marks despite Soviet warnings that 
the maximum the GDR economy could sustain was 6 billion.  The situation was further 
exacerbated by the 1973 oil crisis and general global economic downturn.  While East 
Germany was largely protected from the rising oil prices caused by the 1973 crisis because 
of a five-year agreement on supplies with the Soviet Union, it had much greater difficulty 
in finding markets in the recession-hit West.33  Stokes has argued moreover that the GDR, 
to a far greater extent than any other industrialised nation, was dependent on world trade 
because in the virtual absence of any domestic raw material provision, the import of raw 
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 Jeffrey Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945 – 1989, (Chapel Hill, The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997), pp 12, 88 
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materials had to be financed by the export of finished goods.34  Eventually, however, even 
as pressure from the population to import even more Western goods and technology and 
food was increasing, the Trade Minister was forced to concede that increasing exports 
would no longer be able to cover the deficit.35    
 
 
Policy Reversal 
 
As a consequence, towards the end of the 1970s scientific research, particularly into high 
technology, again began to be seen as the answer to the nation’s economic woes.  In what 
Maier has referred to as the somewhat belated recognition of the fundamental need for an 
increase in the level of research and development in order to keep pace with changes in the 
computer and microelectronics industry,36 but also in an attempt to close the technological 
gap with the West which was a cause of the increasing uncompetitiveness of East German 
exports, the directives of the 9th Party Congress in1976 stated that recruitment to both 
Fachschulen and Hochschulen were again to be expanded.  Honecker also highlighted the 
need to raise the qualifications level of those cadres employed in research particularly in 
the fields of mathematics, mechanics, cybernetics, data processing, elementary particles, 
molecular and nuclear physics, plasma and solid-state physics, optics and quantum 
electronics, isotopes and radiation techniques, bio-sciences and biotechnology stating that: 
 
Enrolment in higher and skilled education and its differentiation along subject 
lines is to be so achieved as to correspond to the long-term requirements of 
societal and scientific-technological progress, and in accordance with the 
planned development of the qualifications structure of the available work in 
society37 
 
Additionally, a new research facility was to be constructed within the Akademie der 
Wissenschaften for the study of the scientific principles of semiconductors and 
semiconductor technology38 and science and technology were to be allocated a funding 
increase of 10 billion marks in order to enable the long term development of basic research 
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 Raymond G. Stokes, Constructing Socialism: Technology and Change in East Germany 1945 – 1990, 
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 Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, pp 96 – 100  
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 Charles S. Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany, (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1997), p 74 
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in natural science and mathematics and to put the results into production.39  The Fifth 
Educational Congress of 1980 subsequently resolved that microelectronics should be 
introduced as a stand-alone discipline for engineers.40   
 
The policy was lent support by a report of a panel of senior economic advisors of the 
governments of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) among whom was Köhler, the 
GDR Minister for Economic Affairs.  Its conclusion was that there was a necessity for 
centrally planned economies to move from extensive to intensive growth by increasing 
overall efficiency.   However, it strongly stressed that as one of the main driving forces of 
economic growth was the development of science and technology, it was essential to 
develop a more effective scientific and technological community in order to supply both the 
intellectual foundation for the generation of knowledge and the capacity to apply it in the 
solving of development problems.  Further research by the ECE in 1980 concluded that, 
particularly in a situation where the demographic trend was static or downward, as was the 
case with the GDR virtually throughout its existence, growth in labour productivity 
accompanied by constant product innovation was the only conceivable means of increasing 
long-term industrial growth.41   
 
There were, moreover, other pressing incentives to expand higher education.  One simple 
one, for instance, was the need to train substantial numbers of new schoolteachers to replace 
the large numbers about to retire.42  Another was indicated in the directives of the Ministry 
for Higher and Technical Education which followed the Fifth Higher Education Conference, 
where it was stated that the support and development of young academics was to become a 
special focus for the managers in higher education because of the pressing need for an 
increase in the numbers of highly qualified docents.43  It should be noted that there was 
some ambiguity in the reporting of some of the figures in the Statistical Yearbooks.  The 
general trend, however, as demonstrated by Figure 6.1, indicates a sharp increase in the 
number of new admissions around the early 1980s with a further surge in 1986.  
Nonetheless, the overall trend from 1969 continued downward, if less relentlessly than 
through the 1970s.   
 
                                                 
39
 Erich Honecker, Neues Deutschland, 19.5.76, p 6 
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 United Nations Economic Bulletin for Europe, 1981, Vol. 33, No.3, pp 383, 388 – 389  
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Figure 6.1 
Numbers registering for higher education 1969 - 
1988
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Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Vols. 1970 - 1989 
 
However, despite an increase in the numbers enrolling for higher education, because there 
was a simultaneous downward trend in the population level over the 1970s and 1980s, the 
overall number of those studying in both Hochschulen and Fachschulen actually fell, as 
demonstrated by the following table:   
 
Table 6.4  
Student numbers in GDR Fach- and Hochschulen 
1981 - 1988 
     
 Fachschulen Hochschulen 
     
 
Year 
 
Total 
% 
female 
 
Total 
% 
female 
     
1981 173,411 72.7 130,633 48.8 
1982 172,058 73.4 130,442 49.3 
1983 167,864 73.4 130,097 50.0 
1984 163,573 73.4 129,628 49.9 
1985 162,221 72.6 129,885 50.1 
1986 160,379 71.7 131,560 50.3 
1987 158,777 70.6 132,602 50.2 
1988 157,513 70.3 132,423 49.2 
     
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik, 1989, p 58 
 
 
 
Prioritising Ideology 
 
At the same time, within the Hochschulen the influence of the SED was becoming 
increasingly dominant.  Among the student body this was noticeable in the increasing 
 178
powers of the FDJ to enforce compulsory attendance, not only at lectures, but at political 
meetings, elections and ‘voluntary’ student activities.  The amount of instruction in 
Marxism-Leninism (for which the SED was responsible) was intensified, as was 
instruction in matters such as the creation of the socialist character of work, the unity of 
technical-economic and social-economic task setting and world-view political education 
and training.44  Moreover, while membership of the party and absolute and overt political 
loyalty became virtually mandatory for a senior position in any field, this was particularly 
so in higher education where the university and Hochschule leadership were entrusted with 
the education of youth and the transmission of the socialist ethos.   Hence, those at the 
helm of the Hochschulen were invariably members of the SED.  The rector of the TH Karl-
Marx-Stadt, for example, stated that as part of their responsibility for the development of 
the society as a whole, the teaching staff saw its duty as being: 
 
to educate our students in the ways of communist behaviour…Much depends on 
the way in which we comrade professors are a model for communism...the goal 
is to shape graduates who are in a position to create our communist future 45 
 
While it is likely that the best teachers and researchers in the universities and Hochschulen 
still regarded themselves primarily as engineers and scientists and tried to conduct 
themselves accordingly, there were a substantial number of others arguably chosen less for 
their expertise in the field than for their unswerving loyalty to party principles.  Indeed 
quotas were set for the proportion of the academic staff which was required to belong to 
the SED.  Although Party loyalty obviously did not imply a lack of academic competence 
in individual professors, the general consensus appears to be that the majority of the higher 
education teaching body was hired on its political credentials and that higher education 
teaching was academically much poorer than in West Germany.46                 
 
New Initiatives 
 
A number of new measures were introduced.  In an attempt to increase the number of 
students in metallurgy, metal processing, electronics and electrotechnology in particular, a 
considerable amount of stress was laid on the need to acquire more students from industry.  
In order to prepare these applicants for higher education a new one-year intensive 
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 Bentley, Research and Technology in the former German Democratic Republic, pp 94 - 95 
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preparatory course was developed.47   Secondly, in order to try to conform more closely to 
the needs of industry, specialisms within disciplines in the Hochschulen were to become 
even more narrowly focused than previously.  In order to assist this process, curricula were 
revised with some of the lectures in compulsory subjects dropped in order to increase the 
number of those in the students’ chosen specialty.  Additionally, individual study plans 
were to be developed in line with individual research interests and more personal research 
time built in.  Postgraduate provision was to be considerably extended and the students 
offered more seminar time for “free and open scientific discussion” and encouraged to take 
part in high-level scientific seminars, as well as collaborative projects with the Academy of 
the Sciences and other scientific institutions, both in the GDR and in other socialist 
countries.48  Thirdly, more funding was allocated to the development of cooperative 
relations between the Hochschulen and agriculture and industry;49 however, the funding of 
research in the Hochschulen once again became the main responsibility of industry.  In 
some institutions, such as the Friedrich-Schiller University in Jena, industry was funding 
more than 90 percent of research in physics by 1986.50  This development, however, 
inevitably led to a resumption of friction between academia and industry as to what should 
be seen as the main priority areas for research in the Hochschulen.   
 
A fourth initiative concerned the development of a new programme for the education and 
continuing education of engineers and economists which introduced the differentiated 
training of both professions with a much higher level of theoretical education.  Engineers 
would concentrate either on the development of new products and their production or on 
the effective organisation and management of the collectives in order to turn research 
findings into technical and technological solutions.  Economists would focus either on the 
solution of problems of the economy as a whole or on the problems of individual firms, 
again in a management capacity.51   Fifthly, the decision was taken in 1981 to upgrade the 
engineering Fachschulen to Fachhochschulen with a consequent upgrading to university 
level of the teaching and qualification level offered there and of the research undertaken.52   
This was followed by a decision in 1986 to integrate some of the original engineering 
Fachschulen with existing Hochschulen to form institutions “characterised by the unity of 
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practical employment skills and theory”.  Additionally, the building of a new Technische 
Hochschule in Berlin for 4,000 – 5,000 students, which was to become a centre of 
excellence for engineering science, was commissioned.53   Finally, the planners’ aim was 
that by 1990 around 67 percent of the workforce should consist of graduates from either 
higher education or technical college; thus, between 1986 and 1990, admissions to higher 
education and technical colleges were to comprise 22 – 23 percent of the relevant age 
cohort.   In order to cope with this a further 12,765 lecture rooms, seminar rooms, work 
areas were to be created or reconstructed along with 5,181 new accommodation places.54   
 
Problems in Implementation 
 
There were problems in the implementation of many of the above measures, however, in 
that the time frame envisaged for most of the changes was too restricted.  By 1984 the 
Ministry for Energy and Material Economy was already complaining about the slow pace 
of the upgrading of the Fachschulen to Fachhochschulen given the urgent need for more 
graduates in the economy55 and the new integrated institutions were not anticipated to be 
operational until the Five-Year-Plan period 1991 – 1995.56  Moreover, there was simply 
not enough money available in the struggling economy to bring all the plans to fruition.  
The economy was in crisis, partly as a result of the repercussions of the 1979 oil crisis.  
While oil prices returned to normal in much of the world at a relatively early stage, the 
GDR was tied into a five-year agreement with the Soviet Union at vastly inflated oil prices, 
exacerbating the effects of the rapidly escalating sums of money being spent on social 
welfare programmes.  Moreover, Russia’s decision to cut its supplies of subsidised oil had 
a severe impact on one of the GDR’s main sources of hard currency income from its re-
export.57  The underinvestment in the higher education system was apparent in the working 
and living conditions in all of the higher education institutions where there were constant 
complaints of poor maintenance, poor food, heating problems, insufficient teaching rooms 
and living accommodation, a lack of protective clothing and equipment and, particularly in 
the medical Hochschulen, too few technicians.58  The implications of this in terms of the 
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recruitment and retention of teaching staff and students is obvious, while teaching and 
research were necessarily handicapped by the conditions in which they were performed.  
 
Continuing Education 
 
A further measure taken to increase the general level of technical knowledge in the 
workforce involved the expansion of distance learning and the policy of continuous 
training for cadres throughout their working lives.  While the cadres were supposed to 
undertake this for six months in any ten-year period, it often appeared to be honoured more 
in the breach than in the observance.  The courses mostly covered subjects such as 
electrotechnology, microelectronics and “Hardware, Software and Work on the office 
computer” although a significant number were ideological in nature such as Dialectical and 
Historical Materialism, Scientific Socialism and the Socialist Organisation of the 
Workplace.59   Most of these were to take place in the existing institutions of higher 
education.  However, the coordination of supply and demand was somewhat inefficient 
with, for example, only 16 of the 60 courses offered at Ernst-Moritz-Arndt University 
actually running due to lack of numbers, while conversely, 57 courses had to be run at the 
Engineering Hochschule in Wismar instead of the planned 34.60  This level of provision 
appeared to be exceptional however.  There remained constant complaints from industry 
that employees were unable to perform well enough to achieve Plan targets because they 
were neither qualified, nor prepared enough to cope with the new key technologies which 
demanded ever more comprehensive scientific and technical knowledge.  Part of the 
problem seemed to be insufficient provision of further training.  A 1988 survey of 350 
management cadres indicated that 69.8 percent would  be willing to undertake further 
training and a further 13.8 percent would consider it if the opportunity were presented, 
although up to that point, it had not been.61  The Hochschulen, on the other hand, 
complained that the extra teaching burden was compromising the potential for the research 
necessary for technological, and hence economic, progress.62  The implication, then, is that 
the planning system was not working efficiently.  Not only was capacity inadequate for 
demand, the provision which did exist was insufficient to cope with the pace of 
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technological change.  Moreover, the resultant inability of the cadres to work effectively 
with the new technologies ultimately resulted in the reduced efficiency of the workforce 
and lower productivity. 
 
 
Intensification and Rationalisation 
 
The same philosophy which had been applied to industry was also applied to higher 
education.  The intensification and rationalisation of industry had been achieved through 
the vertical integration of firms into fewer productive units called Kombinate (combines).  
This allowed a much greater degree of centralised control which was supposed to ease the 
difficulties inherent in trying to coordinate the supply chain, disruption of which was a 
persistent cause of production bottlenecks.  It was also intended to revitalise industrial 
performance, stimulate technological innovation and increase export performance.  Far 
from doing this, however, the monopolies on production created by the restructure 
militated against incentives to innovate or modernise, and East German goods became 
progressively less competitive on the international market, even in the machine-building 
sector which had traditionally been strong.63   
 
Applied to higher education and research, intensification was defined thus: 
 
By the intensification of the processes of scientific work, we usually mean an 
increase in productivity and effectiveness, i.e. the improvement of the connection 
between the resources of society for the execution of the processes of scientific 
work and their productiveness in the form of scientific results and their 
transformation into scientific, technical, economic and social effectiveness 64 
 
Translated, this meant the achievement of a substantial increase in fundamentally new 
scientific discoveries in the main priority areas of the economy for a relatively much 
smaller outlay.  Consequently, a number of steps were undertaken.  A review of academic 
research projects took place and the planners trimmed 532 months from 58 different 
research projects while scientists were compelled to abandon anything which might be 
considered “hobby” research and were forced into an even narrower concentration on 
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planned foci.65  Applied research projects were to be completed within a mandatory three 
years and basic research within four. 66  Efforts were made to encourage the policy of 
intensification by the implementation of ‘the performance principle’ and “moral and 
material stimulation” through a system of bonus payments instituted in 1978.  For 
example, in 1984 higher education teachers could earn an extra 1,000 – 1,500 marks for 
excellence in the presentation of lectures.  Excellence in leading seminars could earn them 
between 600 and 1,000 marks and the designation of ‘excellent educator’ could lead to a 
similar amount.67  Similar arrangements were in place for the achievement of scientific 
results both in the Hochschulen and the Akademie der Wissenschaften.  However, having 
instituted the system in 1978, the Party had apparently never provided the Hochschulen 
with any extra funding to pay for it with the result that, as a policy it “lost its effectiveness 
over the course of the years”.68   
 
Intensification and rationalisation was also the rationale behind several other developments 
in the Hochschulen.  These included increased collaboration between FDJ student 
collectives, FDJ brigades and the brigades of socialist work in industry, with the aim of 
creating strong links between FDJ seminar groups and work collectives so that academic 
research was even more firmly focused on the needs of the firm.   Another involved 
changing the focus of teaching from a concentration on improving the performance of 
weaker students to the identification and support of the brightest.69  In a 1980 article for 
Die Pädagogik, the Director of the Institute for Theory, History and Organisation of 
Science argued the need to design education and training to recognise the existence of and 
encourage a “greater density” of particularly intelligent youngsters in science and 
production because “Our society cannot afford to neglect a single talent and leave it to 
atrophy”.70  The Hochschulen were mandated to single out particularly gifted youngsters 
who could form a reserve of cadres with the potential to become leading academics or 
scientists.71  These high achievers were encouraged by means of specially designed 
individual study plans, exchange visits to other Hochschulen, spending part of their study 
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time in other socialist countries (usually Russia) for which they received special political-
ideological and language training, as well as by collaborating with Young Researcher 
Collectives in the industrial combines.72  However, the policy, inevitably, was restricted to 
those students who demonstrated sound ideological convictions, thus arguably excluding 
many fine academic brains.  Moreover, the principle of the differentiated treatment of 
students did not correspond to the socialist concept of equality of opportunity and this 
became a significant source of societal dissatisfaction. It was seen as economically 
expedient pragmatism and a betrayal of proletarianism: the reproduction of social 
differences with, coincidentally or otherwise, the social advantage being largely restricted 
to the offspring of an aristocracy of the Party faithful.73   
 
Other methods employed included the institution of performance comparisons 
(Leistungsvergleiche) between the institutions of higher education, over and above the 
existing ‘socialist competition’ in higher education, in the face of “considerable 
reservations on the part of rectors and the directors of the sections, institutes and clinics”.74  
Leistungsvergleiche were based on criteria such as the planned placing of graduates into 
specific branches and areas of the economy; teaching loads; high numbers of graduates or 
those continuing to postgraduate study; the supervisory load of individual professors; the 
punctual completion of doctorates; the number of manuscripts of textbooks, monographs, 
research reports and studies submitted; the assessment of the number of patents and 
inventions per cadre; early or timely achievement of the goals in science and technology 
mandated by the state and numerous others including the more intensive use of machinery 
and instruments.  For example, certificates were awarded to institutions for being 
designated “energiewirtschaftlich vorbildlich” (exemplary in energy saving).75  The idea 
was that these criteria should be a guide to the “consequent enforcement of the socialist 
performance principle” and that best practice (as demonstrated by the competition 
‘winners’) would then be adopted on a mass scale.76   
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Research in Higher Education 
 
Between 1985 and 1987 there was a further substantial increase in state funding for R&D in 
the Hoch- and Fachhochschulen amounting to a little over 21 million marks, consistent with 
massive increases in overall R&D funding.77  Of this, much the biggest proportion was 
spent on research and production in microelectronics (around 3.7 billion marks in the same 
time period).  By contrast, R&D in machine-building received around 1.9 billion marks and 
R&D in chemicals less than 1.6 billion.  The total number of R&D personnel increased 
from 128,785 in 1985 to 131,873 in 1987 and 132,341 in 1989, of which the proportion 
employed in the higher education sector increased from 10 percent to 10.4 and 10.6 percent 
respectively.78  The planners also allocated new research priorities for individual 
institutions.  For example, the Technische Universität Dresden, Technische Hochschule 
Karl-Marx-Stadt and the Technische Hochschule Magdeburg were to become centres for 
training and research into CAD/CAM in the metal processing industry.  Dresden also 
became a centre for the teaching of employment-oriented studies in electrotechnology, 
while research into information technology was to become a focus in the University of 
Rostock, the Technische Hochschule Ilmenau, the Engineering Hochschule at Dresden as 
well as in the universities of Magdeburg and Karl-Marx-Stadt.79 
 
Underinvestment 
 
One of the main problems encountered was that of underinvestment.  Foreign currency for 
the import of expensive research equipment was extremely scarce.  The amount allocated 
fell from around ten million valuta marks80 in 1976 to zero in 1983, where it remained until 
1986 when around seven million valuta marks were again made available.  Over the course 
of the 1980s the Hochschulen received less than 5 percent of the machine tools they 
needed for research and in 1989 only around 12 percent of the foreign currency they 
required to buy research equipment.  Hence, the proportion of Hochschulen which 
estimated their research equipment as of comparable standard to that of other countries fell 
from 55 percent in1979 to ten percent in 1982.81 A report for the Council of Ministers on 
research technology in 1986 intimated that fifteen percent of larger-scale research 
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equipment was more than ten years old, 19 percent more than fifteen years old and 52 
percent of smaller –scale equipment was more than ten or fifteen years old.  Equipment 
imported from socialist countries frequently proved itself unsatisfactory and there were, in 
any case, problems in accessing equipment and expertise from the Soviet Union because of 
their militarily sensitive nature.  Moreover, a trade embargo, which had been imposed on 
the Soviet bloc for strategically important products by COCOM82 tightened even further, 
pushing prices up significantly and resulting in a fall in the import of research equipment 
from the early 1980s to 1990.  A further survey in1990 highlighted the fact that even when 
newly acquired, equipment was technologically at least five years behind that of the 
West.83   
 
Many academic research facilities, such as those of the Universities of Jena and the 
Humboldt were therefore forced to devote a substantial amount of their research capacity 
to the development of scientific instruments for themselves and for other Hochschulen and 
scientific institutions because, as the rhetoric of the Party had it: “Commercial instrument 
technology alone will, in the long term, only lead to middling achievements”.84  Thus, in 
1984 827 instruments of 63 different types were produced: an increase from the 1983 
figures of 267 of 25 types. The corollary to this was, of course, that this work took up time, 
resources and personnel skills which could have been otherwise employed on the research 
into the main economic priorities.85   
 
In 1987 for the first time the contracts negotiated between industry and higher education 
institutions included basic research as part of their common remit in a “new form of 
bilateral exploitation of material and intellectual potential”.86   The main reason, according 
to the authorities, was to promote the rapid development and comprehensive use of the key 
technologies of microelectronics, modern computer technology, computer-aided project 
and production design, flexible manufacturing systems, new processing technologies, new 
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materials and the new biotechnologies.87   Regarding its collaboration with the Friedrich-
Schiller-Universität Jena, the combine ZIMET Jena stated: 
 
Because our socialist DDR can only be further strengthened through intelligent 
thinking and concrete action, we are undertaking further obligations/duties which 
are directed, above all, at additional results in basic research88 
 
However, although the ‘industrial partners’ were supposed to provide the Hochschulen 
with the necessary instruments/machinery to perform the research projects they had 
contracted with them, this proved problematic as firms, once again, appeared to be 
“insufficiently ready to commit themselves to common, long-term strategies – above all to 
basic research” which was of no short-term benefit to the firm.89  The GDR was forced, 
therefore, to rely on developing technology by the “reverse engineering” either of 
technology acquired illegally or semi-legally by Koko (Bereich Kommerzielle 
Koordinierung or Sector for the Coordination of Commerce) at a very high price, or the 
copying of older technology, the components for which were widely available in both East 
and West.  However, the machinery thus produced was inevitably obsolete before it hit the 
market. 90   
 
Scientific Isolation 
 
A further problem lay in the scientific isolation of East Germany from the West.  With 
conference visits strictly confined to trusted party members only, conversation with non-
socialist visitors limited to restricted topics only, and the constant supervision of the Stasi, 
the only access the GDR scientists had to Western science (at least until the signing of the 
agreement on scientific cooperation between the two Germanys in1987) was via permitted 
scientific publications.  Predictably, though, the GDR could not afford to buy as many 
foreign publications as were required.  Photocopies were severely limited because of a 
scarcity of machines, due both to production difficulties and because the authorities feared 
they would foster the spread of subversion.  Additionally, the publication of domestic 
research was hampered by excessive secrecy regarding anything which might be 
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considered industrially or politically sensitive, or because of the purported ideologically 
unsound character of the scientist(s) involved.91  Crucially, though, yet another reason 
appeared to lie in the difficulty of persuading some party officials that there actually was a 
need to achieve international competitiveness in science and technology.92 
 
Hochschulen v. Akademie der Wissenschaften 
 
The performance of research in the Fachhochschulen and Hochschulen was also hampered 
by the Party’s perception of the Akademie der Wissenschaften as the main performer of 
academic research and particularly of basic research, although it also undertook applied 
research which had been contracted by industry or the state.  By 1989 the Academy 
boasted 18,285 persons directly employed in R&D compared to 14,088 in the higher 
education sector.  The Academy also had the power to confer doctorates and arguably 
siphoned off the cream of academic talent in the country as well as the major portion of 
state R&D funding from the state.  The Hochschulen were responsible for the majority of 
industrial research, but unlike the scientists in the Academy were also forced to contend 
with much more rigid organisational structures as well as the time constraints imposed by 
long teaching years, student overcrowding and a high level of administrative tasks.  Thus, 
the research effort in the Hochschulen was considerably handicapped in comparison to that 
in the Academy.  In some cases this led to the perception that the institutions had become 
divorced from the principle of the unity of teaching and research and performed only a 
teaching function.  Bentley argues, however, that while most research on informatics, 
biosciences and in newer, emerging sectors took place in the Academy, most of the 
academic research in classical engineering and 22 percent of that in physics took place 
within the Hochschulen.  Mathematics and the natural sciences were also well represented, 
although medicine and the humanities considerably less so.  The Fachhochschulen focused 
almost exclusively on industrial research projects, but underfunding and high teaching and 
administrative burdens also hindered research efforts there.93 
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Impact of Academic Research on the Economy 
 
Despite the problems outlined above, GDR statistics point to a serious research effort with 
substantial results in terms of patents granted.  The following table demonstrates the 
number of total reported inventions for the years 1985 and 1986: 
 
Table 6.5 
Total reported inventions from GDR academic institutions 
for 1985 and 1986 
   
 1985 1986 
 
    
MHF¹ 1,944  2,021  
AdW² 1,062  1,021  
AdL³    205     231  
 
    
Of which in collaboration with industry/practice 
 
 
    
MHF    830  42.7%    927  45.9% 
AdW    282  26.6%    282  27.6% 
AdL     36  17.6%     38  16.4% 
     
¹Medical Academies, Universities, Hochschulen and Fachschulen 
²Academy of the Sciences 
³Academy of Agricultural Sciences 
     
Source: Ergebnisse der Erfinder- und Neuertätigkeit des Jahres 1986, 
SAPMO, DY 53/1089 
 
 
It is difficult to be certain about the effectiveness of the research effort, however.  Firstly, 
neither the above table, nor the document to which it pertains, contain any details as to the 
nature of the inventions.  Bentley points out, however, that many of these apparent 
inventions were simply minor product or process improvements, or were redevelopments 
of existing Western technology.  Moreover, the numbers were further padded by the 
breaking down of research projects into much smaller individual areas.  Any small 
development in any area or of any component, therefore, would also count as a new 
invention.94  In an address to the rectors of the universities and Hochschulen in 1985, the 
Minister for Technical and Higher Education waxed lyrical about 243 new inventions 
which had earned around 48 million marks for the economy in their first year of use but the 
utilisation rate of most of the new inventions was apparently small: on average, only 28 
percent of the MHF applications, seven percent of the AdW applications and fifteen 
percent of the AdL applications were taken up by the economy.   Of 1,094 patents 
registered to all East German Hochschulen, only 44 included effective new principles, of 
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which only six were of use to the main priorities of the economy.95  Moreover, the 
Statistical Yearbook shows a declining trend in the numbers of patents applied for and 
granted to GDR Hochschulen between 1985 and 1988.96  The official hypothesis was that 
the planning of inventions was not yet sufficiently geared to the thematic foci of the 
economy and to the achievement of concrete goals.97  This could, arguably, have been due 
to the high degree of focus on industrial research in higher education.  However, a further 
report from 1988 stated that only three of a total of 56 patents registered by the Karl-Marx 
University in Leipzig were of practical use to its partners in industry, suggesting that the 
Hochschulen may indeed have been attempting to gear their efforts more towards national 
economic priorities rather than those of local industry.98   
 
An examination of all patents applied for by the GDR in Europe over the period 1979 – 
1988 appears to indicate that the GDR’s strengths lay in paper and printing, textiles, 
machine tools, handling technology, optical instruments, measuring technology and food.  It 
was particularly weak in a number of areas, most significantly electronics, communications 
engineering and information technology: precisely the areas it had targeted for priority 
development.99  In 1985 the GDR Minister for Higher and Technical Education was 
unequivocal in his estimation of the unpreparedness and inability of all research 
establishments to cope with the research and development of a fifth generation of computers 
which was well underway in other countries.100  The directives of the 11th Congress of the 
SED in 1986, therefore, called for the redrafting of all programmes for the general and 
advanced training of engineers, economists, technologists and scientists before 1990 in 
order to remedy this.  It also intensified demands to concentrate academic research on 
microelectronics, robotics and computer and information technology in order to effect the 
introduction of large-scale automation throughout industry which would, in theory, increase 
labour productivity by 400 – 500 percent and reduce the cost of materials by up to 40 
percent.101   
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Overall, Bentley concludes that the GDR was much weaker than West Germany in terms of 
academic research of international standard and, despite its heavy focus on applied, 
industry-oriented research, was considerably weaker in this too.  Moreover, he cites the 
Max-Planck Society’s view that the gap between East and West German science matched, if 
not exceeded the economic gap between the two.  One further reason advanced for the lack 
of technical progress demonstrated by the GDR was the bias in trade concentration on the 
Comecon countries, especially the Soviet Union.  The sure market for products there, 
accompanied by the virtual absence of competition, led to a tendency to adapt to a lower 
level of development.102   
 
A second point which deserves consideration is how the concentration on applied research 
and product development for industry in the Hochschulen, affected the development of 
human capital.  Koeshall has argued that the higher education system in East Germany did 
not predispose its students to develop advanced critical thinking skills because of the 
inherent rigidity of the ideological instruction received and because of the over-narrow 
focus of the specialisms in the scientific and technological disciplines.103   Hence, the sort of   
research which required well informed and wide-ranging critical thought was bound to 
suffer.  As we have seen, however, it would be hard to attribute the GDR’s less than stellar 
contribution to international academic research solely to pedagogical failure.  Moreover, 
because we are considering the contribution of human capital development to economic 
growth, it would be possible to make a case that the contribution made by higher education 
research to product and process development in local industry could have proved at least as 
beneficial to the economy as the government’s insistence on developing high technology 
sectors which, for so many reasons, it was unsuited and ill-equipped to develop.  Macrakis 
makes the point, however, that the policy of using reverse engineering technology to try and 
compete in the high technology sector was not only demoralising to East German scientists, 
it also inhibited creativity and ultimately promoted laziness in the pursuit of innovation.104  
The same could also be said of a system which forced a large proportion of the teaching and 
research effort of the Hochschulen to focus so narrowly on the short-term (and arguably 
also short-sighted) requirements of local industry instead of developing wider, longer-term 
and more theoretical perspectives.  
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The Endgame 
 
The Economy 
 
The high levels of investment in high technology inevitably led to the neglect of less 
technologically sophisticated areas within the economy in which it could have been more 
competitive.105  In 1988 the UN Economic Bulletin highlighted the downturn in exports to 
the West of machinery, consumer goods and, most particularly chemicals, in which East 
Germany had hitherto enjoyed a competitive advantage.106  In many cases, exports to the 
West were sold at prices well below cost simply to ensure a supply of hard currency with 
which to service a national debt which was spiralling completely out of control.107  Despite 
the enormous levels of investment in them, the new technologies represented only a very 
small proportion of the economy and even had they reached the ambitious growth targets 
laid down in the 1986 directives, they could not have been expected to have a major effect 
on other sectors of the economy in the short term.108  Faced with the wholly unachievable 
necessity of running an estimated DM 6.5 billion trade surplus with the West every year in 
order to service its debt, Finance Minister Schürer advocated a radical cutback of consumer 
price subsidy as the only means of rectifying the situation.  The Central Committee, 
however, threw out the plan on the grounds of its irreconcilability with socialist economic 
and social policy.109  Shortages of even the most basic consumer goods within the GDR 
worsened despite imports of Western capital goods more than doubling between 1985 and 
1988 110 and open discontent over economic conditions was becoming more and more 
apparent while demands for greater liberalisation within society increased.   
 
Social and Academic Unrest 
 
Levels of disaffection also became increasingly apparent throughout the higher education 
sector, both among staff and students, and the situation deteriorated rapidly towards the 
end of the decade.  For example, meetings of the academic trade union were hijacked by 
staff and students to discuss why the country was so much in debt to the FRG; what, if 
there was no acid rain in East Germany, was affecting the forests so badly; the high fat 
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content of sausage products; the poor quality and unfashionable design of shoes, textiles 
and other consumer goods; the shortages of basic medicines; and the delays in being called 
for medical tests and procedures.  Academics at another Hochschule asserted that it would 
be more honest if the media, without denying the successes of the GDR, also 
acknowledged the country’s problems.111   Organisations within the Hochschulen, such as 
the Jugendkommission of the academic trade union were having increasing difficulty in 
recruiting students to act as functionaries while others reported that members “were not 
taking their positions seriously”.112  The general impression obtained from the primary 
sources is that the authorities were increasingly disconcerted by events.  In the absence of 
any other obvious solution, the state’s response was an attempt to crack the ideological 
whip even harder.  Open dissidence was severely punished and motivational events 
arranged to debate subjects such as “the optimal development of the personality in the 
educational process taking particularly into account the demands of the scientific and 
technological revolution“.113  Trade union influence was brought to bear on higher 
education teachers to remind them of their “great responsibility”, their “creative 
relationship” with students and the need for “the achievement of a creative atmosphere … 
in order to deal with the new demands and their associated ideological problems”.114   
 
As general social dissidence increased, however, in the absence of Soviet willingness to 
provide military support as in the past, it was impossible to enforce what Günter Mittag 
described as “the primacy of the social over the majority of individual interests”.115  In the 
end, the opening of the borders to the West in Hungary sealed the fate of the GDR, 
precipitating the fall of the Berlin Wall and reunification with West Germany. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The effect of changes in higher education on economic growth is obviously impossible to 
quantify precisely.  There are, nevertheless, a number of points which can be made.  
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Firstly, its contribution to economic growth was considered important enough that a great 
deal of governmental time, effort and rhetoric was devoted to it.  Secondly, higher 
education institutions were responsible for the training of the vast majority of those 
employed in the larger research effort as well as of virtually all the leading cadres in the 
people’s economy.  Thus, the restrictions on student numbers because of an apparent lack 
of appropriate employment most certainly had an disadvantageous effect on the pool of 
academic research talent available to the economy and of technicians and the innovative 
potential available to industry, as well as fomenting a great deal of social discontent among 
the young because of their reduced opportunities.  Moreover, even though the policy was 
reversed in 1976 in order to produce more graduates in the areas of the key technologies, 
student numbers maintained an overall downward trend thereafter, though this is partly 
explained by demographic developments.   
 
Thirdly, the quality of the teaching was obviously as critically important to the economy as 
were the subject areas prioritised by the planners.  (By 1988 the numbers studying the 
technical sciences (41, 700) simply dwarfed any other area of study including economics 
(17,336), medicine (12,954) and mathematics and the natural sciences (8,401)).116  
However, much of the teaching was formulaic and subject specialisms were constantly 
narrowed involving a risk of rapid technical obsolescence.  The virtual exclusion from 
much of the published scientific work of western scientists because of the risk of 
ideological subversion was exacerbated by restricted access to much of the scientific 
material published in the GDR, especially in priority areas such as microelectronics.   
Moreover, the GDR’s tendency to appoint senior teaching and research personnel on the 
basis of political reliability rather than scientific ability does not necessarily inspire 
confidence in their intellectual achievements or that the results in terms of effective 
education were optimal. 
 
It would be wrong, however, to dismiss the humanities as irrelevant to GDR higher 
education.  As the files of the Kulturbund (Cultural Association) and the Institut für 
Marxismus Leninismus make very clear, the GDR was also anxious to establish a presence 
as a cultured and civilised country albeit within the fairly narrow parameters of the East 
German vision of socialism.  There was, for example, much emphasis on the better 
integration of ‘suitable’ art, classical and folk music, dance and literature into the 
Hochschulen as an essential factor in the development of class-consciousness, and the need 
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to utilise the potential of higher education institutions for the development of the 
intellectual and cultural life of the whole country.117  Moreover, a thorough education in 
the history of socialism and philosophy in the form of Marxism-Leninism was considered 
critical for the full development of the socialist personality. However, the humanities were 
never allowed to assume the prominence which they did in West Germany and the primary 
function of the Hochschulen (and of the good socialist personalities created there) was seen 
as being of service to the economy. 
 
Fourthly, although basic research was initially promoted more strongly in the Hochschulen 
following Honecker’s accession to power, this position was largely reversed as economic 
necessity dictated the need for industry to take responsibility for the majority of the 
financing of research in the Hochschulen.  Thus, the facilities in the Hochschulen were 
once again put to use in the fulfilment of the combines’ production targets.  It was not until 
the late 1980s that real emphasis began to be put upon the sort of basic research which 
might lead to technological breakthrough, and even then this was hampered by the 
unwillingness of the ‘industrial partners’ to fund it when the perspectives were so long 
term and the benefit to the individual firm was uncertain.  Moreover, because of the 
increasing impoverishment of the country, the government was forced to severely restrict 
the amount of foreign currency given to higher education institutions to purchase necessary 
research equipment from the West.  This, combined with the ‘intensified use’ use of 
outmoded, existing equipment well beyond its intended service life meant that research in 
the higher education sector was operating under an almost insurmountable disadvantage 
and was unable to achieve the sort of results dictated by the planners.  That said, higher 
education’s contribution to the GDR research effort was smaller than that of the Akademie 
der Wissenschaften; however, similar strictures affected all research institutions in the 
GDR. 
 
GDR Hochschulen were not, then, the bastions of learning dedicated to producing the best 
from each individual student and researcher portrayed in the literature of the SED.  Rather 
they were ideologically hamstrung, cash-strapped institutions with an overburdened 
teaching body, too narrowly focused on a few key and ultimately unachievable 
technologies and on the practical problems of individual industrial and agricultural 
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collectives.  They were also subject to violent swings in educational policy.  The state, 
therefore, failed to make optimal use of higher education and compromised its potential 
contribution to the economy.  Nevertheless, as a number of commentators have pointed 
out, GDR engineers were well trained; GDR academics produced a number internationally 
well-regarded textbooks and publications; and the research conducted in the Hochschulen 
was regarded far more highly by international observers than the GDR’s industrial R&D, 
even if ultimately regarded by the GDR itself as “mediocre” on the international scale.118  
The GDR’s lack of economic success was far more a result of the political, economic and 
cultural rigidities of the socialist system as practised in East Germany.  The decisions of 
the planners were not necessarily based on economic criteria and poor planning decisions 
led to an overwhelming emphasis on high technology sectors where there was little chance 
of the GDR ever becoming competitive, thus neglecting the lower-tech industries where it 
might have stood some chance.  Lack of competition in the industrial field gave no impetus 
to competitive, innovative activity resulting in low productivity, inefficiency and the 
manufacture of products which became increasingly unsaleable on the international 
market.  Moreover, tradition, labour law, class and gender bias prevented the absorption of 
graduate level personnel into positions in industry where they might have made a 
difference.  The massive outlay on high-tech research programmes only added to the strain 
of an economy already stretched to breaking by the repercussions of the 1979 oil crisis and 
the GDR’s extensive social welfare programmes.   
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusion 
 
The story of this thesis has been in essence about the development of higher levels of 
human capital in two very diverse social and political systems, the means chosen to 
achieve this and their impact on economic growth in both states.  It proceeds from the 
hypothesis that the technological progress theory of economic growth is valid: that 
investment in human capital development will result in increasing returns to scale and thus 
will have economic benefits for a country by enabling increases in productivity and 
growth.  In other words, that long-term economic growth fundamentally depends on the 
ability of human capital development to produce the new ideas and technologies necessary 
for such growth.   
 
The ability of a society to generate its own technological innovation is likely to be 
economically beneficial in several respects: for instance, in terms of being first to market, 
improved productivity and the financial benefits accruing from patent rights.  There are, 
moreover, further benefits related to a country’s international status and political influence.  
There can also be little dispute that a rapidly technologising society requires an 
increasingly well-educated workforce in order to be able to exploit the new technologies 
and reap the economic benefits of doing so.  However, as the literature on human capital 
development theory also makes clear, investment in education of itself is no guarantee of 
economic growth: certain preconditions are necessary.  In the academic sphere, these 
include the necessity of expanding the areas most relevant to the development of science 
and technology; a flexible infrastructure open to new ideas and economic development; 
competition between individual educational institutions in order to stimulate a more 
efficient absorption of technological advances into the curriculum, improve teaching and 
accelerate research efforts; and continued investment in both physical and human capital.   
Also critical in terms of turning the effects of increased human capital into economic 
growth are efficient systems of technology transfer; exposure of the economy to the market 
to allow marketplace competition to encourage innovative activity and the adoption of new 
technology within industry; and the existence of effective forms of management both in the 
higher education sphere and in industry in order to optimise the activities of the labour 
forces of both in response to new technology.  In the absence of any of these, increased 
investment in higher education is unlikely to bring all the rewards anticipated of it.  
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The story, however, also concerns the relationship between the cultures and traditions of 
two countries and the development of patterns of education which conformed to the 
cultural and ideological mores of each, as well as to a more economically-driven agenda.  
Thus, the impact of the higher education system on economic growth in East and West 
Germany can be assessed only within the context of the radically different social systems 
of each state.  My thesis has presented a fairly comprehensive overview of the 
development of higher education in both East and West Germany from 1945 – 1990 in 
order to highlight, not only the main changes to both systems, but the extent of their 
general impact on each country in economic terms.  This concluding chapter will return to 
some of the questions posed in the discussions in chapter one of the thesis. I will relate 
these to both countries’ responses to the challenges faced over the period under 
consideration and will also try to draw some tentative conclusions as to the effects of these 
changes on the economic growth of both countries. 
 
 
Questions 
 
The questions raised in the introduction concerned the viability of the re-establishment of 
the pre-Weimar elite system of higher education and its self-imposed alienation from 
economic need on the one hand; and the restructuring of higher education according to 
Marxist-Leninist principles and the enforcement of a strong orientation to perceived 
economic and societal need on the other.  Related to this are the issues of the subjects 
offered and taught at higher level, the number and type of graduates produced by the 
respective systems, the quality and orientation of the teaching and research performed in 
higher education and whether these represented an adequate response to the challenges 
posed by a rapidly developing technological environment.  This, in turn, raises questions 
with respect to the effectiveness of the control and administration of higher education and 
the impact of much larger numbers of graduates on the employment markets.  The 
influence of the divergent institutional structure of both countries is also of particular 
significance, firstly, in terms of how the development of human capital at a higher level 
was/was not encouraged and secondly, of how the action taken was translated into 
technological and industrial performance.  Ultimately, the questions to be answered are 
how the effective the respective systems were in developing systems of higher education 
which which were of benefit to their economic growth and, to some degree, the extent of 
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the part played by different factors such as levels of investment, industrial forms, patterns 
of management and social change. 
 
 
 
Challenges 
 
Germany’s stellar reputation in the training of scientists and in the research and 
development of science and technology during the nineteenth century was, arguably, based 
somewhat less on the basic research performed in the traditional university system than on 
the efforts of the Technische Hochschulen, industrial enterprises and a number of 
independent and state-run research institutes which focused very strongly on applied as 
well as basic research.  The interwar period, however, was characterised firstly by self-
imposed partial isolation from the international scientific community during the duration of 
the Weimar Republic, which Forman has referred to as “the cold war in international 
scientific relations” with the Allies,1 and secondly by the National Socialist policy of 
rigorous isolation from the international scientific community, its focus on the war effort 
and its rejection of swaths of academic disciplines, particularly the more modern 
interdisciplinary fields of science such as biotechnology, geophysics and astronomy.  The 
effects of both on German science and technology were harmful, resulting in the opening 
up of large gaps in more modern technologies between Germany and the USA.   There 
were, therefore, parallels in the situation of West and East Germany in their mutual need to 
reconstruct their economies, adjust to the limits imposed by new borders and develop an 
entirely new type of society from the ashes of a fairly disastrous three decades or so.  The 
answer appeared to lie in scientific and technological progress, key to which was the 
growth and development of higher education.   
 
West Germany 
 
The challenge faced by the federal governments of the FRG, once the initial phase of 
reconstruction was past, was the development of a higher education system which was 
more closely attuned to a rapidly developing technological world.  This, in effect, meant 
the democratising and expansion of the highly elitist system which had existed prior to the 
First World War in order to create sufficient numbers of graduates with the higher level 
qualifications in the technical sciences needed to re-establish West Germany’s presence as 
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a global industrial and economic power.  This, however, had to be achieved within the 
parameters of a federalised political system and system of administrative control restored 
by the Allied Powers to prevent the resurgence of a strong central authority capable of 
initiating another military challenge.  The weakness of the authority of the federal 
government over the individual Länder and the consequent bureaucratic and political 
wrangling posed another serious challenge which was evident in successive attempts to 
achieve change in higher education.  Moreover, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) imposed 
strictures on both federal and Länder governments when it came to controlling the size of 
the expansion of the sector and in directing students’ choice of study discipline.   
 
A change of government in the late 1960s encouraged even wider access to higher 
education during a period when the size of the relevant age cohorts were increasing rapidly 
as a result of West Germany’s post-war baby boom.  The challenges faced in response to 
this lay in the ability to fund such extensive growth and the channelling of student choice 
away from studies which would equip them only for increasingly saturated traditional 
graduate employment markets and towards sectors perceived of as more immediately 
useful to the economy and where the employment prospects were more certain.  As the 
economic climate worsened through the 1970s and 1980s, an increasingly significant 
challenge related to the need to make the Hochschulen more economically relevant in 
terms of curricula and the ability to better utilise the results of the research performed 
there, firstly, by orienting teaching and research projects more closely to the country’s 
main economic priorities and secondly, by improving the transfer of research results to 
industry for applied use and through the undertaking of contracted research and other 
cooperative projects with industry and other research institutions. 
 
East Germany 
 
The major challenge for East Germany initially was the restructuring of the higher 
education system through a considerably more thorough process of denazification than 
took place in the West; rescinding the autonomy of higher education institutions and 
achieving central control; the promotion of democratisation through the creation of the 
Arbeiter/Bauer Fakultäten (worker/peasant faculties created within Hochschulen to 
prepare ‘workers’ and ‘peasants’ for university level education); and the progressive 
sovietisation of the system.  Given that science and technology had great ideological 
significance as major tenets of Marxism-Leninism, the aim was to promote these heavily 
and develop close links to industry in the creation of a Stalinist-type vision of heavy 
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industry and the pursuit of the scientific-technological revolution.  As well as being central 
to the rebuilding process, an equally pressing aim was the legitimisation of East Germany’s 
status in the world and, in effect, the creation of a centrally planned system which could 
successfully compete in a global free market environment, proving the superiority of 
socialism over capitalism.  Thus, the goal was first to increase the general educational level 
of the workforce, thereby prompting innovative development, increasing the general level 
of productivity and generating economic growth through a steady and centrally planned 
increase of higher education along lines pre-determined by the economic planners.  The 
second element was the development of research projects which were both financed by, 
and strongly oriented to industrial and economic development. 
 
Over time, however, the situation changed.  Because of declining economic performance 
and the perception of an excess of graduate engineers for whom there appeared to be 
insufficient appropriate employment, a new leadership restricted access to higher 
education, encouraging instead the training of skilled and semi-skilled workers to work in 
industry producing consumer durables for domestic consumption and for the export 
market.  When this also failed to have the desired economic effect, the subsequent 
promotion of the high-technology sector again demanded the expansion of higher 
education in order to produce the theoretically trained technicians capable of this level of 
work.    
 
As with West Germany, one of the greatest challenges incurred by the GDR was financing 
the development of higher education.  Economic shocks in the form of the fall-out from the 
oil crises of the 1970s, particularly the second in 1979, coupled with the cost of supporting 
an over-ambitious system of social welfare and increasing trade deficits greatly intensified 
the problem of an economy which had been in decline from the end of the 1950s.   
 
Finally, it could reasonably be argued that one of the biggest challenges affecting 
economic growth and higher education expansion in the East was demographic 
development.  In contrast to West Germany’s late onset post-war baby boom, which 
brought its own problems with regard to the provision and funding of higher education, the 
population of East Germany showed an almost continuous steady fall right from the 
country’s inception, despite the building of the Berlin Wall and the stemming of an 
estimated total exodus of around 2,200,000.2  Thus, attempts to increase participation in 
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higher education were bound in the end to reach a finite level as well as affecting the 
provision of lower-skilled labour in the economy.   The answer to compensating for its 
diminishing population levels depended largely on finding a way to increase labour 
productivity by means of a better trained workforce capable of creating innovation in the 
workplace and through the development of new technologies and processes in the research 
laboratories of the institutions of higher education and the Akademie der Wissenschaften. 
 
 
Responses 
 
The ideological divisions between East and West Germany prompted very different 
responses to the restructuring of their respective higher education systems and in both 
cases, a number of issues related to their respective ideologies and institutional structures 
proved to be unhelpful in terms of encouraging economic growth.   
 
Change and Reform in West Germany 
 
In the West, academia’s original aim was the restoration of the societal structure which had 
existed before WWI and its own role as an aristocratic elite therein.  This involved the 
restoration of traditional academic values within the universities and Hochschulen; a return 
to the traditional faculty structure; the unity of teaching and research; enhancing the 
autonomy of the academic senates in running the universities; and the primacy of ‘pure’ 
scholarship and basic research over more practically-oriented technology and its 
application.  Technology was regarded as the function of the Technische Hochschulen, 
although the senates of these regarded their status and the scholarship practised there as the 
equal of that of the traditional universities.   
 
It rapidly became obvious, however, that whether academia liked it or not the world had 
changed and was continuing to change at an increasing rate in terms of the egalitarianism 
of society, science and technology and the economy.  The initial expansion of student 
numbers in the early post-war years was simply the result of demographic pressure and 
social change; however, in the mid-1960s a number of measures were adopted, in the face 
of objections from much of academia, to increase the numbers qualified to study at 
university level.  In part this was done to increase the country’s scientific and economic 
potential and to address the gaps in technology which had developed between West 
Germany and the USA, but it was also a response to the perception of West German higher 
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education as failing in international comparison and to public frustration with restricted 
opportunity in a more democratic age.  Nor can the effects of the counter-culture 
revolution at the end of the 1960s be ignored in this respect.  Many of the demonstrations 
reflected popular dissatisfaction at the elitism inherent in the sytem and the more restricted 
opportunity, in comparison with some other countries, for those of the working class to 
access higher education in the FRG. 
 
The opening up of higher education, however, resulted in a huge expansion of the number 
of students studying the arts and humanities at the expense of more technical subjects.  In 
some respects this was a predictable response in this still highly elitist system, reflecting a 
desire for social mobility by following the traditional higher education path which prepared 
students for employment in traditional graduate markets such as the civil service, even 
some of those who were graduating in technological disciplines.  However, it did little to 
advance the cause of science and technology.  Moreover, industry complained of 
increasing levels of skills obsolescence among those who graduated in the technical and 
engineering sciences, giving rise to supposition that the teaching provided in these 
disciplines was outdated and/or inadequate.  This, in turn, reflected on the capacity of West 
German academia to stay abreast of scientific and technological development and its 
ability to change and adopt the new disciplines required in a modernising economy.   
 
Another significant determinant of the development of the West German higher education 
system was the highly decentralised federal political structure restored in modified form by 
the Allied Powers.  Under this system the administrative control of education was placed 
with the individual Länder governments.  Subsequently, however, political manoeuvring 
between the Länder made any attempt to create a unified national system of education very 
difficult, particularly when combined with the power exercised by the autonomous and 
highly bureaucratic self-governing system of the Hochschulen and the competing aims of a 
number of associated professional bodies also involved in the decision-making process.  
Successive attempts to coordinate a national policy of higher education through the 
creation of various organs such as the Deutscher Ausschuß für Erziehungs- und 
Bildungswesen, the Bildungsrat, the Wissenschaftsrat and the Bund-Länder-Kommission 
für Bildungsplanung und Forschungsförderung frequently seemed to complicate matters 
even further by adding another level of bureaucracy to an already complex, consensual 
decision-making process.  
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Change and Reform in East Germany 
 
In the East, change and reform involved a programme of democratisation, sovietisation and 
planned expansion, most particularly in the engineering and scientific disciplines.  Central 
planning in higher education, however, frequently proved itself inadequate for purpose.  
Among many other issues, the prioritising of Party loyalty over academic ability among 
both staff and students led to a general lowering of academic standards.  This was 
exacerbated by the lengthening of the academic year, the pre-eminence accorded to 
Marxism-Leninism and the ‘social sciences’ in the curriculum and the continual shortage 
of teaching materials, ideologically suitable literature and up-to-date equipment.  Study in 
the technical disciplines became progressively more fragmented, narrower and more 
specialised giving rise to the problem of skills obsolescence by the time of graduation; 
while restrictions on access to both foreign and domestic research papers restricted the 
ability of the Hochschulen to keep abreast of cutting edge developments in science and 
technology.  The policies of the 1960s led to a further huge increase in engineering science 
students unmatched by a similar increase in facilities.  The effects were manifested in 
overcrowded, poorly resourced teaching facilities and excessive teaching and 
administrative burdens.   The attempt at the beginning of the 1970s to restrict entry to 
higher education in line with Honecker’s new economic policies and its subsequent 
reversal led to the resumption of strenuous efforts to increase the number of students 
studying at higher level and course material being upgraded to incorporate much higher 
levels of theoretical instruction than previously.  The process was, however, bedevilled by 
poor planning at central level, a lack of flexibility in the system and underfunding which, 
again, had an impact on the quality of the education provided.    
 
Thus the levels of bureaucracy which accompanied the development of the respective 
systems, while stemming from very different ideological wellsprings, were instrumental in 
hampering their efficient operation.  As indicated above, investment in higher education 
was another problem common to both states and became increasingly so in the worsening 
domestic and international economic climates of the 1970s and 1980s.   
 
Higher Education Financing in West Germany 
 
In the West, the early expansion of higher education was paid for by the strong economic 
growth of the 1950s and early 1960s; however, the expansion which took place in the late 
1960s happened during a period of economic recession and slowing economic growth, that 
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is, at a time when the Land and federal authorities could arguably least afford it.  One of 
the solutions was a much more limited expansion of the teaching body in comparison to 
the student body, leading to much greater teaching and administrative loads with 
consequent negative effects on the quality of the teaching and on the time available for 
research.   Post 1970, increasingly rapid expansion took place against the background of 
two oil crises and a general economic slowdown with consequent detrimental effects on 
the education budgets of the Länder, while the federal contribution to the building of new 
institutions was also cut back.   This, in turn, led to accumulating evidence of declining 
standards of teaching and research and of growing dissatisfaction among students and 
teachers alike.  The rapidity and extent of the expansion left many students unable to study 
their preferred subjects leading to a general and increasing tendency to extend academic 
study over a much longer period of time.  Underfunded, overcrowded, poorly resourced 
teaching and research facilities and an overworked professoriate also worsened the 
prospects for teaching and research.  Attempts to ease the pressure on the Hochschulen and 
promote a more vocational ethos by developing degree programmes in the 
Fachhochschulen and the creation of the integrated ‘comprehensive’ Gesamthochschulen 
were not as successful as desired.  Nevertheless, further reforms which might have eased 
the situation were delayed and frequently thwarted by the attitudes of the academic senates 
and the degree of politicking which took place in the decision-making process.  
 
Higher Education Financing in East Germany 
 
Very much the same results were visible in the East German higher education system. 
Despite the apparently careful planning of student numbers and the much more limited 
freedom of subject choice, poor decision-making by the planners and the rejection of the 
economic tools supplied in a free market situation resulted in the development of a 
progressively more precarious economic situation.  The limited attempts to rectify the 
latter during the 1960s were ultimately rejected by the more hard line faction of the 
Politbüro as being antipathetic to the cause of socialism.  Subsequently, a financially 
ruinous system of social welfare was embarked upon to protect the workers from the 
realities of the worsening financial situation of the country.  The result was, predictably, 
very much less money being available for the maintenance and expansion of physical 
capital in the Hochschulen.  Moreover, the deteriorating salary and working conditions led 
to increasing levels of defection to industry among the teaching staff.  Those who replaced 
them, if they were replaced, were considerably less experienced.  The consequences for 
teaching and research were inevitably harmful. 
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Overeducation in West Germany 
 
One potential outcome of the expansion of higher education services identified in the 
discussion on human capital development was overeducation, or the creation of more 
graduates than is required in the economy.  There are two logical consequences of this, i.e. 
graduate unemployment and graduate underemployment, both arguably representing a 
waste of resources with respect to the individual’s training and for the economy.  If, as 
posited in chapter one, in an elastic labour market employers tend to fill lower-skilled posts 
with more highly qualified labour, there are two likely by-products.  Firstly, qualifications 
inflation will develop and secondly, the more highly skilled workforce which results from 
this has the capacity to be more innovative and the potential to create increased 
productivity and economic growth.  In the West, extremely low unemployment figures in 
all sectors were a consistent feature until the recession following the first oil crisis in 1973.  
Graduate unemployment, therefore, did not present a problem during this period and 
indeed, demand for graduates in the technological disciplines consistently outstripped 
supply.   
 
Underemployment, however, became an increasing feature as more traditional sectors for 
graduate employment began to show signs of saturation because of the much greater 
numbers acquiring degrees in the humanities and social sciences.  After 1973, as 
opportunities in the graduate sectors declined rapidly, the labour market adjustment 
mechanism did indeed lead to the development of qualifications inflation and a number of 
graduates therefore suffered a persistent level of underemployment.  Consistent with the 
theory, although there was a small increase in graduate unemployment levels, the main 
burden of unemployment fell mainly on the lower skilled.  The numbers of unemployed 
graduate engineers, chemists, physicists and mathematicians, however, halved3 because a 
steady supply of graduates in these disciplines was required to provide the technological 
expertise required by industries in growth sectors such as chemicals, plastics, automobiles 
and mechanical engineering.  Consequently, the employment situation finally led to a 
perceptible change in student subject choices away from the humanities and towards the 
engineering sciences during the 1980s. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Statistisches Bundesamt, Wirtschaft und Statistik, issue 1981, p 81 
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Overeducation in East Germany 
 
Theoretically, unemployment did not exist in East Germany and the demographic 
development of the country meant that this was unlikely to ever become a problem.  The 
underemployment of graduates was, however, a chronic problem, particularly after the 
building of the Berlin Wall, with fewer than one third of graduate engineers finding 
employment suitable for their qualification level.  The ineffective use of graduate labour 
for reasons of workplace politics was a serious issue in this regard and one which arguably 
had a serious impact on the innovative potential and productivity levels of industry.  
Additionally, as previously mentioned, at the beginning of the 1970s the increasing skills 
levels in the population had led to considerably fewer workers qualifying for lower skilled 
employment than the Five Year Plan and Honecker’s new economic priorities demanded.   
The ensuing restriction of entry to higher education and rising levels of underemployment 
in all levels of the economy then became a source of considerable social discontent.  
Although the policy was later reversed as the economic focus switched to the high-
technology sector, workplace culture was such that graduates still struggled to find 
employment consistent with their level of qualification. 
 
Research and Development in West Germany 
 
If one accepts that scientific and technological progress are necessary for the promotion of 
economic growth, the interaction between higher education (which directly affects the 
R&D capabilities of a country and its ability to utilise them effectively) and the level and 
type of R&D performed assumes great significance.  In this respect, the two states could 
hardly have been more different.  In the West, the Hochschulen were regarded as the 
“Oberzentren” (principal centres) and the “Fundament der Forschung” (foundation of all 
research) in the FRG,4 thus guaranteeing a high level of autonomy for its researchers.  
Nevertheless, by the middle of the 1960s, a number of organisations, including the federal 
government, were beginning to advocate a more practical approach to scientific and 
technological research in the Hochschulen as well as improved cooperation with extra-
academic research institutions and industry on the practical application of research results.  
By the end of the 1970s, basic research in the Hochschulen was absorbing more than one 
fifth of the whole national R&D budget5 and economic stringency led to considerably more 
                                                 
4
 Uwe Schimank, Hochschulforschung im Schatten der Lehre, (Frankfurt, Campus Verlag, 1995), p 18 
5
 ‘Bericht der Bund-Länder Kommission für Bildungsplanung und Forschungsförderung der 
Grundlagenforschung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, 29.10.81, Bundestag Drucksache 9/962, p 5 
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governmental emphasis being laid on improving research planning in the Hochschulen to 
conform to the needs of the economy.   
 
This is not to deny that a good deal of fine scholarship was emerging from West German 
Hochschulen.  There were, for example, 22 West German Nobel Prize winners between 
1950 and 1989, virtually all of whom won for developments in chemistry, physics and 
medicine, with the majority of the winners employed in, or working in collaboration with 
Hochschulen.6  Moreover, basic research, which opens up radically new areas for 
development, is essential for progress in all fields of science and technology.  However, 
the ethos in the Hochschulen was not conducive to the translation of basic research into 
applied development.  Measures were therefore taken to encourage the adoption of 
different forms of interdisciplinary and cooperative research and improve the levels of 
technology transfer from the laboratories of the Hochschulen, in order to bridge the gap 
between basic research and its applied development.  Parallels between the West and East 
German systems became very apparent; for example, in the development of competition 
between Hochschulen; the creation of individual institutional profiles for teaching and 
special research foci (Schwerpunkte) designed to foster excellence in defined subject areas; 
the strengthening of connections to the immediate geographical area of the individual 
institutions; and the improvement of research planning, all of which had been adopted in 
the East in the late 1960s. 
 
Technology transfer from the other organs of research in West Germany was much less of 
a problem, thus allowing technological advance to proceed, albeit along paths dictated by 
the particular nature of the research structure in the FRG.  The best performing sectors of 
the economy in terms of productivity, economic and export growth were the mechanical 
and electrical engineering sectors, electrotechnology and the motor vehicle, chemical and 
machine-building industries.  The vast majority of the research involved in developing 
these industries, however, was applied research frequently undertaken privately within the 
industries themselves where returns to product improvements, protected by patent, 
provided strong market incentives to keep expanding research and development initiatives.   
Nevertheless, such was the pressure for constant technological advance that cooperation 
with academic institutions was seen as a means of relieving the pressure on the industrial 
engineers as well as improving access to the basic research underpinning technological 
development.  Moreover, because the Hochschulen were the training ground for all 
                                                 
6
 Laureates listed as born and working in West Germany by the Nobel Prize committee on its website 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes (accessed 25.8.2009) 
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researchers, cooperation with academia allowed industries to target the most talented at 
source.   
 
Research and Development in East Germany 
 
In the East, by contrast, the removal of the vast majority of basic research from the 
Hochschulen to the Akademie der Wissenschaften, while detrimental to the Hochschulen in 
many respects, arguably should have allowed them to concentrate more effectively on 
research with direct applicability to the needs of the economy.  Crucially, they were 
required to develop close financial links with industry in order to perform research in the 
field of production of local enterprise, undertaking contract research for individual firms.  
However, the more immediately applicable short-term fixes demanded by industry did not 
conform to government demands on the Hochschulen for the longer-term development of 
the type of technological progress intended to establish East Germany’s global scientific 
and technological position.  This was indicative of the inability of the central planning 
system to coordinate the conception and execution of policy.  Moreover, the inefficiencies 
of the central planning system, aggravated by a lack of technical knowledge among the 
planners, led to the wasting of human, physical and financial resources on irrelevant and 
frequently useless research projects, while its failure to effectively disseminate research 
results to the relevant bodies for implementation also militated against the system’s 
success.  The collectives were in any case opposed to introducing innovation which might 
temporarily slow productivity and imperil the payment of bonuses on the achievement of 
monthly and yearly Plan targets.   
 
What small leeway the Hochschulen had in terms of selecting research topics outwith the 
Plans was severely constrained by financial considerations.   Moreover, as the economic 
situation worsened, industry again became increasingly responsible for the funding of 
research in the Hochschulen, thus effectively reducing a considerable proportion of the 
research efforts of the Hochschulen to little more than that of a service function for 
industry.  Although for the first time the research contracts between higher education and 
industry were legally required to include a component of basic research in order to promote 
more wide-ranging technological advance, industry was increasingly reluctant to fund this.  
Moreover, as Bentley points out, the term ‘basic research’ in East Germany was used to 
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cover a large amount of applied and product-oriented research.7  State funding was 
concentrated on high-technology sectors, which for many reasons including lack of 
resources, embargos on necessary research equipment and lack of cooperation from the 
Soviet Union, the GDR was unable to develop adequately.  This, then, also meant diverting 
funding away from lower-technology areas which might have been more effective in 
creating growth.  The reverse or ‘copy’ engineering programme using smuggled Western 
technology which resulted ensured that the GDR was unable to keep pace with 
international standards in the industry. 
 
 
Performance 
 
The conclusion to be drawn from the above, then, is that while the expansion of the higher 
education systems of both countries without question increased the skills levels in the 
population, the beneficial effects of this on economic growth were compromised by the 
less than optimal conditions in which the mechanism was operating.  West German higher 
education was hampered by inflexible and over-bureaucratic governance in the form of the 
academic senates, as well as the difficulties, created by its strongly federal political system, 
of reconciling the differing priorities of the disparate governing authorities, academia, 
related bodies with input into the educational system and the aspirations of the citizens.  
This system not only delayed or prevented decisions on structural and curricular changes 
but was also responsible for hiatuses in funding, leading to the sort of problems outlined in 
previous chapters.  While the human capital of the population undoubtedly expanded 
significantly, a combination of tradition, culture, counter-cultural revolution and the 
constitution meant that human capital was raised in areas not necessarily of benefit to the 
advance of science and technology which were perceived as necessary for economic 
growth.  Nor was competition between academic institutions a feature of the system until 
later in the 1980s.   
 
However, economic growth proceeded.  It is, therefore, tempting to assume that federal 
government planners may have been thinking too narrowly and were wrong in their 
assumption that as many engineers and scientists were required to ensure economic growth 
as thought.  A cultured, civilised country does, after all, still require artists, philosophers, 
linguists and historians, although labour market statistics would suggest that the numbers 
                                                 
7
 Raymond Bentley, Research and Technology in the Former German Democratic Republic, (Boulder, Col., 
Westview Press, 1992), pp 84 – 85  
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of humanities graduates produced were excessive and that technically trained graduates 
found employment far more easily.  However, it is also possible to posit that the planners 
were aware of the economic advantages accruing to societies able to generate their own 
technological innovation outlined at the start of this chapter.  They were also well aware 
that most of the major scientific and technological breakthroughs which precipitated 
progress and economic growth were emanating from other countries, albeit the FRG 
proved proficient in absorbing them to create innovation in its own manufactures and 
services.  Moreover, there is another argument to be made that the cost of funding the 
expansion of higher education would be offset by the economic benefits to be gained from 
the growth generated by a greater supply of engineers and scientists.   
 
A further reason for West Germany’s economic success, however, was arguably due to 
exposure to extensive domestic and international marketplace competition in the form of 
the European Economic Community (which later became the European Union).   This 
provided a much more open and rigorous form of competition than much of that which 
existed within West Germany, where cartelisation and capital concentration remained 
dominant in many areas of commercial life, restricting the free operation of the domestic 
marketplace.8   The intensity of intra-European competition, then, arguably mitigated the 
worst effects of West Germany’s corporate culture and prompted the growth of networks 
of small- and medium-sized enterprises which were more flexible in their response to 
market stimuli.  Intra-European competition was also at least part of the reason for the 
constant urging of federal government towards greater technological progress.  It is, 
however, also likely that much of the sort of research on which West German economic 
growth was dependent did not emanate directly from the institutions of higher education.  
Many of the larger firms, in response to competitive pressure and what they saw as the 
intransigence of higher education, were financing their own research and development 
laboratories.  Moreover, they were taking reponsibility for the further training and 
upgrading of the skills of their workforces in-house, thus increasing the levels of human 
capital, efficiency and productivity within the firm.   This resonates very clearly with the 
features of the social market economy outlined in chapter one, while the strong emphasis 
on the coordination of employer/labour interests ensured the development of mutual 
respect, stable relationships and a low level of workplace conflict, encouraging further 
                                                 
8
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European Studies, University of California and Berkeley, January 1999, 
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investment in the firm and in training, research and development.  On the negative side, it 
is likely that the strength of the labour laws, a concomitant of the social market economy, 
were responsible for the reluctance of many firms to hire large numbers of the graduates 
emanating from the system as well as for their inability to rapidly decrease the size of their 
workforces during an economic downturn, thus exacerbating their financial situation. 
 
In East Germany, the level of bureaucracy inherent in the socialist system of government 
and the focus on central planning ultimately created a wholly unwieldy, rigid and 
inefficient system of government.  Some very poor planning decisions, the inflexibility 
inherent in the system and the refusal to allow the economy to respond to market signals 
either domestically or internationally, led to a persistently under-performing economy and 
a vicious circle of underinvestment in industry.  Successive attempts to centralise industrial 
production even more intensively in the form of the Kombinate, instead of increasing 
efficiency, led to even lower levels of competition and hence of innovation, productivity 
and efficiency on the domestic market.  On the international market, rather than 
encouraging competitive behaviour in the manner of the European Economic Community, 
East Germany’s membership of Comecon ensured it a ready market for whatever it 
produced, thus eliminating any pressure to innovate, economise and improve.  The 
production of East German goods, therefore, became increasingly expensive while many 
were unsaleable in developed Western markets, thus cutting off a major source of the 
foreign currency needed to acquire advanced technology and to service the country’s 
growing debt levels.   
 
The vicious circle extended to higher education where persistent underinvestment had 
knock-on effects for the economy with regard to the ability to foster innovative activity and 
advance the level of technology available to industry.  This, in turn, meant that less money 
was available for investment in higher education.  Hence, despite a proportionately much 
larger increase of students in the disciplines necessary for the advance of science and 
technology than in West Germany, continuing underinvestment and a number of rapid 
policy reversals, both in higher education and economic focus, created a particularly 
unfavourable climate for economic growth stemming from an increase in human capital.   
The socialist guiding principle of central planning proved itself inflexible and inefficient, 
neither able to promote the development of the scientific research needed for the creation 
of new technology, nor to enforce its adoption by industry.  Higher education’s financial 
reliance on local industry and relative isolation from Western science and technology 
further hampered the sort of research which might have met the regime’s ambitions for the 
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fulfilment of its economic priorities.  Nor was the ideological foundation of the regime 
hospitable to another advantage of a well-trained workforce, namely the attraction of 
foreign investment.  Moreover, the removal of industry from market influences in the form 
of profit incentives, price signals and marketplace competition considerably hindered the 
potential for innovation and the improvement of efficiency and productivity, while 
workplace politics frequently prevented the effective absorption of the highly qualified 
graduates into industry and thus their ability to innovate within the workplace and to 
influence productivity.   
 
It would be wrong, however, to dismiss all East German academics as inferior to those in 
the West and as career-oriented political appointees, particularly following the Third 
Higher Education Reform of 1968.  There is, however, evidence to support a resurgence, if 
not a continuation, of the tradition of academic scholarship in the GDR.  After the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, academics from the Akademie der Wissenschaften put forward a plan for 
the restructuring of higher education so comprehensive and detailed that it must have been 
many months, if not years in the drafting.  Amongst other things, it highlighted intellectual 
freedom and international scientific cooperation in teaching and research as crucial to 
academic progress and economic growth.9   
 
Finally, then, while it might be tempting to downgrade the influence of higher education on 
economic growth in the context of this study, it should be remembered that the institutions 
of higher education were responsible for the training of all those who went on to perform 
the sort of higher-level research which increased the level of science and technology in 
both countries wherever it was performed and whatever form it took.  Moreover, while it is 
arguable that economic growth in both countries was dependent very much more on the 
development of applied research and its subsequent incremental development, basic 
research with its longer-term perspectives and broader contexts provides the foundation of 
virtually all major scientific and technological advances.  Basic research was very much 
more a feature of the laboratories of West German Hochschulen of course, but it also 
existed to some extent in those of the East, albeit disadvantaged by the circumstances 
outlined above.  Finally, higher education also promoted a general increase in the general 
level of human capital in the workplace and produced the graduates who went on to 
occupy positions in areas such as management and the service industries, which were also 
crucial to the smooth functioning of an economy, especially in the light of the continuing 
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shift from secondary to tertiary economic sector activities.  Ultimately, I would argue that 
the case for human capital development at a higher level as a promoter of economic growth 
is proven, but that in the case of both Germanys, there were a considerable number of 
factors preventing the mechanism from functioning as effectively as it could have and 
which, in the case of the GDR, caused its collapse.   
 
 
Avenues for Future Research  
 
This study has attempted to perform an analysis of the development of higher education in 
two countries closely related by tradition but fundamentally opposed politically and 
ideologically, although both were convinced that increasing the level of human capital 
development at the higher level was critical for reconstruction, economic growth and an 
increase in global political influence.  With this in mind, a number of issues suggest 
themselves as fruitful areas for future study.  Among these is the question of technology 
transfer from the institutions of higher education which appeared to present particular 
problems for West Germany, but also affected the East.  The opportunity provided by the 
archival sources to research and compare a number of case studies would be of particular 
interest in this respect.  A further issue which invites further research is inevitably that of 
the funding of higher education research in both East and West Germany; the possible 
distortions to the unity of research and teaching caused through the introduction of funding 
by agencies outwith the academic sphere and the potential for impeding the effectiveness 
of human capital development as an economic tool.  Finally, the overwhelming conclusion 
of the vast majority of literature on human capital development is that much more, 
particularly country-specific, research is needed in order to explore the interactions 
between different institutional systems and the promotion of higher education in the 
creation of growth. 
 
 
Contribution to Historiography 
 
The significance of my thesis to the historiography of higher education lies firstly in its 
emphasis on the direct comparison of education in the two states at higher level; secondly 
on its primary emphasis on scientific and technological education and the role of these in 
furthering economic growth by creating technological advance; and thirdly, in its focus on 
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the interconnections between the higher education sector, labour markets and economic 
growth.  In so doing, the thesis informs and develops current debate concerning the 
structure of post-compulsory education, higher education planning and lifelong learning in 
developed countries generally.  More specifically, it contributes to the debate regarding the 
decline of particularly the East German, but also of other centrally-planned economies as 
well as that of their short to medium-term economic futures.  Moreover, it is positioned 
within the wider context of the theoretical debate of the contribution of human capital 
formation to economic growth, addressing by implication the human capital development 
needs of countries in transition and in the developing world for successful economic 
growth. 
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